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The 1990s have witnessed some important shifts in the underlying growth 
performances of the EU and US economies, with a significant gap opening up in 
terms of GDP, and more importantly, GDP per capita, growth rates. From a situation 
over the period 1980-1995 when EU and US living standards were growing at 
roughly an equivalent rate, the second half of the 1990s has seen the emergence of a 
significant growth gap in favour of the US. These EU-US differences are mirrored at 
the EU Member State level, with simple measures of dispersion indicating that 
individual country divergences relative to the average EU performance have grown 
by close to 50 per cent in the 1990s compared with the 1980s. These extra- and intra-
EU divergences in economic fortunes have been the subject of intense research efforts 
in recent years,
1 with policy makers keen to decipher the reasons for their own 




The present study will contribute to this ongoing debate regarding the sources of 
growth in general, with specific attention being devoted to productivity determinants 
given their importance in shaping medium to long run changes in living standards. 
Any analysis of growth however must be seen as an ongoing process, with economies 
in a constant process of “creative destruction” and with the emerging structural 
patterns difficult to disentangle from cyclical influences and policy adjustment lags. 
Consequently, while the main sources of growth over long periods of time are easily 
established, less success is possible in explaining more recent breaks in trends and in 
assessing whether these breaks are durable or not.
3 While the evidence of a break in 
the US is becoming more compelling, for the EU, short-run transitional factors 
severely complicates an assessment at this point in time. 
 
While conscious of such uncertainties the present study examines the empirical 
evidence to ascertain whether some tentative conclusions can be drawn regarding 
recent trends and future prospects in terms of productivity. The study is particularly 
interested in examining the evidence as to whether a genuine break has occurred in 
the 1990s in the post World War II pattern of EU convergence to US living standards, 
with the previous rapid progress of the 1960s and 1970s, and the stabilisation of the 
1980s, now giving way to a further pulling ahead by the US over the second half of 
the 1990s. A number of key questions are addressed, firstly, as mentioned above, 
whether this break in the convergence pattern is likely to be permanent or transitory; 
secondly, in terms of explaining recent EU and US trends in investment and technical 
progress, what was the role played by information and communication technologies 
                                                 
1  See, amongst others, Scarpetta et al (2000); Bassanini et al (2002); Colecchia and Schreyer (2002); and OECD 
(2003). 
2  See, for example, Temple (1999) and Ahn and Hemmings (2000) for surveys of the literature on economic 
growth. 
3  As a general point, readers should be mindful that international comparisons of growth performances are 
particularly problematic at the present time due to a range of differences in the measurement techniques used in 
the national accounts of the respective countries. These differences include, for example, the use or non-use of 
new methodologies for constructing price deflators for the output of fast growing, high technology, industries 
or for measuring the output of a number of the service sectors. Some of these measurement issues have been 
overcome in the industry datasets used in section 2 of this paper. 
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(ICT)
4 and by increases in the employment content of growth; and finally whether 
any policy lessons need to be learnt by EU, and especially continental EU, Member 
States, from the growth pattern which has emerged in the US and a small number of 
individual EU countries. 
 
In terms of content, following the present introduction, Sections 1 and 2 present the 
broad stylized facts concerning growth and productivity trends at the economy-wide 
and industry levels for the US and the 15 EU Member States.  
•  Section  1, drawing on official data sources and using mainly a growth 
accounting approach, concludes that the EU is now, for the first time in 
decades, on a trend productivity growth path which is lower than that of the 
US. This recent EU performance reflects a deterioration in terms of both 
investment and innovation and marks a serious downgrading relative to the 
situation in the early 1990s when annual EU labour productivity growth was 
averaging nearly 2 ½ per cent, compared with 1 per cent for the US. Since then 
EU labour productivity growth has declined by a full 1 % point to 1½ per cent, 
compared with an acceleration of ¾ of a % point in the US to 1¾ per cent. 
•  Section  2, exploiting two new, internationally comparable, industry datasets 
based on the OECD’s STAN database, goes on to pinpoint the small number of 
industries which have been driving the EU-US productivity differentials over 
recent decades and in particular over the second half of the 1990s.
5 In terms of 
individual countries, it also highlights the negative contributions from a 
number of the larger Member States, most notably Italy, in driving the overall 
deterioration in the EU’s performance. An interesting feature of this dataset is 
that, for all countries, it uses US hedonic deflators for deflating the relevant 
ICT industries and classifies computer software as investment expenditure (and 
not as a business expense which is the convention in a large number of EU 
countries). It therefore provides a more accurate, internationally comparable, 
estimate of the contribution of ICT to the growth performances of the 
respective countries. In this way it is possible to assess whether the decline in 
EU labour productivity growth could be due, as some commentators have 
suggested,
6 to mismeasurement of the growth impact of ICT.
7 Unfortunately, 
despite pointing to a positive contribution to growth from ICT in the EU, the 
industry level analysis still confirms the conclusion from the economy-wide 
analysis in Section  1, namely that the EU as a whole has experienced a 
significant decline in its trend productivity growth rate over the second half of 
the 1990s. The positive contribution of ICT to EU productivity growth over 
this period in time, both in terms of capital deepening and TFP growth, was 
                                                 
4  See, for example, Gordon (2000); Oliner and Sichel (2000); Council of Economic Advisors (2000); Pilat and 
Lee (2001); Baily and Lawrence (2001); and Daveri (2002). 
5 The data used in section 2 draws heavily on a study prepared for the Enterprise Directorate-General by M. 
O'Mahony and B. van Ark (2003): "EU Productivity and Competitiveness: An Industry Perspective - Can 
Europe Resume the Catching-up Process?". 
6 For example, Jorgenson (2003) asserts that ICT has made a much larger contribution to growth in the non-US   
G7 countries than that suggested by official statistics. In his recent paper, “Information Technology and the G7 
economies”, he compares the growth performances of the G7 economies, on the basis of an internationally 
comparable dataset (similar to the one used in section 2) which focusses on the impact of investment in IT 
equipment and software. See also the “Economist” article “Computing the gains”, of 25 October 2003, which 
summarises the Jorgenson paper.  
7 Regarding price measurement issues for ICT goods, see Colecchia and Schreyer (2002), and Pilat and Lee 
(2001). 
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firstly on a lower scale than that experienced in the US and secondly, all the 
EU gains on the ICT side were more than offset by a sharp deterioration in the 
performance of the non-ICT part of the EU economy, which it must be stressed 
still accounts for around 70 per cent of EU output. In contrast the non-ICT part 
of the US economy, whilst not showing the spectacular gains experienced on 
the ICT side, has nevertheless steadily improved its productivity performance 
over the second half of the 1990s (part of which may be linked to positive 
spillover effects from the heavy ICT investments which have taken place in 
those industries).  
Section 3 of the paper tries to draw some policy lessons from the aggregate and 
industry analyses. In particular it addresses two key questions, firstly, why the EU as 
a whole has not gained as much as the US in terms of ICT; and secondly, why the 
non-ICT part of the US economy has been doing significantly better than the 
equivalent part of the EU economy in terms of both investment and innovation trends. 
The section tries to answer these questions by assessing the relative merits of the 
major hypotheses for explaining productivity growth over time
8– i.e. the role played 
by the regulatory environment (product, labour and financial markets)
9; by the degree 
of openness of economies
10; by the efficiency of knowledge production (R&D and 
education)
11; by the determinants of physical investment levels
12; and finally by 
demographics.
13 An analytical framework is presented which combines standard 
growth regressions with recent developments in endogenous growth theory.  
The final section of the paper demonstrates the usefulness of the analytical framework 
by presenting a number of historical analyses for the 1990’s and a “Lisbon Strategy” 
simulation for the EU and the US for the period up to 2010.  Regarding the historical 
period, an assessment is made of issues such as whether the second half of the 1990s 
was exceptional in terms of ICT technologies (with regard to both industry 
specialisation and the speed of diffusion) and whether the slowdown in EU 
productivity growth over this period simply reflected the temporary negative effects 
of a higher employment content of growth. The “Lisbon” simulation examines the 
impact on EU growth of implementing those policy reforms which have been 
established by the regression analysis (covering a total of 21 OECD countries) as 
being vital for sustaining labour productivity growth in the long run. In terms of 
policy conclusions, this last section stresses that international labour productivity 
differentials to a large extent reflect differences in the basic determinants affecting 
physical capital formation (especially the regulatory environment and the structure of 
financial markets) and the creation of knowledge (where R&D expenditures are 
closely linked with educational attainment levels, the openness of economies and 
market size considerations).  
 
                                                 
8  See Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and Mendoza et al (1997). 
9  See Soskice (1997), Nickell et al. (1997), Eichengreen and Iversen (1999), Nickell and Layard (1999), Nicoletti 
et al (2001), Scarpetta and Tressel (2002), Scarpetta et al (2002), and IMF (2003). 
10 See Sachs and Warner (1997), Alesina et al (1997), Frankel and Romer (1999), and Ben-David and Kimhi 
(2000). 
11 See Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Coe and Helpman (1995), and Aghion and 
Howitt (1998). 
12 See Arrow (1962), Romer (1986), De Long and Summers (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and Levine 
(1997). 
13 See EU Review (2002) and Jones (2002). 
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EU and US Labour Productivity Developments
OUTLINE OF STUDY
Basic Trends at the Total
Economy Level
(SECTION 1)








SECTION 1 : BASIC TRENDS AT THE TOTAL ECONOMY LEVEL 
 
The main objective of this section is to present the basic stylised facts concerning 
growth patterns in the EU and the US over the last 40 years. In order to get a more 
complete understanding of the underlying factors driving the aggregate performance 
and to set the stage for the industry analysis in Section 2, the results of some basic 
growth accounting analyses are described.
14 At the outset it is important to distinguish 
between the different measures of growth performance which will be used. In 
addition to actual GDP, this section will make reference to two basic indicators of the 
relative performance of the different economies, namely GDP per capita (which 
simply adjusts for changes in population and represents the widest possible measure 
of a country’s living standards) and GDP per hour worked (which adjusts the GDP 
per capita measure for changes in employment and hours worked and constitutes the 
primary indicator used in this study to compare the underlying productivity 
performance of the various countries). 
 
GDP AND GDP PER CAPITA TRENDS 1960-2002 : In terms of GDP and GDP per 
capita, Table 1 and Graph 1
15 provide an overview of the EU and US performances 
over the last four decades. At the outset, the EU enjoyed a period of strong 
convergence towards US standards of living, with an average annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita of 3 ¼ per cent in the 1960s and 1970s, which was ¾ of a percentage 
point higher than that of the US. This performance formed part of a continuous post 
World War II process of EU income convergence, with GDP per capita levels rising 
from less than 50 per cent of the US level in the 1950s to over 70 per cent by the early 
1980s. Over the subsequent period to 1995, the convergence process in effect stalled, 
with GDP per capita growth rates in the EU only managing to grow at rates similar to 
those of the US, with both areas growing by about 2-2¼ per cent, on an annual 
average basis, in the 1980s and by 1-1¼ per cent in the first half of the 1990s. While a 
stalling of the process was an obvious concern to EU policy makers over this period, 
especially given the relatively low level at which the convergence process had halted, 
a more worrying trend emerged over the second half of the 1990s, with US living 
standards clearly moving onto a higher growth path relative to that of the EU, with 
the result that the convergence process went into reverse. This trend break which, on 
the basis of standard statistical techniques, can be traced to the year 1995, witnessed 
the US growing at nearly ½ a percentage point higher, in GDP per capita terms, 
compared with the EU over the period 1996-2000, with Graph 1 also indicating that 







                                                 
14  See, in particular, Barro (1991); Sala-i-Martin (1997); Temple (1999); Durlauf and Quah (1999); and Levine 
and Renelt (1992).  
15  Given the problem of deciphering underlying patterns in the data series, the present paper makes recourse to 
trend series which have been calculated using a Hodrick Prescott statistical filter. These trend series are mainly 
used in the graphs, with the actual data series (normally period averages) being given in the Tables. 
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TABLE 1 : GDP, POPULATION AND GDP PER CAPITA TRENDS 1981-2000 : ANNUAL 
AVERAGE % CHANGES FOR THE US AND EU15 
  EU15 US 
1961-1980
- GDP  3.9 3.7 
- POPULATION  0.6 1.2 
- GDP PER CAPITA  3.3 2.5 
1981-1990
- GDP  2.4 3.2 
- POPULATION  0.3 1.0 
- GDP PER CAPITA  2.1 2.2 
1991-1995
- GDP  1.6 2.4 
- POPULATION  0.4 1.3 
- GDP PER CAPITA  1.2 1.1 
1996-2000
- GDP  2.7 4.1 
- POPULATION  0.3 1.3 
- GDP PER CAPITA  2.4 2.8 
SOURCE : AMECO 
 
GRAPH 1 : GDP PER CAPITA : EU + US (1960-2002) 
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EU trend level as 
% of US 
SOURCE : AMECO 
 
 
1.1 STANDARD GROWTH ACCOUNTING ANALYSIS
16 : Theories about what exactly 
determines economic growth at a high and sustainable rate have been discussed at 
length since the 1950s and are not exempted from controversy. However, in recent 
years, the neo-classical growth model, initially proposed by R. Solow (1956) has been 
increasingly used in “growth accounting” analyses which decompose real GDP 
growth into its main determinants. The objective is to try to measure the proportion of 
                                                 
16 In this section GDP is decomposed into employment (adjusted for hours worked) and hourly labour 
productivity.  While labour productivity per hour worked is theoretically the more appealing concept (see 
OGWG report to EPC), nevertheless a large number of productivity reports still use a breakdown based on 
labour productivity per person employed.  For comparative purposes therefore Annex 5 includes the equivalent 
data and trends based on labour productivity per person employed. 
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the overall growth rate of GDP which can be attributed to the accumulation of factors 
of production (i.e. to the growth of employment and fixed capital) and the part which 
can be attributed to independent technical progress or total factor productivity (i.e. the 
so-called Solow growth residual).
 Indeed, such a framework captures the essential 
characteristics of the US, EU and individual EU Member States performances and is 
useful in pinpointing the broad sources of the recent changes in growth. In fact, as 
Graph 2 and Tables 2 and 3 show, the engines of growth have changed significantly 
in the course of the 1990s, with marked differences not only between the EU and the 
US but also within the EU itself. 
 














GDP   3.4 3.2 3.1 2.4 4.0 3.2 
LABOUR  1.6 1.6 1.7 1.3 2.4 1.5 
(HOURS WORKED) (-0.8)  (-0.5)  (-0.1)  (0.2)  (0.4)  (0.2) 
(EMPLOYMENT)  (2.4) (2.1) (1.8) (1.1) (2.0) (1.3) 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
(HOURLY) 
1.8 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.6 1.7 
(TFP)  (1.2) (1.1) (1.1) (0.8) (1.2) (1.1) 
(CAPITAL DEEPENING)  (0.6) (0.5) (0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.6) 
EU15 
GDP   5.0 3.2 2.4 1.7 2.6 2.2 
LABOUR  -0.7 -0.6 0.1 -0.7 1.1 0.9 
(HOURS WORKED)  (-0.9) (-0.9) (-0.6) (-0.5) (-0.3) (-0.3) 
(EMPLOYMENT)  (0.2) (0.3) (0.7) (-0.2) (1.4) (1.2) 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
(HOURLY) 
5.6 3.8 2.2 2.4 1.6 1.4 
(TFP)  (3.8) (2.4) (1.5) (1.4) (1.2) (0.9) 
(CAPITAL DEEPENING)  (1.8) (1.4) (0.7) (1.0) (0.4) (0.5) 
SOURCE : ALL DATA ARE FROM AMECO, EXCEPT FOR THE HOURS WORKED SERIES WHICH IS TAKEN FROM THE GRONINGEN 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTRE (GGDC) (NOTE : FOR US EMPLOYMENT NUMBERS AMECO USES DATA FOR FULL TIME 
EQUIVALENTS FROM THE BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (BEA).  THESE FIGURES ARE CLOSE TO THE PERSONS EMPLOYED 
SERIES FROM THE BUREAU OF LABOUR STATISTICS (BLS) 
 
DECOMPOSITION OF EU AND US  GROWTH  PERFORMANCES INTO THE 
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM LABOUR AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY : While the post 1995 
experience is the time period of most intense interest to policy makers, for a more 
complete understanding Table 2 and Graph 2 show data from the mid 1960s in order 
to put the most recent years into their proper historical context. What is striking from 
the data presented is the fact that the long established US and EU trends for both 
labour utilisation and labour productivity have each been altered dramatically over 
the second half of the 1990s. 
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GRAPH 2 : TREND GROWTH AND ITS LABOUR AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
COMPONENTS (1966-2002) 
A.  TREND GDP GROWTH 













B. TREND LABOUR INPUT + TREND HOURLY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
 






















•  LABOUR UTILISATION : The second half of the 1990s has witnessed a reversal 
of the US trend of a strong contribution to growth from labour which has been 
a feature of the US performance since the 1960s. From a situation as recently 
as the mid 1990s when over 60 per cent of the US overall trend growth rate 
was emanating from labour, in 2002 only 1/3 was attributable to this factor of 
production. This however must be seen in the context of the recent period of 
”jobless growth” in the US and with the fact that the US employment rate is at 
around 72 per cent compared with 64 per cent in the EU. For the EU the 
turnaround in its performance has been significant, with its origins around the 
start of the 1990s but with the trend accelerating strongly over the second half 
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of the decade. In terms of trend growth, the EU is now in a situation where 
labour is contributing almost as much as in the US which compares with the 
situation in the mid 1990s when labour’s contribution to growth in the EU was 
only one-tenth of that of the US.
17 
•  LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY : Unfortunately, for the EU the strong recovery 
which took place in terms of the utilisation of the factor of production labour 
was accompanied by a correspondingly negative trend which emerged for 
labour productivity. In addition, for the first time in decades the EU has now a 
rate of productivity growth which is lower than that of the US. Whilst there 
has been a reversal in the extent of the employment content of US growth, 
nevertheless the US is still in the relatively unique position internationally of 
being able to combine both a high employment rate and a strong productivity 
performance. In terms of employment creation, the US has since the early 
1970s consistently outperformed the EU, with the present employment rate 8 
percentage points higher in the US. Indeed until recently the EU was able to 
maintain its relatively high standards of living compared to the US due to its 
superior productivity performance. If this productivity route to prosperity is 
now in doubt, the EU is facing a difficult future since the present recovery in 
labour utilisation rates is, by definition, a temporary phenomenon. 
Furthermore, looking towards the medium term, it is only a matter of a few 
years before the negative effects of ageing populations really start to impact 
on the potential growth rates of a large number of EU Member States. 
 
1.2 : FURTHER BREAKDOWN OF LABOUR UTILISATION AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  
: An inverse relationship between the contributions to growth from labour utilisation 
and labour productivity has been very evident for the EU, and to a lesser extent the 
US, over the second half of the 1990s. This suggests that a further breakdown of both 
growth components is needed in order to decipher the underlying determinants. 
 
LABOUR UTILISATION DECOMPOSITION INTO HOURS WORKED AND EMPLOYMENT : 
The breakdown of the individual roles played by hours worked and employment in 
determining the overall labour input trend is shown in Graph 3: 
•  For the EU, the marked upward trend in the overall contribution from labour 
is driven by employment growth rather than by an increase in hours worked. 
While the fall in average hours worked is now substantially less than in 
previous decades, nevertheless the average time spent at work continues to fall 
in the EU. 
•  The situation in the US is very different to that in the EU, with the average 
hours worked per worker starting to rise in the late 1980s and with this trend 
persisting up until 2002. At the same time the US employment creation 
performance is on a downward trend, driven by the jobless growth pattern of 
                                                 
17 Factor input proportions in the EU have altered in a labour-friendly way over recent years. This pattern reflects 
the effects of the real wage moderation which took place over the period as well as the support provided by 
some structural labour market reform efforts. Employment growth has also been accompanied by a marked 
decline in capital/labour substitution, which is suggestive that EU employment creation has been occurring in 
the relatively less capital intensive service industries (see Section 2).
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recent years, with the EU now in the historically unusual position of having an 
employment growth rate which compares favourably with that of the US. 
 
GRAPH 3 : BREAKDOWN OF TREND LABOUR INPUT INTO HOURS  
WORKED AND EMPLOYMENT 




















LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY DECOMPOSITION INTO CAPITAL DEEPENING AND TOTAL 
FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY (TFP):  
•  CAPITAL DEEPENING: The growth process in industrialised countries is 
characterised by a process of continuous capital deepening, which is crucial 
for productivity and, consequently, income growth. In terms of capital 
deepening trends for the EU, following a long period stretching over 3 
decades when the growth rate of the capital/labour ratio in the EU was at 
significantly higher levels than in the US, a growing gap has emerged over the 
second half of the 1990s in favour of the US (Graph 4).
18 While it can be 
questioned whether the US trend is a sustainable one given the “bubble-like” 
features evident over this period, what is more puzzling is the poor EU 
performance, with meagre/falling rates of investment despite rising 
profitability and declining costs of capital. The significant fall in EU capital 
deepening reflects not only a halt to unfavourable capital-for-labour 
substitution trends but also other, hopefully temporary, phenomena such as 
the negative effects emanating from the collapse in equity markets. While this 
latter, generally more sanguine, view of recent investment patterns will 
hopefully turn out to be the reality, other more worrying structural factors may 
also be at play, such as locational investment considerations
19 and adverse 
demographic trends.
20 
                                                 
18 The smaller capital-deepening component in EU labour productivity growth over the period 1996-2002 partly 
reflects the reversal of the unfavourable capital-for-labour substitution of earlier periods. In addition, a 
slowdown in the rate of capital substitution at a macroeconomic level does not of course automatically imply 
that firms are switching to more labour intensive forms of production. In fact in the case of the EU, the slower 
increase in capital/labour substitution to a large extent reflects an increase in employment in those industries 
which are more employment intensive, such as certain service industries. These employment increases in the 
generally non-capital intensive, more traditional, service industries can also explain a proportion of the apparent 
fall in EU labour productivity over the same period since these service industries have in the past been 
characterised by comparatively low productivity growth rates. However, while such employment patterns may 
be temporarily negative for productivity growth, they are nevertheless positive for GDP per capita. 
19 Various factors influence the investment to GDP ratio, with current and expected profitability and capital costs 
being the major driving forces. These factors are themselves determined by demand conditions, the availability 
of (skilled) workers, tax levels, expected rates of innovation etc. With improved international communications 
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•  TFP: Finally, and from an EU perspective potentially the most concerning 
aspect of the analysis so far, is the evolution of the TFP trend. For the first 
time in a generation the US has a trend rate of TFP growth which is higher 
than that of the EU (Graph 4). This significant turning point results from a 
combination of a sharp downturn in the EU trend and an acceleration for the 
US. Given the crucial importance of the evolution of TFP to long-run growth 
perspectives, this recent reversal in TFP fortunes for the EU bodes ominously 
for its future prosperity. 
GRAPH 4 : BREAKDOWN OF TREND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY INTO CAPITAL  
DEEPENING AND TFP 






















INTRA-EU DIFFERENCES IN OVERALL GROWTH PERFORMANCES : Table 3 shows the 
large differences in overall GDP growth performances amongst the EU’s 15 Member 
States. 
•  There are 3 broad groups of countries which can be delineated in terms of 
their overall growth performance since the early 1990s. The first group, 
comprising two of the largest Member States, namely Germany and Italy, 
stand out for their persistently poor outturns relative to the EU average 
throughout the 1990s. They collectively represent around 40 per cent of total 
EU15 output, thus their performance constituted a significant drag on the 
                                                                                                                                           
and reductions in transport costs, international locational choices for investors have increased and investment is 
undertaken in those regions which offer the most favourable (expected) ratio between capital productivity and 
capital cost. The US investment boom in the 1990’s offers a good example of how investment opportunities in 
one country can attract substantial foreign direct investment. Falling ICT investment prices and high rates of 
innovation, as expressed by accelerating productivity and TFP growth rates, created an exceptionally positive 
investment climate in the US in the 1990’s which in turn led to a strong increase in US investment. These 
international investment trends were unfortunately not without repercussions for domestic EU investment rates. 
20 Demographic trends in the EU are also likely to affect the investment rate negatively. With an increasing 
dependency ratio, it is likely that domestic investment as a share of GDP declines, or remains constant in a 
situation of falling interest rates. There are several reasons for this to occur. First of all, a declining population 
requires less net investment in order to keep the capital/labour ratio constant. Secondly, a declining domestic 
labour force reduces the return prospects from domestic investment as well as the risk associated with over-
investment. In a world with free capital mobility this effect is likely to be even stronger since firms can avoid 
pressure on domestic returns by investing abroad. It is also interesting to note that the falling trend in the 
investment rate is likely to be accompanied by a secular decline in interest rates, with falling borrowing costs in 
this case reflecting the lower returns from capital investment (due to expected decreases in labour supply and 
domestic demand reductions) rather than acting as a stimulus to undertake additional investment. 
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aggregate EU position. A second group, made up of Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Austria and the UK, grew close to the EU average. The final group of 
mainly small countries (Greece, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Finland and Sweden), managed to grow at a significantly faster pace than the 
EU as a whole, especially over the second half of the 1990s. For example, for 
the period 1996-2002, this latter group of EU countries grew on average by 
3½ per cent, compared with 3¼ for the US and 2¼ for the EU15 as a whole. 
•  For Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, the trends for the 1990s are in part 
influenced by an element of catching-up. Each of these 4 countries had 
standards of living in the early 1990s which were significantly below that of 
the EU as a whole, with Greece and Portugal at around 70 per cent of the EU 
average and with Spain and Ireland at close to 80 percent. 
•  While a large number of the EU countries shared in the general EU upturn in 
the contribution to growth from labour, there were notably poor performances 
from countries such as Belgium, Germany, Greece and Austria. With regard to 
the contribution from labour productivity, the differences across countries 
were quite marked. From a contribution to average growth of only 0.8/1.0 per 
cent in Italy/Spain respectively, at the other end of the spectrum labour 
productivity added nearly 5½ percentage points to the aggregate Irish 
performance. Despite the wide variation in performances, a large number of 
the smaller EU countries, namely Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Austria, Portugal, 
Finland and Sweden had labour productivity performances which were higher 
than both the EU and US averages. 
•  Finally, if one excludes the catching-up countries which were coming from 
relatively low starting positions in the early 1990s, the most striking labour 
productivity performances came from Belgium, Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
However, amongst the latter, it is important to distinguish those countries 
which were unable to combine high rates of both labour utilisation and labour 
productivity (namely Belgium and Austria) and those which could (namely 
Finland and to a lesser extent Sweden). In addition with regard to Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal, whilst Ireland performed spectacularly well in relation to 
both employment and productivity growth rates, Greece and Portugal were 
only average in terms of their labour utilisation rates. 
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TABLE 3 : DECOMPOSITION OF AVERAGE GDP GROWTH RATES
1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 1996-2002
BELGIUM
GDP 2.0 1.6 2.7 2.1
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS -0.5 -0.1 0.1 0.5
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 2.5 1.7 2.6 1.6
DENMARK
GDP 1.6 2.0 2.7 2.3
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS -0.3 0.1 1.2 0.8
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 1.8 1.9 1.4 1.6
GERMANY
GDP 2.3 1.6 1.8 1.4
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS 0.4 0.9 0.0 -0.2
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 1.9 0.7 1.8 1.6
GREECE
GDP 0.7 1.2 3.4 3.5
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 0.1 0.6 2.8 3.1
SPAIN
GDP 2.9 1.5 3.8 3.3
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS 0.1 -0.4 2.9 2.6
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 2.8 1.9 0.8 0.8
FRANCE
GDP 2.4 1.1 2.6 2.4
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS -0.6 -0.4 1.2 0.9
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 3.0 1.5 1.4 1.5
IRELAND
GDP 3.5 4.6 9.3 8.3
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS -0.7 1.0 3.9 3.2
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 4.2 3.6 5.4 5.1
ITALY
GDP 2.2 1.3 1.9 1.7
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS 0.3 -1.0 0.9 1.0
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 2.0 2.3 1.0 0.7
NETHERLANDS
GDP 2.2 2.1 3.6 2.8
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS 0.0 0.6 2.4 1.8
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 2.2 1.5 1.2 1.0
AUSTRIA
GDP 2.4 2.0 2.7 2.2
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS -0.2 -1.3 0.1 0.1
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 2.6 3.4 2.7 2.1
PORTUGAL
GDP 3.2 1.7 3.8 3.0
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS -0.1 -1.2 0.7 0.7
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 3.3 2.9 3.1 2.3
FINLAND
GDP 3.1 -0.6 4.7 3.7
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS 0.0 -3.6 1.7 1.1
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 3.0 3.0 3.1 2.6
SWEDEN
GDP 2.2 1.3 3.2 2.7
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS 1.0 -1.3 0.9 0.6
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 1.1 2.5 2.3 2.1
UK
GDP 2.6 1.7 2.9 2.6
LABOUR INPUT IN HOURS 0.4 -1.4 1.2 1.0
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 2.3 3.1 1.7 1.6  
SOURCE : AMECO, GGDC, OECD AND OWN CALCULATIONS. 
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MAIN POINTS TO BE RETAINED FROM SECTION 1 : The EU15 as a whole and the US 
have experienced significant breaks in the 1990s in terms of employment (measured 
in hours worked) and productivity. The EU has experienced sharp increases in the 
contribution of labour to growth and equally sharp reductions in the contribution from 
productivity, with the latter reflecting the dual impact of lower capital deepening and 
TFP growth. The opposite pattern emerged in the US. 
•  In terms of labour input (i.e. employment * hours worked), following decades 
of negative contributions to growth, the 1990s, and especially the second half, 
has seen the EU display a strong recovery in its contribution from labour. At 
the same time, the opposite trend was emerging in the US, although adequate 
account needs to be taken of the effect on these employment patterns of the 
downturn in US growth rates since 2000. Bearing in mind this latter 
qualification, the EU now has a labour contribution to growth which is very 
similar to that of the US. 
•  In terms of productivity, again as with labour utilisation rates, the reversal of 
past trends in the 1990s in both the EU and the US is remarkable. For 
example, for the first time in the post-World War II period, the EU is now on 
a trend productivity growth path which is lower than that of the US. Since the 
mid-1990s, the EU has been incapable of arresting the long-run decline in its 
productivity performance whereas the US has enjoyed a notable recovery in 
its secular trend, with productivity per hour growth rates in the US starting to 
recover to the rates of growth last experienced in the 1960s. Thus the EU is 
facing a future of increasing divergence, as opposed to convergence, with 
respect to US living standards. 
•  At the individual EU Member State level, a much more nuanced picture 
emerges. In terms of labour productivity, 7 of the EU’s smaller Member 
States had performances which were not only well above the EU average but 
were also higher than that of the US. However, only 3 of the 7, namely 
Ireland, Finland and Sweden, were capable of combining both strong 
productivity growth and high labour utilisation rates. 
Given the large divergences at both the EU/US and the intra-EU levels, it is 
important to dig a little deeper to try to ascertain whether these divergences in 
labour productivity performances can be explained by firstly looking at 
differences in the industrial structure of economies (Section 2) or secondly, at a 
deeper level, by an analysis of the underlying determinants of productivity growth 
(Section 3). 
EU’ s STANDARD OF LI VI NG I S NOW LESS THAN 70% OF US LEVELS AND FALLI NG
EU’ s SUCCESS ON EMPLOYMENT FRONT MORE THAN OFFSET
BY DETERI ORATI ON I N LABOUR PRODUCTI VI TY
BOTH COMPONENTS OF EU LABOUR PRODUCTI VI TY ( CAPI TAL DEEPENI NG & TFP)
HAVE DETERI ORATED SHARPLY OVER THE SECOND HALF OF 1990' s
US LABOUR PRODUCTI VI TY I S ON A CLEAR UPWARD TREND WI TH A SHARP
I MPROVEMENT I N CAPI TAL DEEPENI NG & A MODEST ACCELERATI ON I N TFP
Total  Economy Anal ysi s
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2. INDUSTRY LEVEL ANALYSIS
21 
 
The purpose of the present section is to look beneath the economy-wide trends to 
assess the broad structural changes which have occurred at the industry level in the 
EU and US economies over the period since 1980. This analysis is needed to pinpoint 
the specific industries which are driving the EU-US productivity differentials. In 
particular the following key issues are addressed: 
•  Firstly, do divergences in labour productivity growth trends between the EU 
and the US emanate from either structural employment shifts in the respective 
economies from low to high productivity industries or do they simply reflect 
higher productivity growth rates in specific industries (Section 2.1)? 
•  Secondly, are differences emanating from specific industries in the 
manufacturing or services sectors or are the EU-US productivity differentials 
more pervasive? In this regard, a key related question is whether the US 
economy is benefiting to a greater extent than the EU from the productivity 
gains associated with innovation in general and specifically from the adoption 
of IC technologies (Sections 2.2 and 2.3).  
 
INDUSTRY DATASETS : To address these issues this section draws on two separate, 
internationally comparable, DG Enterprise/GGDC
22 industry datasets which cover the 
period 1979-2001 and provide different levels of detail regarding the industrial 
structures of the EU and US economies: 
•  The “Industry Labour Productivity Database”, which is used for the shift share 
analysis in section 2.1 and for the wider analysis in 2.2, includes a detailed 
breakdown of the total output of the US and all of the EU’s Member States at 
the greatest level of disaggregation which is presently possible i.e. a 56 
industry decomposition. This dataset, which is an expanded version of the 
OECD’s STructural ANalysis (STAN) database, contains a large number of 
variables for the 56 industries, including numbers employed and hours worked 
(which can both be combined to give overall labour utilisation rates) and most 
importantly, for the present study, labour productivity per hour figures.  
•  The “Industry Growth Accounting Database”, which is described in 
Section 2.3, and which permits a growth accounting analysis at the industry 
level similar to that given in Section 1 for the total economy. Due to space 
restrictions, Section 2.3 avoids any decomposition of labour utilization rates at 
the industry level into employment and hours worked and instead focuses 
solely on a decomposition of the hourly labour productivity trends described 
in Sub-section 2.2 into the contributions from capital deepening and TFP. In 
addition since the capital stock series at the industry level is further 
disaggregated into 6 different asset types, 3 of which are ICT-related assets, it 
is possible to calculate the contribution of the ICT and non-ICT parts of the 
EU and US economies to overall labour productivity growth. Due to data 
constraints, however, this second database is only available for the US and 4 
                                                 
21 Annex 2 gives a short technical description of the basic methodologies applied in this section as well as 
providing information on other issues such as the handling of the data series used for the analysis. 
22  GGDC (Groningen Growth and Development Centre). 
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of the 15 EU Member States (i.e. France, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK). It also only disaggregates total output into 26 industries compared with 
the 56 industries in the “Industry Labour Productivity Database”.  
 
Both these datasets have a number of important advantages compared with the one 
used for the economy-wide analysis in Section 1. Firstly, using shift-share analysis 
and other techniques, these datasets can be used to give a highly disaggregated picture 
of industry trends. Secondly, they overcome one of the main criticisms levelled at 
carrying out international comparisons of productivity performances on the basis of 
official national accounts data, namely that, outside the US and Canada, most other 
statistical offices underestimate the role played by IC technologies in recent output 
and productivity growth trends. Two issues in particular which may lead to an 
underestimation of the role played by IT are firstly, the fact that software is often 
excluded from investment expenditure in the national accounts (i.e. it is classified as a 
business expense in most EU countries and therefore excluded from final output) and 
secondly, the well documented problem of hedonic deflators. As stressed in the 
introduction, both these concerns have been addressed in the construction of the 
GGDC datasets, with US ICT industry deflators being applied to the equivalent 
industries in all countries and with ICT investment spending being defined in all 
countries as including software spending (software is in fact one of 3 ICT related 




2.1 SHIFT SHARE ANALYSIS  
 
Aggregate productivity is equal to a weighted average of underlying industry 
productivity, with the weights being determined by each industry’s share in overall 
employment.
24 Consequently, the change in an economy’s productivity growth rate 
over a specific period of time is determined not only by the productivity growth rate 
of the individual industries but also by changes in the industry composition of 
employment. Aggregate changes in productivity are due to either the former, within-
industry, effect or they reflect the latter phenomenon of structural shifts in resources 
between contracting / expanding industries. Shift-share analysis (see Annex 2 for a 
technical overview of this approach) is the most commonly used algebraic method for 
carrying out such a decomposition, with aggregate productivity growth capable of 
being broken down into the sum of the following 3 effects: 
 
•  1. INTRA-INDUSTRY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH EFFECT : equal to the sum of 
productivity growth in the individual industries in the absence of structural 
change (i.e. on the assumption that there are no changes in the employment 
shares of specific industries). This “growth” effect is the natural starting point 
for interpreting the shift-share decomposition since it provides the hourly 
labour productivity growth rate in a situation where the structure of the 
economy remains fixed. For example, if the “intra-industry growth” effect is 
                                                 
23 This ICT investment breakdown applies only to the “Industry Growth Accounting Database”.  
24 The value added of all the different industries are aggregated using Törnqvist indices (based on average nominal 
value added shares) and, in combination with the employment levels (adjusted for hours worked), the hourly 
labour productivity estimates are calculated accordingly. For calculating the contribution of an individual 
industry to aggregate labour productivity growth, the share of the specific industry in total value added (in 
nominal terms) is used as weights (see Annex 2 for additional details). 
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smaller than aggregate productivity growth then the expectation would be that 
industries with higher productivity growth have increased their share in total 
employment. 
 
•  2.  “STRUCTURAL”  CHANGE  EFFECT  : equal to the contribution to overall 
productivity growth of a shift of employment resources from low to high 
productivity industries (i.e. the shift effect). When the structural change effect 
is both positive and increasing over time, this is indicative of a healthy process 
of restructuring occurring in an economy. Boosting overall growth in this 
manner is also suggestive that a favourable up-skilling process is occurring in 
terms of employment. 
 
•  3. INTERACTION EFFECT : This is a residual term which captures the dynamic 
component of structural change.
25 It attempts to measure correlations in an 
economy between productivity and employment changes, with 
positive/negative efficiency gains interacting with the expansion/contraction
26 
of specific industries. The interaction term is positive when the first two 
effects (i.e. the intra-industry plus the “structural” effects) are complementary 
(i.e. productivity growth is positive in expanding industries and negative in 
contracting industries). The interaction effect is, in turn, negative when the 
first two effects are substitutes (i.e. productivity growth is positive in 
contracting industries - a good example being the agriculture sector - and 
negative in expanding industries). 
 
Based on this decomposition one can ask why the EU and the US economies differ in 
terms of their labour productivity growth rates, with a combination of three 
explanations being possible: firstly, differences in the average productivity growth 
rates of individual industries; secondly, differences in the reallocation of employment 
resources between industries; and finally, the initial starting conditions in both 
countries may not be uniform (i.e. a level effect which encapsulates the potential for 
catching-up). 
 
The main points to be retained from the analysis are as follows (see Graphs 5a to 5c): 
•  Firstly, for all three periods the intra-industry growth effect dominates the 
outcome, accounting for between 85-100 per cent of aggregate productivity 
growth in the case of the EU and from 105-130 per cent of the change in the 
US.
27 
                                                 
25 The sum of the structural change and interaction effects is sometimes used as a measure of the overall 
reallocation process in an economy. Nevertheless, this study takes the view that some additional insights can be 
derived from examining the shift and interaction effects separately. For example, some countries might be able 
to increase their employment share in fast growing productivity industries whilst in other countries fast 
productivity growth could be the result of low productivity firms exiting the market. 
26 Expanding or contracting in terms of employment or, in the case of the present analysis, employment as 
measured in terms of hours worked. 
27 Results from a similar analysis by the OECD (OECD 2003) for the non-farm business sector (i.e. the 
manufacturing plus private services sectors) confirms the importance of the intra-industry effect. For the 
services sector, while the net shift effect made an important contribution for a period of time in certain 
countries, due to the increased size of business services, this effect faded out in the 1980’s. For the 
manufacturing sector, employment shifts across industries did not play a significant role in productivity trends 
(see also Van Ark (1996) and Employment in Europe (2003). 
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•  Secondly, the shift effect has been positive over the last 2 decades for the EU, 
compared with a consistent negative pattern for the US in the 1990’s. Thus the 
EU is still gaining from a shift of employment from low productivity 
industries such as agriculture to higher productivity jobs in manufacturing or 
services. For the US, however, this process would appear to be completed 
with negative contributions from the shift term suggesting that workers are on 
average moving into lower productivity service industries. In overall terms, 
over the period 1980-2000, the EU has been able to use changes in the 
industry composition of employment as a mechanism for closing the 
productivity gap with the US. However, the contribution from this “catching-
up” mechanism has been declining over time, more than halving in fact 
between the 1980s and the 1990s, falling from a contribution of ¾ of a 
percentage point over the 1980-1990 period to an average of less than a ¼ of a 
percentage point in the 1990s. In addition, the positive structural change effect 
was also offset by a negative “interaction” effect on productivity. The EU is 
therefore becoming increasingly like the services-dominated US economy 
where employment shifts from manufacturing to service industries are often 
associated with declines in productivity growth. In these circumstances the 
only option for the EU, as has been the case for the US over the last number of 
decades, is to generate productivity gains at the intra-industry level. 
•  Finally, the shift-share analysis for the US suggests a surge of “pure” 
productivity gains from within the industries themselves, more than 
compensating for the negative effect from the reallocation of employment 
resources between industries. The extent of the surge is suggestive of the 
emergence of a new technological regime which is permeating a wide range of 
US industries and positively influencing their productivity performance. This 
new regime could, in part at least, be driven by the efficiencies being reaped 
from the use of ICT products and services and the wider changes associated 
with the diffusion and creation of ICT-specific knowledge. Isolating the wide-
ranging contribution of IC technologies to aggregate productivity growth, in 
terms of both the production and use of ICT, is where we now focus our 
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GRAPH 5 : SHIFT SHARE ANALYSIS FOR EU + US :  DECOMPOSITION OF HOURLY 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATES (ANNUAL AVERAGES) 
 
GRAPH 5A  : 1981-1990 
EU
US
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 -0.5 -1






GRAPH 5B : 1991-1995 
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GRAPH 5C : 1996-2000 
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SOURCE : GGDC AND OWN CALCULATIONS 
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2.2 : KEY INDUSTRIES DRIVING THE EU-US PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH GAP : The 
shift share analysis has established that most of the growth in labour productivity over 
the second half of the 1990s occurred within the industries themselves rather than due 
to a reallocation of resources between industries. Consequently, EU-US productivity 
growth differentials are overwhelmingly due to differences in the size of the 
productivity gains in individual EU and US industries. Using the “Industry Labour 
Productivity Database”, this Sub-section firstly isolates the broad groups of industries 
(i.e. manufacturing and private services) which are driving the productivity 
differentials (Sub-section 2.2.1) and secondly assesses the specific role of ICT-
producing and intensive ICT-using industries in determining overall productivity 
trends (Sub-section 2.2.2).  
 
2.2.1  OVERVIEW OF LABOUR  PRODUCTIVITY  TRENDS : Table  4 gives a quick 
overview of the industrial structure of the EU and US economies on the basis of an 
aggregation of the 56 industries into the standard four categories of primary 
production, manufacturing, private services and government services. In terms of 
productivity levels, Table 4 underlines the extent of the deterioration experienced by 
the EU over the second half of the 1990s, with the US pulling ahead in virtually all 
areas of the economy. This compares with a situation in the early 1990s when the EU 
was making steady progress in all 4 categories in converging towards US productivity 
levels. 
 
In terms of labour productivity growth rates, an aggregation of the 56 industries 
displays trends similar to those established in Section 1 on the basis of the economy-
wide data, namely a sharp deterioration in EU labour productivity growth over the 
two halves of the 1990s and an acceleration for the US. Consequently, while the use 
of hedonic deflators and equivalent definitions of what constitutes ICT investment 
expenditure did help, to a small extent, in reducing the pace of decline in EU labour 
productivity growth rates over the 1990s, these adjustments were insufficient to 
change the overall pattern. Graph 6 confirms the US dominance in productivity terms 
over the period 1996-2000, with the US doing better in terms of manufacturing and 
private service industries and with the EU only ahead in the “rest of the economy” 
category (which includes primary industries and public services). When one looks in 
more detail at the trends for the manufacturing and private services industries (see 
Graph 7), one sees the extent of the transformation in relative performances, with the 
US powering ahead over the 1990s as a whole in both areas, compared with persistent 
downward trends for the EU in both industry categories.
28 
 
                                                 
28  Graph 7 also shows that average trend productivity growth in the manufacturing sector has always been higher 
than that of services in both the EU and the US. While this is still the case, the recent surge in productivity 
growth in US service industries is suggestive that the latter industries could challenge manufacturing in the not 
too distant future. (For a further discussion on these issues, see Bernard and Jones (1996) and Triplett and 
Bosworth (2002)). If this were to occur it would have enormous implications for the overall growth 
performance of the US economy since the private services sector is over 3 times larger than that of 
manufacturing in terms of both output and employment shares. In addition, at least up until the mid-1990’s, the 
manufacturing sector accounted for between 60-75 per cent of total US productivity growth despite 
representing only 15-20 per cent of total employment. Finally, Graph 7 shows that the EU has experienced a 
marked downward trend in productivity growth in both its manufacturing and service industries over both 
decades. The US in contrast is characterised, in manufacturing, by a declining trend only up until the end of the 
1980’s followed by a strong recovery in the 1990’s. For services the US has been on a steady upward trend 
since the early 1980’s and has now opened up a marked advantage over the EU in such industries, with US 
private services productivity growing from a pace of less than 1 percentage point, on an annual average basis, 
in the early 1980’s to well over 2 per cent in the second half of the 1990’s. 
- 23 -  
 
 
TABLE 4 : OVERVIEW OF THE SECTORAL COMPOSITION + PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS  
OF THE EU AND US ECONOMIES (1981-2000) 
SHARE OF TOTAL 
OUTPUT 
(NOMINAL) 
SHARE OF TOTAL 
EMPLOYMENT 







EU US EU US  EU 
PRIMARY INDUSTRIES
(1981-1990) .05 .05 .10 .04 47.8* 
(1991-1995) .04 .03 .07 .04     63.8* * 
(1996-2000) .03 .03 .06 .03        58.1* **      
MANUFACTURING
(1981-1990) .24 .20 .24 .19 78.9 
(1991-1995) .21 .18 .21 .17 81.4 
(1996-2000) .20 .17 .19 .15 73.5 
PRIVATE SERVICES
(1981-1990) .50 .52 .42 .49 82.9 
(1991-1995) .53 .54 .45 .50 98.4 
(1996-2000) .55 .57 .47 .53 91.9 
PUBLIC SERVICES
(1981-1990) .21 .23 .24 .28 72.4 
(1991-1995) .22 .25 .27 .29 83.8 
(1996-2000) .22 .23 .28 .29 89.3 
TOTAL ECONOMY
(1996-2000) 1 1 1 1 86.4 
SOURCE : DG ENTERPRISE / GGDC AND OWN CALCULATIONS 
*=1980 **=1995 ***=2000 
 
2.2.2  SPECIFIC  ROLE OF ICT-PRODUCING AND ICT-USING  INDUSTRIES IN 
DETERMINING OVERALL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS : While sub-section 2.2.1 
has displayed the broad overall trends for labour productivity at the industry level, it 
is necessary to dig a little deeper to see the important role which IC technologies are 
playing in the substantial transformation of industrial structures in the EU and US 
economies. Building on the 4-way breakdown of industries given earlier in Table 4, 
and in order to isolate the increasing role being played by ICT in the respective 
economies, these 4 categories are further sub-divided in Table 5 on the basis of the 
ICT content of the different industries. The complete breakdown of the ICT intensity 
of all 56 industries into ICT-producing, intensive ICT-using and less intensive ICT-
using industries is provided in Table 6.
29 This three-way ICT breakdown can also be 
used as a rough proxy for high, medium and low productivity industries in the EU 






                                                 
29 This three-way categorisation of the 56 industries is based on the University of Groningen’s Growth and 
Development Centre’s ICT intensity breakdown for these industries - see also OECD (2000) “Measuring the 
ICT Sector”; and Sutton (2000). 
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TABLE 5 : INDUSTRIES CLASSIFIED ON THE BASIS OF THEIR ICT-CONTENT  : AN 
OVERVIEW FOR THE PERIOD 1996-2000 
SHARE OF TOTAL 
OUTPUT 
(NOMINAL) 


































(ICT-PRODUCING) (.01)  (.02)  (.01)  (.02) (46.3) 
(INTENSIVE ICT-USING) (.06)  (.05)  (.07)  (.05)  (95.8) 













(ICT-PRODUCING) (.04)  (.04)  (.03)  (.03)  (116.1) 
(INTENSIVE ICT-USING) (.21)  (.26)  (.20)  (.25)  (79.7) 













TOTAL ECONOMY  1 1 1 1 86.4 




GRAPH 6 : CONTRIBUTION TO TOTAL ECONOMY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 





















SOURCE : DG ENTERPRISE / GGDC AND OWN CALCULATIONS 
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TABLE 6 : ICT BREAKDOWN OF ALL INDUSTRIES (ISIC REV 3)* 
 
2. NON-FARM BUSINESS SECTOR 




(LESS INTENSIVE ICT 
























AGRICULTURE (01)    OFFICE AND 
COMPUTING 
EQUIPMENT (30) 







REPAIRS (50) PUBLIC 
ADMINSTRATION AND 
DEFENCE (75) 
FORESTRY (02)      INSULATED WIRE AND 
CABLES  (313) 
PRINTING AND 
PUBLISHING (22) 
TEXTILES (17) COMPUTER AND 
RELATED SERVICES (72) 
RETAIL TRADE (52) HOTELS AND 
RESTAURANTS (55) 
EDUCATION  (80) 
FISHING (05)  F SEMICONDUCTORS AND 
OTHER ELECTRONIC 









HEALTH AND SOCIAL 
WORK  (85) 
MINING (10-14)     COMMUNICATION AND 
BROADCASTING 
EQUIPMENT  (322) 
OTHER ELECTRICAL 
MACHINERY (31 EX. 
313) 
WOOD PRODUCTS (20) INSURANCE AND 




SOCIAL AND PERSONAL 
SERVICES  (90-93) 
  RADIO AND TV 
RECEIVERS  (323) 
OTHER INSTRUMENTS 
(33 EX. 331) 
PULP AND PAPER 
PRODUCTS (21) 
    A CTIVITIES AUXILIARY 
TO FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIATION (67) 
AIR TRANSPORT (62) PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH EMPLOYED 
PERSONS  (95) 
  SCIENTIFIC 
INSTRUMENTS  (331) 
BUILDING AND 
REPAIRING OF SHIPS 
AND BOATS (351) 
OIL REFINING AND 
NUCLEAR FUEL (23) 






       A IRCRAFT AND 
SPACECRAFT (353) 





      R AILROAD AND 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
(352+359)  














E LECTRICITY, GAS AND 
WATER SUPPLY (40-41)   
BASIC METALS (27) CONSTRUCTION (45)   
FABRICATED METAL 
PRODUCTS (28)   
MOTOR VEHICLES (34)  
     
        
       
          
SOURCE :  GGDC 
*ISIC rev 3 codes in Brackets 
 
 
- 26 -  
ARE THE ICT-PRODUCING MANUFACTURING OR THE INTENSIVE ICT-USING 
SERVICE INDUSTRIES DRIVING THE EU-US PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS ? : 
Table  7 gives an overview of the total economy, broken down into the same 3 
categories which were used for Graph  6, namely manufacturing, private services 
(both of which when combined form the non-farm business sector) and the “rest of 
the economy”. These 3 groups of industries are in turn broken down into ICT-
producing, intensive-ICT-using and less-intensive ICT-using industries. This latter 3-
way breakdown is not however applied to the “rest of the economy” grouping since 
the 9 industries which are included in this category (i.e. primary industries and 
government services) are all classified as less intensive ICT-using industries.  
 
In order to assess the relative importance of the different groups of industries to 
overall productivity growth, Table  7 gives firstly the productivity growth rates of 
each group, and secondly (using their respective nominal shares in total economy 
output as weights) their contribution to economy-wide labour productivity growth. As 
can be seen from the Table (which confirms the story given in Graphs 6 and 7), the 
non-farm business sector is where the divergences in EU-US productivity growth 
rates are emanating from. In fact, in terms of overall contributions to productivity 
growth, the non-farm business sector can explain virtually all of the change in 




GRAPH 7 : TREND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATES FOR THE  
MANUFACTURING AND PRIVATE SERVICES SECTORS : EU V US (1981-2000) 
(ANNUAL % CHANGE) 


























                                                 
30 This in fact is what one would have expected since the non-farm business sector accounts for roughly 75 per 
cent of total output in the EU and the US. 
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TABLE 7 : BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL ECONOMY INTO 3 CATEGORIES – 2 ICT CATEGORIES (ICT 
PRODUCING + INTENSIVE ICT-USING) AND 1 CATEGORY OF LESS INTENSIVE ICT USING (I.E. MORE 
TRADITIONAL) INDUSTRIES  
  Average % Change in Labour 
Productivity per Hour 
Contribution to Total Change in 
Labour Productivity per Hour (%)* 
  1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 
Total Economy (1+2+3)
EU 2.4 2.3  1.6 2.4 2.3 1.6 
US 1.1 1.1  2.3 1.1 1.1 2.3 
1+2 Total Non-Farm Business Sector**
EU 2.7 2.5  1.7 2.0 1.8 1.3 
US 1.6 1.7  3.1 1.1 1.2 2.3 
1. Manufacturing Sector
EU 3.9 3.7  2.6 1.0 0.9 0.5 
US 3.6 3.6  4.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 
1(a) ICT-Producing Manufacturing Industries
EU  (13.9) (9.6) (17.1) (0.2)  (0.2)  (0.2) 
US  (16.2) (16.4) (26.0)  (0.4)  (0.4)  (0.7) 
1(b)  Intensive ICT-Using Manufacturing Industries 
EU  (2.8) (2.6) (2.0) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) 
US  (0.8) (-0.6) (1.4) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) 
1(b) Rest of Manufacturing (Less-Intensive ICT using)
EU  (3.2) (3.6) (1.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.2) 
US  (2.4) (2.6) (0.6) (0.3) (0.3) (0.1) 
2. Private Services Sector
EU 2.0 1.9  1.4 1.0 1.0 0.7 
US 0.8 1.0  2.7 0.4 0.5 1.5 
2(a) ICT-Producing Service Industries
EU  (4.1) (4.8) (6.8) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) 
US  (2.1) (2.4) (0.8) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) 
2(b) Intensive ICT-Using Service Industries 
EU  (2.2) (1.8) (2.1) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) 
US  (1.6) (1.6) (5.3) (0.3) (0.4) (1.3) 
2(b) Rest of  Services (Less-Intensive ICT using)
EU  (1.7) (1.7) (0.2) (0.5) (0.5) (0.1) 
US  (-0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) 
3. Rest of Economy (Primary Industries + Public Services) (Less Intensive ICT-Using) 
EU 1.6 2.0  1.1 0.4 0.5 0.3 
US 0.2 -0.3  -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
SOURCE :  GGDC AND OWN CALCULATIONS 
* In terms of contributions to the change in labour productivity, the aggregate figures given in the table include the sum of the 
intra-industry, shift and interaction effects.  However, since it is not possible to allocate the structural shift and interaction effects 
to specific manufacturing and service industries, the sum of the labour productivity contributions from these industries may not 
therefore equal the total change in labour productivity per hour at the aggregate industry level.  The size of the residuals are 
however very small (in all cases not more than 0.1) since the intra-industry effect accounts for the bulk of the overall change in 
hourly labour productivity in both the US and the EU as a whole.  As shown in Tables 9b-9d, however, this conclusion does not 
apply to all of the individual EU Member States where these residuals (i.e. the combined effect of the shift and interaction terms) 
are somewhat larger. 
**Total economy excluding agriculture and government services. 
 
The key results from Table 7 are as follows: 
•  Firstly, at an overall level, despite having productivity growth rates which 
were often 3 to 4 times higher than that of services, the manufacturing sector, 
due to its smaller share in overall GDP, had a contribution to aggregate 
productivity growth in both the EU and the US which was often only about 
the same as that of services. In addition, over the most recent 1996-2000 
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period, it is services which is by far the biggest contributor to total labour 
productivity growth, especially in the US.  
 
•  Secondly, looking at the ICT based breakdown for manufacturing, the highest 
productivity growth rates have been achieved in the ICT-producing industries, 
reaching over 25 per cent in the US and 17 per cent in the EU, on an annual 
average basis, over the second half of the 1990s (Graph  8). While these 
industries only account for between 1-2 per cent of EU and US GDP 
respectively, by virtue of their exceptionally high growth rates, they 
contributed 13 per cent (EU) and 30 per cent (US) to overall productivity 
growth over the 1996-2000 period. For the intensive ICT-using and non-ICT 
(i.e. less ICT-intensive) manufacturing industries, which combined represent 
by far the largest share of the overall manufacturing sector, the EU has 
consistently outperformed the US over the last 2 decades.  
 
GRAPH 8 : TREND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR IN ICT-PRODUCING 
MANUFACTURING AND INTENSIVE ICT-USING PRIVATE SERVICES 
(ANNUAL % CHANGE) 

























SOURCE : DG ENTERPRISE / GGDC AND OWN CALCULATIONS 
NOTE : SCALES ARE DIFFERENT FOR THE ICT-PRODUCING MANUFACTURING AND ICT-USING SERVICES GRAPHS. 
 
•  In addition, despite having productivity growth rates which were much lower 
than those of the ICT-producing industries, nevertheless given their higher 
share in EU GDP, these industries made, until recently, a higher contribution 
to overall productivity growth in the EU. For the US, the ICT-producing 
industries have consistently outperformed the rest of US manufacturing over 
the period as a whole. 
•  Thirdly, in terms of private services industries, which account for 55 and 57 
per cent of overall EU and US output respectively, the EU has consistently 
outperformed the US in terms of ICT-producing services (i.e. mainly 
telecommunications), and indeed up until the mid 1990s in all areas of 
services. However, over the second half of the 1990s, the US has pulled 
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significantly ahead in ICT-using private services industries (see Graph 8). In 
terms of contributions to total productivity growth, since ICT-using services 
industries are substantially larger in terms of GDP than the ICT-producing 
services sector, they are crucial in determining the growth rate for services as 
a whole, especially in the US. As Table  7 shows, ICT-using services 
contributed well over half of all US productivity growth in the second half of 
the 1990s. For the non-ICT (i.e. the less intensive-ICT-using) service 
industries, which collectively form the largest share of total services, the EU 
had been consistently outperforming the US up until the most recent period. 
•  Finally, as Table  8 shows, within the ICT-producing and ICT-using 
categories, the 5 most important individual industries, in terms of 
contributions to economy-wide productivity growth, are semiconductors and 
other electronic equipment; telecommunications; wholesale trade; retail trade; 
and financial services. In 4 of these 5 industries (telecommunications is the 
exception), the EU has to radically improve its performance over the coming 
years in order to match the US position, with the 5 specific industries shown 
in Table 8 contributing 80 per cent of the US total productivity growth rate 
over the 1996-2000 period, compared with only 40 per cent in the case of the 
EU. 
 
In overall terms, therefore, the story which has emerged from Table 7 and Graph 8 is 
one in which the US has pulled ahead of the EU over recent years in terms of 
productivity growth rates. This is essentially due to the superior performance of the 
US in a wide range of ICT-producing and ICT-using industries. This conclusion 
applies to both the manufacturing and services sectors as a whole. In manufacturing, 
while EU productivity growth rates in ICT-producing industries are not dramatically 
different from those in the US, unfortunately the size of the EU ICT-producing sector 
is much smaller than the equivalent sector in the US, and the contribution to overall 
productivity growth is correspondingly smaller. With regard to services, which is the 
main source of the US productivity advantage over the EU, the US appears to have 
benefited enormously from substantial investments in the intensive ICT-using service 
industries such as wholesale and retail trade and financial services. Finally, regarding 
the non-ICT part of the respective economies, the slowdown in the EU’s productivity 
growth rate in both the “rest of manufacturing” and the “rest of services” categories is 
marked over the most recent period. These industries collectively still account for 
over 40 per cent of EU GDP. The US has also experienced a slowdown in 
productivity growth in these, relatively less high-tech, manufacturing industries, 












- 30 -  
 
TABLE 8 : FIVE MOST IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES FROM AN EU + US  
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PERSPECTIVE (1996-2000)* 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH RATE 






EU US EU US EU US 
ICT-PRODUCING MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
1.SEMICONDUCTORS AND OTHER ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 
(1981-1990)  22.6 23.3 0.2 0.4 0.04 0.09
(1991-1995)  35.6 38.2 0.1 0.6 0.05 0.22
(1996-2000)  57.3 52.9 0.2 0.9 0.10 0.46
ICT-PRODUCING SERVICE INDUSTRIES
2. POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
(1981-1990)  5.0 1.0 2.1 2.8 0.10  0.03
(1991-1995)  6.3 2.4 2.2 2.3 0.14  0.05
(1996-2000)  10.0 5.9 2.4 2.4 0.24  0.14
ICT-USING SERVICE INDUSTRIES
3.WHOLESALE TRADE
(1981-1990)  2.2 2.8 4.7 6.3 0.10  0.17
(1991-1995)  3.3 2.9 4.9 5.5 0.16  0.16
(1996-2000)  2.0 8.3 5.0 5.6 0.10  0.47
4.RETAIL TRADE
(1981-1990)  2.0 3.1 4.7 6.9 0.10  0.21
(1991-1995)  1.7 2.0 4.8 6.5 0.08  0.13
(1996-2000)  1.6 6.6 4.7 6.5 0.07  0.43
5.FINANCIAL SERVICES**
(1981-1990)  2.2 -0.7 4.7 4.7 0.11  -0.03
(1991-1995)  0.8 1.7 5.5 5.9 0.05  0.10
(1996-2000)  2.9 5.0 5.4 7.1 0.16  0.35
TOTAL OF ABOVE 5 INDUSTRIES***
(1981-1990)  2.9 2.3 16.3 21.1 0.45 (19) 0.47 (43)
(1991-1995)  2.7 3.2 17.5 20.8 0.48 (21) 0.66 (60)
(1996-2000)  3.7 8.3 17.6 22.4 0.67 (42) 1.85 (80)
SOURCE : DG ENTERPRISE / GGDC AND OWN CALCULATIONS 
* These are the five most important industries in terms of growth rates if one takes the average of the EU and US economies 
(note : the sixth industry in this ranking is office machinery).  There is a different ranking of course if one looks at the top 5 
industries for the EU and the US separately in terms of contributions to labour productivity growth (which is what is done in  
Box 1). For the EU the 5 industries with the fastest growth rates were telecommunications; financial services; electricity, gas 
and water supply; office machinery; and wholesale trade.  Compared with the list shown in Table 8, it is interesting that the EU 
is experiencing fast productivity gains in recently liberalised industries such as the utilities. For the US, the top 5 were 
s miconductors and other electronic equipment; wholesale trade; retail trade; financial services; and telecommunications.   e
** Financial services includes financial intermediation, insurance and pension funding and auxiliary financial services 
*** Share of total labour productivity growth is given in brackets. 
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BOX 1 : TOP 10 INDUSTRIES IN THE EU AND THE US
31 
 
TABLE A : TOP 10 INDUSTRIES IN EU (MEASURED IN TERMS OF CONTRIBUTION TO 
TOTAL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATE) (1996-2000) 
CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH RATE OF   
INDUSTRIES 
(SHARE OF TOTAL VALUE ADDED / SHARE OF 








1.TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2.4 / 1.6)  0.24 0.01  0.24 
2. FINANCIAL SERVICES (5.4 / 3.3)  0.16 0.02    0.20 
3. ELECTRICITY, GAS & WATER (2.4 / 0.8)  0.14 -0.03    0.06 
4. OFFICE MACHINERY (0.2 / 0.1)  0.12 -0.01    0.12 
5. WHOLESALE TRADE (5.0 / 4.0)  0.10 0.07  0.18 
6. AGRICULTURE (2.3 / 5.2)  0.10 -0.12    0.04 
7. SEMICONDUCTORS (0.2 / 0.1)  0.10 0.01  0.10 
8. CHEMICALS (2.2 / 1.2)  0.09 -0.01  0.07 
9. RETAIL TRADE (4.7 / 8.7)  0.07 0.09  0.12 
10. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION + DEFENCE (6.8  / 7.3)  0.07 -0.02  0.05 
TOTAL OF 10  INDUSTRIES  (%  SHARE OF ALL 
INDUSTRIES IN BRACKETS) 
1.18 (73)  0.0 (0)  1.18 (44) 
* Employment adjusted for hours worked 
TABLE B : TOP 10 INDUSTRIES IN US (MEASURED IN TERMS OF CONTRIBUTION TO 
TOTAL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATE) (1996-2000) 
CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH RATE OF   
INDUSTRIES 
(SHARE OF TOTAL VALUE ADDED / SHARE OF 








1.WHOLESALE TRADE (5.6 / 5.4)  0.47 0.08  0.55 
2. SEMICONDUCTORS  (0.9 / 0.3)  0.46 0.01    0.49 
3. RETAIL TRADE (6.5 / 10.5)  0.43 0.11    0.50 
4. FINANCIAL SERVICES (7.1 / 4.4)  0.35 0.10    0.52 
5. OFFICE MACHINERY (0.4 / 0.2)  0.24 -0.01  0.22 
6. AGRICULTURE (1.5 / 2.5)  0.16 -0.01    0.15 
7. TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2.4 / 1.6)  0.14 0.04  0.21 
8. REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES (10.3 / 1.2)  0.12 0.03  0.36 
9. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION + DEFENCE (9.2  / 6.5)  0.08 0.02  0.11 
10. ELECTRICITY, GAS &WATER (2.6/ 0.8)  0.06 -0.01  0.02 
TOTAL OF 10  INDUSTRIES  (%  SHARE OF ALL 
INDUSTRIES IN BRACKETS) 
2.50 (109)  0.37 (42)  3.12 (72) 
* Employment adjusted for hours worked 
                                                 
31 The contributions to the growth rate of labour productivity and of value added (1
st and 3
rd columns) are the 
growth rates of the relevant variable multiplied by their share in total value added. For the contribution to the 
growth rate of labour input (2
nd column), the growth rate is multiplied by its share in total employment. Therefore, 
when the share in value added is close to the share in employment, the third column is close to / equal to the sum 
of the first two columns (i.e. value added growth is equal to the sum of labour productivity and employment). 
When the shares in value added and in employment are very different, like in the case of “Real Estate Activities”, 
we observe large differences. (Note : The rankings in Table 8 and Box 1 are not directly comparable). 
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2.2.3  :  HOW DO THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER  STATES PERFORM ? :  As with the 
aggregate analysis in Section  1, it is important to differentiate the overall EU 
performance from that of the individual Member States. As Tables 9a-9d show, the 
deterioration in the EU’s trend productivity growth rate is largely due to the 
performance of a number of the larger Member States, most notably Italy.  
 
As with the analysis at the overall EU level, labour productivity trends in the 
individual Member States are determined for the most part by the non-farm business 
sector. Table 9d shows how the EU Member States have been performing over the 
second half of the 1990s, in terms of this crucial sector (Tables 9b and 9c show the 
figures for 1981-1990 and 1991-1995 respectively). Again, there is an extremely wide 
range of experiences, from zero productivity growth in the business sector in the case 
of Spain to 6 per cent in the case of Ireland. Three EU countries, namely Ireland, 
Austria and Portugal, achieved business sector productivity growth rates which 
matched or even exceeded that of the US over the second half of the 1990s. Within 
the total business sector of these countries, Austria and Portugal managed to achieve a 
reasonable balance between manufacturing and service industries. In Ireland, on the 




TABLE 9A : CONTRIBUTIONS TO TOTAL EU-15 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
1981-2000 
  1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 
BELGIUM  0.09 0.07 0.07 
DENMARK  0.04 0.04 0.03 
GERMANY  0.54 0.59 0.56 
GREECE  0.02 0.01 0.04 
SPAIN  0.21 0.13 0.03 
FRANCE  0.57 0.27 0.25 
IRELAND  0.03 0.03 0.06 
ITALY  0.28 0.38 0.09 
LUX  0.01 0.00 0.00 
NETHS  0.12 0.06 0.06 
AUSTRIA  0.06 0.09 0.08 
PORTUGAL  0.03 0.02 0.04 
FINLAND  0.04 0.06 0.03 
SWEDEN  0.06 0.07 0.06 
UK  0.32 0.45 0.29 
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TABLE  9B : HOURLY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH : 1981-1990  
(CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MANUFACTURING, PRIVATE SERVICES AND REST OF ECONOMY) 
1. CONTRIBUTION FROM 
MANUFACTURING 
2. CONTRIBUTION FROM 
PRIVATE SERVICES 




( 1 + 2 + 3 ) 
TOTAL 
 NON-FARM  
BUSINESS 
SECTOR 




















FROM REST OF 
ECONOMY 
(PRIMARY INDUSTRIES 
+ PUBLIC SERVICES) 
(LESS INTENSIVE ICT 
USING INDUSTRIES)
BELGIUM  2.6                 2.5 1.4 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.1  0.1 0.5 0.5 0.2 
DENMARK  2.2                 1.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.0  0.1 0.5 0.4 0.8 
GERMANY  2.1                 1.8 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.0  0.1 0.4 0.5 0.3 
GREECE  1.0                 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7  0.1 -0.1 0.8 0.1 
SPAIN  3.1                 2.4 1.5 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.9  0.0 0.3 0.6 0.8 
FRANCE  3.0                 2.4 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.6  0.2 0.8 0.7 0.6 
IRELAND  4.5                 3.3 2.5 0.5 0.3 1.4 0.4  0.0 0.4 -0.1 1.2 
ITALY  2.1                 1.7 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.6  0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 
LUX  3.7                 3.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.9 1.9  0.2 1.1 0.7 0.7 
NETHS  2.3                 1.9 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.1  0.0 0.5 0.6 0.4 
AUSTRIA  2.8                 2.4 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.2  0.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 
PORTUGAL  3.1                 2.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.4 1.3  0.1 0.7 0.4 1.0 
FINLAND  3.1                 2.5 1.5 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.1  0.1 0.5 0.5 0.6 
SWEDEN  1.6                 1.5 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6  0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 
UK  2.1                 2.1 1.6 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.7  0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 
EU15  2.4                 2.0 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0  0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 
US  1.1                 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4  0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Source : DG Enterprise / GGDC and own calculations 




TABLE  9C : HOURLY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH : 1991-1995  
(CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MANUFACTURING, PRIVATE SERVICES AND REST OF ECONOMY) 
1. CONTRIBUTION FROM 
MANUFACTURING 
2. CONTRIBUTION FROM 
PRIVATE SERVICES 
   
TOTAL 
ECONOMY 


























FROM REST OF 
ECONOMY 
(PRIMARY INDUSTRIES 
+ PUBLIC SERVICES) 
(LESS INTENSIVE ICT 
USING INDUSTRIES)
BELGIUM  2.5                 1.9 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.1  0.1 0.9 0.2 0.6 
DENMARK  1.9                 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6  0.3 0.1 0.2 0.8 
GERMANY  2.4                 1.9 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.9  0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 
GREECE  0.8                 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.3  0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.4 
SPAIN  1.7                 1.3 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6  0.0 -0.2 0.7 0.4 
FRANCE  1.5                 1.4 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6  0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 
IRELAND  4.1                 3.2 2.4 0.8 0.4 1.1 0.8  0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.8 
ITALY  2.3                 1.9 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.0  0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 
LUX  2.2                 1.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.9  0.3 0.6 0.2 0.5 
NETHS  1.4                 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 
AUSTRIA  3.8                 2.9 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.6  0.2 0.8 0.7 0.9 
PORTUGAL  2.1                 1.4 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7  0.2 0.0 0.4 0.7 
FINLAND  2.9                 3.0 1.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.7  0.1 0.1 1.6 0.3 
SWEDEN  2.0                 2.1 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.2  0.2 0.4 0.7 0.0 
UK  3.1                 2.5 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.5  0.2 0.5 0.9 0.7 
EU15  2.3                 1.8 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0  0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 
US  1.1                 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.5  0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.1 
Source : DG Enterprise / GGDC and own calculations 
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TABLE  9D : HOURLY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH : 1996-2000  
(CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MANUFACTURING, PRIVATE SERVICES AND REST OF ECONOMY) 
1. CONTRIBUTION FROM 
MANUFACTURING 
2. CONTRIBUTION FROM 
PRIVATE SERVICES 
   
TOTAL 
ECONOMY 
( 1 + 2 + 3 ) 
 
TOTAL 
 NON-FARM  
BUSINESS 
SECTOR 




















FROM REST OF 
ECONOMY 
(PRIMARY INDUSTRIES 
+ PUBLIC SERVICES) 
(LESS INTENSIVE ICT 
USING INDUSTRIES)
BELGIUM  2.2                 2.1 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.2  0.3 0.2 0.8 0.2 
DENMARK  1.4                 1.3 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7  0.2 0.7 -0.2 0.2 
GERMANY  2.0                 1.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.2  0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 
GREECE  2.6                 2.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.7  0.2 0.6 0.8 0.3 
SPAIN  0.5                 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1  0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.3 
FRANCE  1.4                 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3  0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.3 
IRELAND  7.6                 6.0 5.2 2.5 1.0 1.7 1.3  0.1 0.5 0.6 0.8 
ITALY  0.7                 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.2 0.3 -0.5 0.2 
LUX  1.5                 1.3 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.8  0.2 0.6 0.0 0.1 
NETHS  1.3                 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.9  0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 
AUSTRIA  2.7                 2.4 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.3  0.1 0.6 0.6 0.3 
PORTUGAL  3.0                 2.3 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.1  0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 
FINLAND  2.2                 1.5 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.5  0.2 0.5 -0.1 0.4 
SWEDEN  2.1                 1.2 0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.9  0.2 0.6 0.1 0.7 
UK  2.2                 1.9 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.4  0.2 0.9 0.3 0.3 
EU15  1.6                 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7  0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 
US  2.3                 2.3 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.1 1.5  0.0 1.3 0.1 0.0 
Source : DG Enterprise / GGDC and own calculations 
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2.3   WHAT PROPORTION OF ECONOMY-WIDE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH CAN 
BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE EFFECT OF ICT (ICT INVESTMENTS AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS 
IN  ICT-PRODUCING INDUSTRIES)  :  Section  2.2 described the contribution of ICT-
producing and ICT-using industries to overall labour productivity growth. Although 
this analysis suggests that the production and use of ICT technologies is playing an 
important role, it is not possible to infer how much of the productivity increases are 
directly linked to ICT investments in the economy and to innovation in ICT-
producing industries. The present section, using the “Industry Growth Accounting 
Database” provides a quantification of the overall contribution of ICT to labour 
productivity trends via the investment and TFP transmission channels. This is done 
by calculating firstly, the contribution to capital deepening from investment in ICT 
and secondly by measuring the contribution to TFP growth from technical progress in 
ICT-producing industries in both the manufacturing and services sectors (see Annex 2 
for details).  
 
As explained at the start of Section 2, due to significant data constraints in terms of 
capital stock data for the respective industries, the EU average used for this exercise 
is made up of only 4 countries. These countries do, however, provide a reasonably 
representative picture for the EU as a whole since they include France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK which collectively account for nearly 2/3 of EU GDP.  
 
In order to reflect the respective contributions from the ICT and non-ICT parts of the 
economy to overall investment and TFP trends, Graphs 9 and 10 give a breakdown of 
labour productivity into the contributions from capital deepening and TFP. This 
decomposition shows : 
•  firstly, that whilst investment in ICT equipment contributed positively to 
labour productivity growth in the EU4 over the second half of the 1990s, the 
contribution was substantially less than that in the US, and if anything the gap 
appears to be widening in favour of the US.  
•  secondly, that non-ICT capital deepening has fallen significantly in the EU 
over the 1996-2000 period, with only part of the relatively poor investment 
performance due to the higher labour content of growth (with perhaps, as 
mentioned in Section  1, other factors such as locational investment 
considerations or adverse demographic trends playing a role). Over the same 
period the US has experienced a small acceleration in its trend rate of non-ICT 
capital spending. 
•  thirdly, in terms of TFP, the contribution of technical progress in ICT-
producing industries such as semiconductors and telecommunications 
equipment has been consistently higher in the US since the early 1990s but the 
divergence with the EU is not as high compared with ICT investment 
spending due to the good performance of the EU in the telecommunications 
industry.  
•  finally, the contribution to TFP from the non-ICT-producing industries has 
shown a slight downward trend since the late 1980s in the EU, with the US 
sharing this trend up until around the mid-1990s but with a clear upward 
pattern emerging over the last years of the 1990s.
32 This upward pattern may 
                                                 
32  Research by Baily and Lawrence (2001) and Oliner and Sichel (2002) would support this empirical finding. 
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be suggestive of some positive growth spillovers from ICT investment, 
including both embodiment effects associated with a more modern capital 
stock and possible tangential gains in areas such as network externalities.
33 
 
In overall terms, from the ICT investment and TFP channels described above, it 
would appear that ICT was contributing roughly 60 per cent of US labour 
productivity growth at the end of the 1990s compared with around 40 per cent in the 
case of the EU-4.  
 
























Source : DG Enterprise / GGDC and own calculations 
 
GRAPH 10 : BREAKDOWN OF TREND TFP INTO ICT AND NON-ICT COMPONENTS 
Non-ICT 
Contribution to TFP




















Source : DG Enterprise / GGDC and own calculations 
                                                 
33   In trying to assess spillover effects in ICT-using industries, caution is undoubtedly warranted since researchers 
are confronted with 2 major difficulties, firstly measurement problems in a number of the intensive ICT-using 
industries, such as financial services, wholesale and retail trade; and secondly, identifying the long-run impact 
of innovative, ICT-based, businesses and markets, many of which are now only in the start-up phase of their 
operations. For a discussion of these issues see Coppel (2000); Fixler and Zieschang (1999); Gullickson and 
Harper (1999); and Moulton, Parker and Seskin (1999). 
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MAIN CONCLUSIONS TO BE RETAINED FROM SECTION 2 : 
•  Firstly, the industry analysis confirms the broad conclusion from the 
aggregate analysis in Section 1, namely that the US has achieved a significant 
turnaround in its labour productivity performance over the second half of the 
1990s whereas the EU’s long-run trend of declining productivity growth has, 
if anything, accelerated over the same period. 
•  Secondly, the superior performance of the US in ICT-producing 
manufacturing and ICT-using service industries is the source of the diverging 
productivity trends. While the ICT-producing manufacturing industries have 
been growing at a substantially faster pace than the associated ICT-using 
service industries, nevertheless it is the latter grouping which accounts for the 
largest part of the US upsurge in productivity. This higher contribution to 
growth from ICT-using service industries simply reflects their higher share in 
overall value added.  Measurement issues also need to be borne in mind. 
•  The individual EU Member States show a high degree of dispersion in their 
respective performances, with four EU countries (Greece, Ireland, Austria and 
Portugal) all achieving labour productivity growth rates which matched or 
even exceeded those of the US over the period 1996-2000.  
•  Finally, Section  2.3 concluded that the overall contribution to labour 
productivity growth from ICT investments and from technical progress in the 
production of ICT goods and services accounted for about 60 per cent of US 
labour productivity growth over the second half of the 1990s, compared with 
40 per cent in the EU. If one was to apply these ratios to the aggregate labour 
productivity growth rates given in Section  1, this would translate over the 
second half of the 1990s into an ICT contribution to labour productivity 
growth of around 1 percentage point in the US and 2/3 of a percentage point 
in the case of the EU. 
BULK OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN EU & US EMANATES FROM WITHIN
SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES RATHER THAN FROM A RE-ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
BETWEEN INDUSTRIES
FIVE KEY INDUSTRIES
1996-2000 : ICT RESPONSIBLE FOR 60% OF US + 40% OF EU LABOUR
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
EU-US LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS DRIVEN





SEMICONDUCTORS COMMUNICATIONS RETAIL TRADE FINANCIAL SERVICES WHOLESALE TRADE
Industry Level Analysis
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SECTION 3 : KEY MACRO DETERMINANTS OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH – AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Following on from the aggregate and industry analyses in Sections 1 and 2, the 
present section builds on the insights gained so far in terms of explaining the relative 
growth performances of the EU and the US economies over the 1980s and the 1990s. 
While the highly industry-specific nature of the growth rate differentials in recent 
years cannot be disputed, it is nevertheless important to place these stylised facts into 
a more policy relevant context by examining the factors which have shaped the wider 
economic environment in both the EU and the US over recent decades. 
3.1  :  THE BASIC PRODUCTIVITY DETERMINANTS : The achievement of a better 
understanding of the key determinants of productivity growth has been high on the 
research agenda of international organisations and the academic community for some 
decades now.
34 The present research represents an attempt to combine a detailed 
knowledge of these growth determinants (based on reviews of the literature and 
regression analysis) with the central policy concerns of European governments. It 
identifies five areas which are both quantitatively important for productivity and 
relevant in a European context i.e. the level of regulation; the structure of financial 
markets; the degree of product market integration; the size of knowledge investment; 
and the ageing of the labour force. 
•  LEVEL OF REGULATION : In recent studies both the OECD (2003) and the IMF 
(2003) have stressed that levels of regulation are potentially crucial driving forces 
for efficiency gains. Given the EU’s relatively weak performance on a range of 
different measures of regulation, the IMF study concluded that deregulating the 
EU economy to US levels could increase output by nearly 7 per cent and 
productivity by 3 per cent in the longer term (see Bayoumi et al. (2003)). The 
OECD study pointed to deleterious effects in terms of physical investment rates 
and to a particularly negative impact from regulation in a panel of OECD service 
industries. 
•  STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS : In academic discussions a lot of attention 
has been given to the link between financial markets and growth (see, for 
example, Levine (1997)). Special emphasis is devoted to the question of the 
relative effectiveness of bank based or equity based financial systems. Could 
stockmarkets, for example, have special advantages in the commercial assessment 
of innovations or as vehicles for fostering international portfolio and direct 
investment? The question of financial market efficiency is also a central concern 
for the EU authorities, with the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
summarising a large set of policy initiatives aimed at improving the functioning of 
the EU’s financial architecture. 
•  PRODUCT MARKET INTEGRATION : Related to the creation of the single market 
and EMU, the relationship between trade integration and productivity growth 
becomes relevant. Here again recent studies (see, for example Frankel and Rose 
(2000) and Alesina et al. (1998)) suggest significant gains from further 
integration. In this context, the initial benefits from increased trade openness 
                                                 
34 See, for example, Bassanini, Hemmings and Scarpetta (2001). 
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amongst Euro area Member States are already beginning to emerge in the post-
EMU environment.  
•  KNOWLEDGE  INVESTMENT  : With the striking impact of ICT, there has been 
considerable interest in analysing the effects of investments in knowledge and 
human capital formation. With Europe lagging behind not only in terms of ICT 
penetration rates but also with regard to other indicators of knowledge production 
(such as R&D investments and the share of high tech industries) the creation of 
knowledge capital has emerged as a central policy concern. Both the Lisbon 
process and the more recent EU growth initiative are concrete examples of 
ongoing policy programmes aimed at boosting the pace of innovation. 
•  AGEING : An unavoidable consequence of declining birth rates is an ageing of the 
labour force. While so far there has been little research carried out on the possible 
consequences of ageing for productivity, nevertheless there is a widespread 
suspicion that an older labour force will be less adept in creating and adopting 
new technologies. Given the magnitude of the demographic transition in Europe, 
it seems appropriate to explore the possible consequences for productivity of this 
“greying” phenomenon. 
 
DI AGRAM 1 : BASI C GROWTH DETERMI NANTS
A.  SI ZE OF GOVERNMENT
B.  DEGREE OF REGULATI ON
C.  FI NANCI AL MARKETS




A.  DEGREE OF TRADE
OPENNESS
B. POPULATION SIZE
3.  DEMOGRAPHI CS +
LABOUR SUPPLY
A.  YOUTH DEPENDENCY RATI O
B.  LABOUR SUPPLY (MEASURED
AS HOURS WORKED)




(i.e. K N O W LED G E)
A . PH YSIC A L IN VESTM EN T
-Domestic Investment (ICT+Non-ICT)
-Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
B.  EDUCATI ON LEVELS
C.  KNOWLEDGE I NVESTMENT
(R & D  IN TEN SITY)*
 
*Knowledge investment is in fact defined in much wider terms in the analysis to include spending on higher 
education, software as well as R&D spending. 
 
In order to integrate all these diverse aspects into a unifying framework, growth 
regressions are used to draw lessons from the growth experiences of OECD member 
states over the last 2½ decades. In a more forward looking perspective, estimated 
multipliers are employed to provide some tentative projections concerning the 
possible impact of specific policy measures. On the analytical side an attempt is made 
to integrate recent developments in endogenous growth theory into the specification. 
This burgeoning growth literature combined with the distinctive nature of recent 
growth patterns has underlined the importance of knowledge production for 
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productivity growth. In broad terms growth theory isolates two productivity 
enhancing channels, namely capital deepening and technical progress which is 
deemed proportional to knowledge. By looking at how these basic growth elements 
affect knowledge and physical capital formation enables one to establish a more 
nuanced understanding of the channels through which they affect productivity. A 
detailed technical description of the model used as well as a discussion of the 
theoretical linkages is provided in Annex 1, which also contains the regression 
results.  
 
It must be mentioned at the outset that we are far from a complete understanding of 
the determinants of productivity. The growth experience since the mid 1990s is a 
reflection of continuous structural changes. Any empirical study which draws on past 
data must be aware of these shifts. Special emphasis will therefore be devoted to the 
issue of understanding recent trends. In interpreting these trends two main questions 
arise, firstly how do the basic growth determinants affect physical investment and 
knowledge production, and secondly what is the relative importance of physical and 
knowledge capital formation for productivity growth. 
 
3.2  :  HOW DO THE BASIC GROWTH DETERMINANTS AFFECT INVESTMENT AND 
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION ? 
When analysing investment one has to take into account the fact that its structure is 
changing in at least two important dimensions:  
•  Firstly, the growth in the importance of more knowledge intensive forms of 
investment : The share of ICT investment in total investment has grown 
steadily over the 1990s, with the ICT share of non-residential gross fixed 
capital formation in the US presently approaching 1/3. ICT investment itself 
has not only a larger knowledge share in terms of software and R&D spending 
but is also complementary to skilled labour. In addition, overall R&D 
spending (whilst still comparatively small in terms of overall GDP) is playing 
a more prominent role in many of the more advanced economies.  
•  Secondly, the observed increase in the international mobility of capital : 
Technology, allied to globalisation and capital market liberalisation, has 
generated a huge increase in the volume of capital movements in general and 
FDI flows in particular. The growing importance of multinationals in 
determining worldwide investment trends is reflected in the fact that the stock 
of FDI assets have grown from around 5 per cent of world GDP in the mid 
1980s to over 15 per cent at the end of the 1990s (see Box 2). In order to 
capture these structural shifts, it is important not only to look at aggregate 
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BOX 2 : FDI  
 
 
GRAPH A : FDI INFLOWS : TREND SHARES OF WORLD TOTAL FOR EU, US, JAPAN 
AND CHINA (1980-2002) 
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Source : UNESCO and own calculations 
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TABLE A : TREND PERCENTAGE SHARES OF TOTAL EU FDI INFLOWS  
(1970-2002) 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 
BELGIUM  / 
LUXEMBOURG 
7.0 8.3 9.5  18.2  19.7 
DENMARK  2.5 0.7 1.6 3.1 3.0 
GERMANY  21.5 7.5  4.8 12.3  12.8 
GREECE  0.4 3.1 1.6 0.4 0.3 
SPAIN  2.9  9.7 13.3 5.9  5.4 
FRANCE  10.9 15.3  14.2 13.7 
IRELAND  0.5 1.5 1.0 3.4 3.6 
ITALY  10.1  5.6 5.7 2.7 2.7 
NETHS  12.1 9.8  9.7 10.7  10.7 
AUSTRIA  2.2 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.5 
PORTUGAL  0.9 0.9 2.0 1.2 1.1 
FINLAND  0.4 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.3 
SWEDEN  1.3 1.3 4.3 6.8 6.5 
UK  27.2 35.6 27.9 18.5 17.8 
17.3 
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3.2.1 DETERMINANTS OF PHYSICAL INVESTMENT : Amongst all the various growth 
determinants assessed in the regression analysis in Annex 1, regulation appears to be 
the most important driver of investment rates. The degree of regulation plays an 
especially important role for foreign direct investment but it is also a crucial driver for 
new forms of investment such as ICT. These results are consistent with a recent 
empirical study by Alesina et al (2003) which uses OECD regulatory indices for 
service industries. As discussed in Annex 1, these results are in accordance with 
theoretical priors. There is also some evidence that equity based financial systems are 
more favourable to physical investment. Again, FDI flows are positively correlated 
with a more equity based structure for financial markets. Finally, education appears to 
be an important factor for foreign direct investment. These results suggest that in an 
environment characterised by increasing international capital mobility, levels of 
regulation, financial market conditions and human capital endowments are important 
determinants for the attractiveness of a country as an investment location.  
 
DETERMINANTS OF R&D INVESTMENT : The determinants of knowledge investment 
are different to those of physical investment. Firstly, R&D is less affected by the 
regulatory environment. What seems to be more important for R&D is market size as 
measured by openness and population size. The lack of importance of regulation for 
R&D could be due to the fact that entry barriers are less important for R&D activities 
which are typically concentrated amongst incumbent firms 
 
Also, theoretically the link between regulation and research intensity is less clearcut. 
Given the sunk cost nature of R&D activities, the prospects of more secure rents 
provided by product market regulations (for example in the form of higher protection 
against violation of property rights from new inventions) may act as an incentive for 
R&D.The sunk cost nature of R&D also makes it plausible that market size matters in 
that firms located in more open and/or larger economies will typically engage more 
strongly in R&D activities. Investments in R&D are usually more risky than in 
physical investments and therefore the attitude of all financial institutions towards the 
financing of such investments is important. More market based financing 
mechanisms, including equity markets and venture capital funds, tend to favour 
riskier investments. This is borne out in the empirical analysis where it is found that 
stock market turnover indices move more closely with R&D investment compared 
with bank credit measures. Whether this can be unambiguously interpreted in a causal 
sense is an open question. An alternative interpretation could be that stock markets 
simply value the returns from R&D investments more highly. This argument would 
be supported by the fact that R&D expenditures can equally well be explained by 
only concentrating on fundamentals such as market size, education and government 
involvement. In this case the role of education as a fundamental determining factor of 
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GRAPH 11 : FRASER INSTITUTE DEREGULATION INDICES 
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Source : Fraser Institute 
 
GRAPH 12 : FINANCIAL MARKET INDICATORS 



















Ratio of Equity Financing 
to Bank Borrowing
Equity Market Capitalisation 
as a % of GDP
 Source : World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002) 
 
3.2.2 KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION : THE EFFECT OF R&D, EDUCATION, MARKET 
SIZE  AND  DEMOGRAPHIC INFLUENCES :  In addition to analysing the specific 
determinants of R&D investment (see Table A1), Annex 1 also assesses the role of 
R&D as one element in the overall knowledge production process in economies 
(Table A2). In this context, the empirical growth literature emphasises knowledge and 
the creation of knowledge via the investment activities of firms, households and the 
government in both R&D and education as crucial for enhancing the level of 
technology (i.e. TFP). As shown in Table A2, both R&D as well as education are 
significant drivers of total factor productivity.  
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Like in the case of R&D, only a limited role is found for deregulation in boosting the 
growth of knowledge.
35 ECFIN’s results broadly occupy a mid-point between a 2003 
joint CEPR and IFS study which reports a negative association between regulation 
and TFP and an OECD (Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003)) study which finds a more 
positive effect of deregulation on TFP. 
 
Trade openness/market size also appears to be especially important. However, it is 
interesting that this particular determinant only affects TFP growth via its impact on 
the level of R&D investment. This is suggestive that country size/scale effects bestow 
no particular efficiency gains in terms of other aspects of productivity growth.  
 
Another important feature revealed by these regression results is the impact of an 
ageing labour force on TFP. Since the mid 1970s the youth dependency ratio has 
declined in all OECD countries. This has led to a reduction in the inflow of young 
workers into the labour force and has increased their mean age. Little is known so far 
on the impact this might have on the creation and adoption of new ideas and 
technologies. The results reported in Table  A2 suggest however that this process 
could have been one of the main contributors to the slowdown in productivity growth. 
 
GRAPH 13 : DEMOGRAPHICS + EDUCATION 




















SOURCE : WORLD BANK, DE LA FUENTE AND DOMÉNECH, OWN CALCULATIONS 
 
WHAT IS THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PHYSICAL INVESTMENT AND KNOWLEDGE 
CAPITAL FORMATION FOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH ? : The previous paragraphs 
have described how the basic determinants affect physical capital formation and the 
creation of knowledge. The present section looks at the relative contribution of these 
two factors to labour productivity growth when they are combined with two other 
                                                 
35 The fact that regulation is neither significant for R&D nor for TFP points in the direction that the link between 
regulation and moving the technology frontier is rather weak. Any gains from deregulation in terms of 
technological catching-up or from privatisations should therefore be interpreted more in terms of static 
efficiency gains and not with the dynamic gains needed for outward shifts in the technology frontier. 
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factors, namely the growth in the employment rate and the potential for catching-up. 
The neoclassical growth model makes fairly precise quantitative predictions 
concerning these four factors, with Annex 1 showing that the estimated labour 
productivity growth contributions from the ECFIN model are very close to those 
predicted by the neoclassical model. The main results are as follows:  
 
1. Physical investments and the impact of regulation :  
•  Physical Investment : A permanent 1 % point increase in gross fixed capital 
formation results in a 1.8 per cent long run effect on the level of labour 
productivity. This is equivalent to an annual average effect of 0.05 on the 
growth rate of labour productivity in the long run (i.e. over 30 years). 
•  Regulation : The implied change of moving to US levels of regulation, as 
measured by the Fraser index, would suggest a long run labour productivity 
effect of about 5 per cent (i.e. 0.15 on the long run growth rate of 
productivity). 
 
2. Knowledge investments (TFP effects) :  
•  R&D : A permanent increase in the share of R&D in GDP of 1 % point would 
increase the long run level of TFP by nearly 18 per cent (i.e. 0.6 of a % point 
on the long run growth rate of productivity).  
•  Education : A permanent increase of 1 year in the average education levels of 
the labour force would lead to a long run level effect on TFP of close to 13 per 
cent (i.e. 0.45 on the long run growth rate of productivity).  
•  Ageing  : A permanent 10 % points decline in the youth dependency ratio 
would reduce the long run level of TFP by 6.8 per cent (i.e. 0.25 on the long 
run growth rate of productivity)  
•  Openness and market size : A permanent 10 % points increase in intra-Euro 
area trade would result in a long run gain in TFP of 3 per cent (i.e. 0.1 on the 
long run growth rate of productivity).  
 
 
3. Hours Worked : A permanent 1 % increase in hours worked lowers the long run 
rate of productivity growth by about 0.25 percent. 
 
 
4. Catching-Up : In terms of the speed of convergence, the results confirm the 
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* This diagram gives an overview of the ECFIN productivity model in terms of the key determinants of capital intensity and 
TFP. The model specifies productivity growth as being generated by 4 distinct activities, namely the investment of firms in both 
physical and knowledge capital, investment of households in human capital and changes in labour supply. As discussed in the 
text and Annex 1, the separate analysis of investment showed clearly that the variables used in the aggregate productivity 
regression affected different types of investment in very different ways. In addition, the separation into gross fixed capital 
formation and R&D also indicated both a physical investment and a TFP channel to labour productivity. Both components are 
manifestly closely linked, and interact with each other in influencing labour productivity, with knowledge investment simply 
being an input into the overall investment process in an economy. In overall terms, consistent with the neoclassical growth 
framework, the ECFIN model predicts that the level of labour productivity is influenced positively via knowledge production 
and the investment rate, and with a negative effect from growth in the labour input (as measured by hours worked). A fourth 
factor, to be considered, would be the potential for catching-up. 
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SECTION 4 : PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The present section provides a number of examples of how this framework can be 
used to further our understanding of past (Sub-section 4.1) and future (Sub-section 
4.2) labour productivity developments. 
 
4.1 HISTORICAL ANALYSES : WERE THE LATE 1990S EXCEPTIONAL IN TERMS OF 
ICT AND LABOUR MARKET TRENDS ? : Here we assess two questions which have 
emerged in the previous sections. Firstly, how large a role did ICT technologies play 
in explaining the growth rate differentials which were experienced and secondly to 
what extent was the slowdown in productivity growth in Europe simply a reflection 
of the higher employment content of growth. 
 
ROLE OF ICT IN THE 1990S : Since the mid 1990s changed patterns and rankings of 
countries in terms of productivity/TFP growth have been increasingly observed. 
Relative productivity growth seems strongly related to the degree to which countries 
have been producing, or investing, in ICT. Given that the knowledge production 
function does not explicitly capture these ICT effects, how can we reconcile this with 
the observed developments? There are four possibilities: 
•  Hypothesis 1: The knowledge generating factors as identified by the 
knowledge production function, namely R&D and human capital investment 
can explain the international TFP growth patterns since the mid 1990s.  
•  Hypothesis 2: There is a large industry specific element which plays a role. 
Countries with high ICT industry shares have benefited from the positive 
productivity shocks taking place in these industries. Alternatively those 
countries which are high ICT users have benefited from technological 
spillovers.  
•  Hypothesis 3: It is true that the ICT revolution was industry specific, but it 
was not confined to a specific country. With high capital mobility, those 
countries which offered attractive investment locations in terms of flexible 
labour and goods markets and/or young labour forces which were open to the 
adoption of new technologies, benefited most from the ICT boom.  
•  Hypothesis 4: Both industry specialisation (Hypothesis 2) as well as 
flexibility in the adoption of new technologies (Hypothesis 3) have interacted 
positively.  
 
ASSESSING THE 4 HYPOTHESES (SEE  TABLE A2.1 IN ANNEX  1) : The empirical 
analysis conducted in Annex 1 is based on explaining the prediction errors for the late 
1990s of the knowledge production function (i.e. did the model under- or over-predict 
TFP per hour growth rates over the period and what can explain these prediction 
errors). It turns out that hypothesis 4 offers the best explanation for the cross country 
variation of prediction errors. As can be seen clearly from Graphs 14 and 15, there is 
a strong relationship between the ICT production share of a country (which is the best 
measure of its degree of industry specialisation), when interacted with either the 
regulatory burden or the age of the labour force, and the size of the deviation of actual 
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TFP growth from the predicted growth rate.
36 This supports the interpretation 
whereby countries, some of which are in the EU, which have low regulatory burdens 
and a comparatively young labour force (creating favourable conditions in terms of 
technology adoption), have been better able to exploit the technological developments 
occurring in the mid-1990s compared with other countries and have consequently 
gained in terms of higher TFP growth. In relative terms, with a strong correlation 
between the ICT production share and TFP growth, the analysis also indicates that 
industry specialisation (Hypothesis 2) is probably more important than the degree of 
regulation and the age of the labour force (Hypothesis 3) in explaining the TFP 
prediction errors. Finally, the clear patterns emerging for these prediction errors also 
leads one to reject Hypothesis 1. 
 
GRAPH 14 :   TFP PREDICTION ERROR CORRELATED WITH ICT PRODUCTION 
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GRAPH 15 : TFP PREDICTION ERROR  CORRELATED WITH ICT PRODUCTION 
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36 The predicted growth rate of TFP would be the rate expected on the basis of the R&D and educational inputs in 
the corresponding country. 
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LINK BETWEEN HOURS  WORKED AND PRODUCTIVITY  DEVELOPMENTS  :  In 
explaining growth patterns over the second half of the 1990s, an assessment of the 
short and long run effects on labour productivity of a significant boost to employment 
(as measured in hours worked) is important to assess the extent to which the present 
downturn in EU labour productivity is a permanent or a short run phenomenon. Since 
the mid 1990s the EU has been experiencing a trend change in labour input. While in 
the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s the growth rate of the labour input was negative on 
average, a positive labour input growth was observed over the period 1996-2002 of 
0.9 per cent on an annual average basis. According to the estimates presented in 
Table A4, this increase in employment growth (when compared to a hypothetical zero 
baseline growth) has had the effect of slowing down EU labour productivity growth 
by about a ¼ of a percentage point per annum over the period in question.  
 
4.2 LISBON SCENARIO : CAN THE EU OVERTAKE THE US IN PRODUCTIVITY AND 
GROWTH TERMS BY 2010 ?  
 
This section focuses on the effects of policy actions in both the TFP and capital 
accumulation areas aimed at boosting future EU labour productivity growth. The 
simulation presented here focuses, for illustrative purposes, on measures aimed at 
achieving the specific Lisbon target of making Europe the most competitive, 
knowledge based, economy in the world by 2010. Realising this ambition will require 
the implementation of far reaching structural reforms in a large number of the 
Member States. Two supply side initiatives have received a lot of media attention, 
namely deregulation and boosting the knowledge economy. In both cases, for 
simplicity, the US will be used as the benchmark: 
 
•  REGULATORY  REFORM  : Due to significant negative effects from the 
regulatory framework on investment, policy makers should consider putting a 
greater emphasis on regulatory changes in their reform agendas. The earlier 
Graph 11 provided, on the basis of Fraser Institute indices
37, a quick overview 
at the EU level of the existing differences with the US. The Graph presented 
both an economy-wide deregulation index as well as one relating specifically 
to the capital, labour and goods markets. It is assumed that EU-US differences 
in terms of the overall economy-wide index are eliminated between now and 
2010. As shown in Annex 1, even a relatively rapid deregulation towards US 
levels would not lead to sufficient productivity gains over the next 7 years to 
close the present efficiency gap of roughly 10 per cent with the US. Even our 
more favourable results (when compared to the IMF WEO (2002)) would only 
give a boost to the level of labour productivity of less than 0.2 annually up 
until 2010 under the condition that reforms are implemented quickly (see 
                                                 
37 The OECD has compiled various regulatory indicators, for example measuring legal barriers to entry or 
administrative burdens for startups. Unfortunately these indicators are normally only available for a single year 
(1998) and therefore they cannot be used to explain changes in economic performance since the mid 1970s. The 
Fraser institute index has the advantage of having a time dimension. It is, however, possible to compare the 
Fraser and OECD indicators by correlating them with each other at least for the year in which both are 
available. In fact both indicators (see CEPR-IFS Study (2003), pp. 64) are highly negatively correlated, which 
should be expected since the Fraser index measures the degree of deregulation whilst the OECD indicators 
measure regulation. The maximum correlation is found for the OECD "administrative burdens on startups 
indicator" (-.57), which suggests that the Fraser index is indeed a reasonable measure for entry barriers. 
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Table A5). A major reason why this would not be sufficient is – according to 
this analysis – the limited dynamic efficiency gains of deregulation. This 
suggests that deregulation must be accompanied by measures which increase 
knowledge production. 
•  KNOWLEDGE  PRODUCTION  : The second element of this illustrative 
“Lisbon” package is action to boost TFP growth. On the TFP side, action is 
needed to boost investment in the knowledge economy, in terms of higher 
spending on third level education, software and R&D.
38 With respect to R&D, 
as Box 3 points out, the focus should not be on boosting public R&D spending 
directly, but on creating the conditions which will promote an endogenous 
increase in research spending.
39 The empirical analysis has identified three 
main channels through which this could be achieved, namely higher product 
market integration, education and more efficient financial markets. Market 
size seems to be a crucial determinant for R&D, since the development of new 
products typically involves large sunk costs. Since research activities are 
human capital intensive, education is an essential requirement for any R&D 
activity. Finally, more equity based financial structures seem to have 
promoted the “riskier” forms of investment, such as R&D, more strongly than 
bank based systems. 
 
GRAPH 16 : INVESTING IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY : EU V US :  
1998 (% OF GDP) 

















SOURCE : OECD 
 
KEY RESULTS OF “LISBON STRATEGY” SIMULATION  : The effect of introducing 
such a large package of supply side reforms over the coming years would be to 
significantly boost EU potential growth rates, on average by between ½ to ¾ of a 
percentage point over a 5-10 year horizon. However, even if one assumes a no-policy 
change scenario in the US, there is no question of the EU overtaking the US over the 
                                                 
38 See OECD (2001) and Guellac and Van Pottelsberghe (2001). For a discussion on recent trends in R&D 
intensity, see OECD (2000) “Science and Technology Outlook”.  
39 The wide variation across industries in the expected returns from R&D activities suggests that direct forms of 
support to specific industries should be avoided in favour of a more market-based, tax credit, approach, except 
in instances where potentially large social benefits can be credibly predicted. 
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timescale laid out by the Lisbon agenda. Apart from the time it will take from the 
implementation of reforms to the appearance of visible effects, there are two further 
obstacles to reaching the productivity target, firstly the need to integrate the 
predominantly low-skilled part of the EU’s potential labour force to reach the Lisbon 
employment target of 70 per cent and secondly the continuous drag on productivity 
induced by Europe’s ageing labour force. This “Lisbon” simulation highlights the 
extent of the challenge facing EU governments in their efforts to boost the supply side 
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BOX 3 : SOME POINTS REGARDING R&D SPENDING IN THE EU AND THE US 
 
This box discusses the issue of R&D spending and TFP growth.  In our view the focus should not be on simply boosting R&D 
spending in the EU directly.  The emphasis must be on creating the conditions which are conducive to an endogenous R&D 
response.  This box would like to stress the following three issues : 
 
•  1. PERSISTENT DIFFERENTIAL IN US AND EU15 EXPENDITURE LEVELS ON R&D :  
 
GRAPH A : R&D EXPENDITURE AS % OF GDP : US + EU15 








Source : OECD 
 
•  2. THE HIGH RISK ATTACHED TO R&D SPENDING : The table below shows clearly that while high R&D spending in 
the ICT area paid off in spectacular fashion, if one looks at other manufacturing sectors which are classified as being R&D 
intensive sectors, the R&D returns are of a much more subdued nature. Nevertheless R&D returns are higher in these non-
ICT, R&D intensive, manufacturing sectors compared with the rest of manufacturing and it is a little unfair to compare 
these more mature R&D intensive industries, such as chemicals and motor vehicles with the newer ICT producing 
industries.  
 
TABLE A : MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES : R&D SPENDING AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
  Average Change in Labour Productivity per Hour  Contribution  to  Total  Change  in  Labour 
Productivity per Hour 
  1980-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 1980-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 
1. ICT-Producing Manufacturing Industries 
EU  13.8 10.3 17.9 0.2  0.2  0.2 
US  15.7 15.0 24.5 0.4  0.4  0.6 
2. Non-ICT Manufacturing but R&D Intensive 
EU  3.1 4.1 2.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
US  1.6 2.2 1.8 0.1 0.2 0.1 
3. Rest of Manufacturing 
EU  3.4 3.0 1.7 0.6 0.4 0.2 
US  1.3 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Source : DG Enterprise / Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC), ECFIN calculations 
 
•   3. HIGHER SHARE OF BUSINESS SECTOR R&D IN TOTAL SPENDING IN THE US + SHARPLY RISING SHARE OF 
SERVICES SECTOR R&D EXPENDITURE : The graphs below underline firstly, that the US has consistently had a much 
higher share of its R&D spending carried out by the business sector as opposed to the government sector and secondly that 
since the late 1980’s there has been a large increase in the divergence between EU and US R&D spending in service 
industries.  At the end of the 1990’s between 30-35% of all R&D spending in the US has occurred in service industries, 
compared with a share  of 10%-15% for the EU.  Is there a link with the performance with the ICT-related service sector as 
a whole which was described in Section 2 ? 
 
GRAPH B : BUSINESS SECTOR R&D EXPENDITURE AS % OF TOTAL  
+ R&D SPENDING ON SERVICES AS % OF TOTAL BUSINESS SECTOR SPENDING 
























% of Total Business R&D
Source : OECD 
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This paper has examined the evidence at both the aggregate and industry levels to 
assess the hypothesis that a new growth pattern has emerged in the US and a small 
number of the EU’s Member States since the mid 1990s. More specifically, the 
objectives of the study were twofold: 
•  Firstly, to establish the stylized facts concerning growth and labour productivity, 
using a growth accounting approach at the aggregate and industry levels; and  
•  Secondly, to exploit a new framework for productivity analysis to derive policy 
lessons from the post-1995 growth experience which, in the context of the Lisbon 
policy strategy, can be harnessed to boost growth and convergence in the EU as a 
whole over the medium to long term. 
 
STYLIZED FACTS : EU employment and productivity growth patterns have diverged 
sharply over recent years. Compared with the first half of the 1990s, the period 1996-
2002 has witnessed a significant increase in the contribution of labour to EU GDP 
growth but unfortunately these gains have been largely offset by a reduction in the 
contribution from labour productivity. By comparison, over the same timeframe, the 
US has enjoyed a combination of strong employment increases allied to an 
acceleration in labour productivity.  
 
Even allowing for the fact that employment and labour productivity trends in the EU 
may be negatively correlated
40, the reversal of past productivity patterns in the 1990s 
relative to the US has nevertheless been striking. For the first time in the post-World 
War II period, the EU is now on a trend productivity growth path which is lower than 
that of the US. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has proved incapable of arresting the 
long-run decline in its productivity performance whereas the US has enjoyed a 
notable recovery in its secular trend. Productivity per hour growth rates in the US 
have in fact started to recover to the rates of growth last experienced in the 1960s. 
While accepting that the present productivity per hour level differences between the 
EU and the US are still only of the order of around 10 per cent
41, on the basis of an 
extrapolation of present trends and policies, and mindful of the ongoing imperative to 
boost employment rates, the EU as a whole looks destined to experience a significant 
widening in its productivity gap relative to the US over the coming years.
42 
                                                 
40 ECFIN estimates that roughly a quarter of the slowdown in EU labour productivity growth over the second half 
of the 1990’s can be attributed to the higher employment content of growth. However, no policy trade-off 
should be implied from this negative correlation, with action on both the employment and productivity fronts 
capable of being taken on a simultaneous basis. Labour market reforms aimed at boosting employment rates 
only lead to a temporary reduction in measured productivity growth, with no negative implications for the long-
run productivity growth of the existing workforce. In addition, a higher employment rate implies an 
unambiguous increase in GDP per capita. 
41 This 10 per cent figure underestimates the differential since the EU has still a long way to go to reach US 
employment rates, which will involve the integration of a significant proportion of low skilled workers which 
will have negative implications for measured labour productivity, at least over the short to medium term. 
42 At the individual EU Member State level, a much more nuanced picture emerges in terms of the EU’s 
performance relative to the US. In terms of labour productivity, over the period 1996-2000, it turns out that 7 of 
the EU’s smaller Member States had performances which were not only well above the EU average but were 
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WHAT EXPLAINS THE DETERIORATION IN THE EU’S LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY TREND 
RELATIVE TO THE US AT THE TOTAL ECONOMY LEVEL? : The most important point 
to underline in terms of aggregate productivity trends is that although a number of the 
EU countries have performed well over the second half of the 1990s, the EU as a 
whole has a productivity problem relative to the US. While the sources of the 
deterioration in EU labour productivity are difficult to disentangle, from a purely 
growth accounting perspective the 1 percentage point decline in labour productivity 
experienced over the period 1996-2002 compared with the first half of the 1990s 
appears to emanate from the following factors: 
•  Firstly, roughly 50 per cent of the decline can be attributed to a reduction in the 
contribution from capital deepening. Within this category, whilst investment in IC 
technologies was contributing positively (but not as positively as in the US), the 
rest of investment performed poorly. The smaller non-ICT capital-deepening 
component in EU labour productivity growth appears to be due firstly to a 
reversal of the unfavourable capital/labour substitution of earlier periods and 
secondly to a more worrying downward trend in non-ICT investment rates 
generally (which may be linked to locational investment considerations or to 
adverse demographic trends). In terms of the capital/labour substitution factor, 
this can be seen as the flip-side of the more employment intensive growth pattern 
experienced over the period. As noted earlier, a move towards full employment 
may entail a temporary reduction in measured productivity growth, but this 
should not be regarded as a trade-off in any sense.  
•  Secondly, the remaining 50 per cent of the decline in labour productivity growth 
emanates from a deterioration in terms of total factor productivity. This probably 
should be seen as the greatest source of concern for policy makers since changes 
in total factor productivity are generally attributed to a more efficient resource 
utilisation emanating from enhanced market efficiency; from technological 
progress resulting from investments in human capital, R&D and information 
technology; or from the natural catching-up process of the less developed EU 
countries through increased business investment in general. Again, as with the 
capital deepening channel, there has been a positive contribution to EU TFP 
growth from ICT (but again less than in the US although the differential is not as 
great as with ICT investment). Consequently, the non-ICT contribution to TFP 
has fallen more than TFP as a whole.  
                                                                                                                                           
also significantly higher than that of the US. 3 of the 7, namely Ireland, Finland and to a lesser extent Sweden 
were also capable of combining strong productivity growth with high labour utilisation rates. 
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WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THE INDUSTRY ANALYSIS ?  :  The industry 
decomposition added some significant new details in terms of our understanding of 
the sources of the EU-US labour productivity differentials. It focussed in particular on 
trying to decompose the overall change in productivity into the effects which can be 
associated with the ICT and non-ICT parts of the economy.
43 It also showed at the 
individual EU country level that it was the deterioration in the productivity 
performance of a number of the larger Member States, most notably Italy, over the 
second half of the 1990s, which was responsible for the deterioration in the overall 
EU performance. 
 
ICT  PART OF EU AND US ECONOMIES (ICT-PRODUCING AND ICT-USING 
INDUSTRIES) : As with the aggregate analysis, the industry breakdown showed that 
ICT has indeed been a significant driver of labour productivity trends in both the US 
and the EU. Accurately measuring the overall contribution from ICT is difficult 
however since it is only possible to directly measure the effect of two of the 
transmission channels from ICT to productivity growth, namely the effect emanating 
from a sharp increase in ICT investment as a share of total investment
44 and secondly 
the contribution from technical progress in ICT-producing industries to overall TFP 
growth. The effect of the third transmission channel (i.e. positive growth spillovers 
from ICT investments, including both embodiment and network externalities) cannot 
be directly measured and consequently is the subject of much controversy. On the 
basis of an assessment of the first two channels, it would appear that around 60 per 
cent of US labour productivity growth at the end of the 1990s can be attributed to ICT 
with a contribution of roughly 40 per cent in the case of the EU. 
 
NON-ICT PART OF EU AND US ECONOMIES : The industry analysis re-affirmed the 
earlier conclusion that ICT is only part of the story behind the rising US and declining 
EU labour productivity trends. Given that ICT has been contributing to both capital 
deepening and TFP in the EU, the deterioration in EU productivity over the two 
halves of the 1990s has therefore occurred in the non-ICT, more traditional, 
industries. Since these industries accounted for around 70 per cent of total EU output 
in the year 2000, it is a source of deep concern that both their capital intensity and 
overall efficiency patterns appear to be deteriorating. In addition, these are the parts 
of an enlarged EU economy which are facing the greatest competitive challenges 
from globalisation. By contrast, for the US, the non-ICT industries showed an 
improving trend for both capital deepening and TFP (but not as dramatic as for the 
ICT-related industries), with some commentators suggesting that part of the 
improvement in non-ICT TFP growth may be due to positive spillover effects from 
ICT investments in other industries
45.  
                                                 
43  This decomposition into ICT and non-ICT industries was based on the GGDC’s ICT intensity breakdown of all 
industries. In total 25 of the 56 industries are classified as either ICT-producing or heavy ICT-using industries, 
with 31 in the non-ICT part of the respective economies. In terms of shares of value added, in the year 2000, 
ICT intensive industries represented 37 per cent of US value added compared with 32 per cent for the EU. 
44  For example in the year 2000, ICT investment represented 30 per cent of all non-residential gross fixed capital 
formation in the US. 
45  It is interesting to note (see Annex 3) that productivity trends in the non-ICT intensive manufacturing industries  
are broadly similar in the EU and the US with both areas experiencing productivity declines.  These are the 
parts of the EU and US economies which at the moment are facing the greatest competitive challenges from 
globalisation (this could soon be extended to the more traditional service industries due to the ICT and 
telecommunication revolutions). It is clear that the US and the EU have both been badly affected by 
competition from low cost producers in China, Mexico and Eastern Europe in these more traditional industries 
such as textiles, footwear and motor vehicle manufacturing.  What is more interesting in terms of explaining 
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MOST IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES FROM A LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PERSPECTIVE : In 
the ICT and non-ICT parts of the US and EU economies there are a total of 56 
different industries but from a labour productivity growth perspective, just 5 of these 
industries dominate the overall patterns, with all of these industries in the ICT-
producing and ICT-using areas of the respective economies.
46 Of these 5 industries, 
the US outperforms the EU in 4, namely in one ICT-producing manufacturing 
industry (i.e. semiconductors and other electronic equipment) and in 3 ICT-using 
service industries (i.e. wholesale trade; retail trade; and financial services). On a more 
encouraging note, the EU is dominant in one ICT-producing service industry, namely 
telecommunications. It is interesting to point out that whilst productivity in ICT-
producing manufacturing industries has been growing at a significantly faster pace 
than the associated ICT-using service industries, it is the latter group of service 
industries which accounts for by far the greatest proportion of the US upsurge in 
productivity.
47 Some caution may therefore need to be exercised given the well-
documented measurement issues in a number of these service industries. 
 
WHAT ROLE COULD POLICIES PLAY IN FUTURE PRODUCTIVITY PATTERNS ?  A 
‘LISBON STRATEGY’ SCENARIO :  Having established the stylized facts from the 
aggregate and industry analyses, the logical next step was to place these results into a 
more policy relevant context. This is particularly important given the diverse 
experiences of the EU’s individual Member States, with many of the latter 
outperforming the US in terms of labour productivity over the period being discussed. 
The key policy question addressed was whether all the EU countries that experienced 
high productivity growth and the US shared certain common characteristics which 
could explain their superior performance. More specifically what were the channels 
via which the more fundamental factors driving growth (i.e. institutions, trade, market 
size, education and labour supply/demographics) affected investment and total factor 
productivity (TFP) in these countries and how did these latter two factors interact to 
generate labour productivity growth.  
 
The productivity model which is developed looks at these issues and specifies 
productivity growth as being generated by 4 distinct activities, namely the investment 
of firms in both physical and knowledge capital, the investment of households in 
human capital formation and changes in labour supply.
48 Using this model, the 
analysis shows that EU-US productivity differentials can in fact be related to some 
fundamental structural differences at the individual country level, with five areas 
                                                                                                                                           
the declining EU trend is what is happening in the traditional service sectors (hotels and restaurants, transport, 
utilities) which still account for 30% of EU output where EU labour market reforms are having a big impact.  
The equivalent US industries have over the last 20 years basically registered no labour productivity growth 
whereas Europe was getting 1 ½ - 2 % annual productivity growth rates from these industries. Over the second 
half of the 1990’s, however, labour market reforms in a number of EU member states have boosted the 
numbers of low skilled workers entering these sectors with a once-off decline in productivity.  
46 If one examines the performance of all 56 industries, the extent of the deterioration in the EU’s performance 
over the two halves of the 1990’s is striking, with 44 of the 56 industries showing a downward trend in their 
productivity performances over the second half of the decade. 
47 This apparent contradiction is explained by the higher share of ICT-using service industries in overall value 
added. 
48 The neoclassical growth model makes fairly precise quantitative predictions concerning these 4 factors, with the 
estimated labour productivity growth contributions from the ECFIN model being very close to those predicted 
by the neoclassical model.  
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being identified as being quantitatively important and relevant in an EU context, 
namely the level of regulation, the structure of financial markets, the degree of 
product market integration, the size of knowledge investment and the ageing of the 
labour force. 
 
The “Lisbon Strategy” simulation at the end of the paper, whilst explicitly 
concentrating on regulatory reform and the knowledge economy, implicitly was an 
attempt to highlight the importance of all these five factors in determining the EU’s 
long run growth performance and for its ambitions to outperform the US in terms of 
potential growth rates (thereby establishing itself as the most competitive, 
knowledge-based, economy in the world):  
•  In terms of boosting investment via regulatory reform, the “Lisbon Strategy” 
simulation showed that even a relatively rapid deregulation towards equivalent 
US levels would not lead to sufficiently large productivity gains over the next 7 
years to close the present 10 per cent efficiency gap with the US. Whilst moving 
to US levels of regulation would lead to a 0.15 increase in the long-run (i.e. over 
30 years) rate of productivity growth, the ECFIN analysis stresses that any gains 
from deregulation in terms of technological catching-up or from privatisations of 
state monopolies should be interpreted more in terms of static efficiency gains and 
not with the dynamic efficiency gains needed to achieve an outward shift of the 
“technology frontier”. This suggests that deregulation, whilst crucial for 
investment, on its own would be insufficient to meet the EU’s “Lisbon” ambitions 
and must therefore be accompanied by concerted efforts aimed at boosting the 
production of knowledge. 
•  In terms of the second element of the “Lisbon” package, namely action to boost 
TFP growth (i.e. the knowledge economy), the recent empirical growth literature 
emphasises knowledge and the creation of knowledge via the investment activities 
of firms, households and the government in both R&D and education as being 
essential for enhancing the level of technology in an economy. The paper points 
to long run productivity gains from investments in both education and R&D.
49 
With respect to R&D, the paper stresses that the focus should not be on boosting 
R&D spending directly, but on creating the framework conditions which would 
promote an endogenous increase in research spending. The empirical analysis in 
this paper identified two main channels through which this could be achieved, 
namely higher product market integration (e.g. completion of the single market 
programme) and an investment environment which ensures the development of a 
more active risk capital market. However, disentangling the different transmission 
channels and even the direction of causality is extremely difficult. For example, 
while, on the one hand, a certain degree of imperfect competition may be 
necessary to cover the costs of knowledge intensive forms of investment such as 
R&D, on the other, there is increasing evidence against the view that firms 
enjoying significant market power plough back excess profits into higher rates of 
R&D and innovation. Rather it appears that a lack of competition tends to provide 
little incentive for firms to pursue technological innovations, slows down its 
                                                 
49 For example, a permanent increase of 1 year in the average education levels of the labour force would lead to a  
0.45 percentage point gain on the EU’s long run rate of productivity growth. R&D is even more potent, with a 
permanent increase in the share of R&D in GDP of 1 percentage point leading to a 0.6 percentage point 
increase in the long run rate of productivity growth.  
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diffusion and impedes a higher variety and quality of goods and services being 
delivered to consumers. 
 
Consequently, in assessing the combined effect of introducing the overall package of 
supply side reforms described in the “Lisbon” simulation, (i.e. deregulation, product 
market integration, human capital development and an investment climate conducive 
to the channelling of financial resources to R&D and other high risk investment 
domains) it is important to underline the uncertainties involved. However, on the 
assumption that the quantitative relationships established in the regression analysis 
hold, this package of supply side reforms would boost EU potential growth rates by 
roughly ½-¾ of a percentage point annually over a 5-10 year horizon. While this 
would undoubtedly represent a significant turnaround in the EU’s present economic 
fortunes, given the extent of the present gap in performance, this package of reforms 
would still not be sufficient for the EU to overtake the US in productivity terms over 
the timescale laid out for the Lisbon agenda. Apart from the time which will need to 
elapse between the implementation of reforms to the appearance of visible effects, 
there are two further obstacles to be overcome in reaching the Lisbon-imposed 
productivity target, firstly the temporary trade-off faced in attaining the parallel 
employment target of 70 per cent and secondly the continuous drag on productivity 
induced by Europe’s ageing labour force.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
At the moment, EU GDP per capita is at around 70 per cent of the US level, with 
roughly 1/3 of the gap due to productivity differentials and 2/3 due to a lower labour 
input (i.e. a lower employment rate and hours worked compared with the US). 
Consequently, improving the EU’s productivity performance and raising employment 
are both fundamental to an increase in the long-term growth potential of the EU 
economy. This study has concentrated on the first aspect of this dual policy path by 
isolating the key drivers explaining the productivity differences between the EU and 
the US and by suggesting a range of policy initiatives aimed at closing the EU’s 
productivity gap over the coming years.  
 
The optimistic view of recent EU productivity trends is that part of the explanation 
for the poor performance could be adjustment lags, with perhaps the basis for future 
growth already firmly established due to the labour, capital and product market 
reforms which have already been introduced. Under this view the EU may now 
simply be in a transition phase whereby some of the negative effects of those reforms 
(e.g. a temporary decrease in productivity due to labour market changes) are visible, 
whilst the gains to be reaped in the future are not. The more pessimistic view (which 
is the one largely supported by the analysis in the present paper) is that a large 
number of Member States have as yet failed to recognise the extent of the reforms 
which need to be introduced given the challenges posed by an acceleration in the pace 
of technological progress, by globalisation (most recently in terms of the growing 
tradability of large parts of the service economy) and finally from the steady greying 
of EU populations.  
 
Whilst based on a different set of indicators to those used for the present analysis, this 
paper’s more pessimistic viewpoint would appear to be borne out by the conclusions 
of the 2003 / 2004 Spring Reports. Realising the difficulties of measuring progress in 
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structural reform, the Commission and the Council devised a set of structural 
indicators which have become one of the main tools for assessing progress in 
achieving the Lisbon objectives. The last two Spring Reports presented very simple 
but highly informative exercises counting the frequency with which each Member 
State was amongst the best or worst performing Member States in the EU on each 
indicator. The results documented that a number of the smaller countries appeared 
repeatedly amongst the top performers. These are precisely the same countries that 
had already undertaken deep and successful reforms well before the launch of the 
Lisbon strategy. On the other hand, some of the larger EU Member States, came out 
as clear laggards with respect to structural reforms. Consequently, as underlined by 
the analysis in the present paper, the strong productivity (and employment) growth 
performances of a number of the smaller EU Member States clearly demonstrates that 
there is nothing inherently wrong with the policy framework established by the 
Lisbon reform strategy. Timely and thorough implementation of the different reform 
measures would appear therefore to be the real Achilles heel of this process. 
 
To conclude, the issue of whether recent EU productivity trends are likely to be 
permanent or transitory was raised at the start of this study. While it is still premature 
to speculate as to the likely answer to this question, what can be said is that the 
outcome will depend on the policy choices which governments make in the policy 
domains outlined earlier. The present paper confirms the importance to the EU’s long 
run productivity performance of a comprehensive reform strategy aimed at reducing 
the regulatory burden, further integrating markets, promoting human capital 
investment and enhancing the innovation potential of the economy. Implementation 
of such a wide-ranging reform agenda would create a more flexible, dynamic and 
investment-friendly business environment which together with better functioning 
markets, and more risk-oriented financing mechanisms, will ultimately be reflected in 
a significant increase in the EU-15’s underlying labour productivity growth rate. 
 
DECLINE IN EU LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (50% DUE TO CAPITAL DEEPENING - 50% DUE TO
TFP)
INCREASE IN US LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (60% DUE TO CAPITAL DEEPENING - 40% DUE
TO TFP)
ICT CONTRIBUTIONS TO LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
60% IN US
40% IN EU
DETERIORATION IN EU LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY DUE TO TRENDS IN NON-ICT INTENSIVE
INDUSTRIES
FIVE KEY DRIVERS OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
1. LEVEL OF REGULATION
2. STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
3. PRODUCT MARKET INTEGRATION
4. KNOWLEDGE INVESTMENT
5. AGEING
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ANNEX 1: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the framework for the empirical analysis presented in this Annex an attempt is 
made to combine standard growth regressions (see, for example, Mankiw et al. 
(1992)) with some new developments in endogenous growth theory. Standard growth 
regressions treat technical progress as exogenous and they therefore miss a large part 
of productivity. The endogenous growth literature makes an attempt to explain 
technical progress as the result of human capital formation both undertaken at the 
household (see, for example, Lucas (1992)) and the firm level (see, for example, 
Romer (1990)) in the form of education and training (for households) and in the form 
of R&D spending (in the case of firms). This literature regards the level of technology 
as being (at least partly) created by a knowledge production function (see Jones 
(2002)).  
 
1.  THE  MODEL:  Output is produced via a conventional neoclassical production 
function. For reasons of analytical convenience and in order to be in conformity with 
most of the literature we assume a Cobb Douglas technology 
(1a)    ()
α α − =
1 * A L K Y
 
Output is produced with capital (K) and labour (L) input which is measured in hours. 
Technical progress is labour augmenting. The level of technology is given by the 
variable A. The level of technology must be regarded as a summary indicator of both 
the knowledge accumulated in the economy and the level of efficiency in which 
factor inputs are used in the production process. Knowledge production is described 
below. With this formulation hourly labour productivity can be decomposed into a 
capital intensity effect and a technology component by reformulating equation (1a) as 
 
(1b)  ()
α α − =
1 A L K L Y  
 
Labour productivity is increased either by capital deepening (K/L) or by the 
accumulation of knowledge (A), with α and (1-α) being their corresponding 
elasticities. Both physical and human capital represent stocks which can be increased 
by corresponding investment activities. Physical capital (we express both physical 
and human capital in per hour terms) evolves according to the following capital 
accumulation equation 
(2)  L L K n L I K ) ( + − = δ &  where  L K K L ≡  
where δ  is the depreciation rate and n is the growth rate of hours worked. Crucial for 
physical capital is investment. In the case of knowledge capital we follow the 












 = &  
 
Knowledge is increased by the investment activities of households and firms. It is a 
positive function of the research intensity of firms as expressed by the R&D to GDP 
ratio (RD/Y) and the level of educational attainment (EDU) of the labour force. We 
correct the average level of education for the time elapsed since the knowledge was 
- 63 -  
created by correcting for the age structure of the labour force. A simple index for this 
is the youth dependency ratio (Ydeprat). Under the assumption that human capital 
depreciates over time one would expect a younger labour force to have a higher 
capacity to create and absorb new ideas and technical developments.  
 
The variable B captures other factors that could potentially affect efficiency. With an 
eye towards the variables of interest in this study, namely regulation, structure of 
financial markets and market size, one can argue that all of them have a potential 
effect on efficiency. For example, more deregulated markets which are open to 
foreign competition improve average efficiency by forcing low productivity firms to 
exit. It is however unclear whether reducing monopoly rents will also increase a 
firm’s incentives to innovate simply because potential rents from the innovation will 
be lower. Increased competition via more openness may be more successful since 
increased market size could compensate for higher competition. Market size (i.e. 
scale effects) can have additional efficiency effects if there are increasing returns to 
production. 
 
Likewise the structure of financial markets can affect efficiency. It has been argued 
recently in the literature (e.g. Levine (1992,1997)) that equity based systems may be 
more efficient in terms of risk sharing, information acquisition and in terms of 
providing management incentives. However, in contrast to this view Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) regard stock markets as having detrimental effects on corporate 
governance. 
 
For empirical testing we formulate the following simple specification for the 
efficiency term in the knowledge production function 
(4)   
κ ϕ φ χ FIN POP OPEN REG B =
where efficiency becomes a function of measures of regulation (REG), market size 
proxied by openness (OPEN) and population size (POP) and a set of financial market 
indicators (FIN). A more precise definition of these variables will be given in the 
following section. 
 
Finally, the question arises of whether an increase in the level of investment in human 
capital will permanently increase the growth rate of knowledge (φ  = 1) or whether 
the marginal product of knowledge capital is declining (φ  < 1). Jones (1995) argues 
forcefully that the stylised facts of declining TFP growth rates and rising human 
capital investments over the last decades is clearly more consistent with the second 
view. 
 
As shown by eqs. (2) and (3), both physical and knowledge capital are driven by 
physical and R&D investment activities correspondingly. Thus, eventually the factors 
influencing investment in both forms of capital will determine the growth rate of 
labour productivity. Since we are interested in how regulation, the structure of 
financial markets, market size as well as the qualification levels of the labour force 
influence investment rates we postulate the following equation 
(5a)     Y FIN POP OPEN REG iy I ) , , , ( =
and 
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(5b)    Y FIN POP OPEN REG rdy RD ) , , , ( =
 
Economic theory provides various justifications for these variables as possible 
predictors of investment rates. 
 
Regulation: The level of regulation affects investment in various ways. First, to the 
extent to which regulation prevents entry, it lowers competition which in turn enables 
firms to earn higher marginal returns which lowers investment. Regulation can also 
affect the investment costs of existing firms and increases capital costs which in turn 
requires higher returns and leads to lower investment rates. Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2002) provide a theoretical framework for a discussion of these effects.  
 
Financial Markets: Another potentially important aspect affecting investment rates is 
access to finance. Allen and Gale (2000) see a special advantage of stock markets in 
the assessment of innovations. This suggests that stock markets should be favourable 
to new forms of investment (or investment undertaken by new firms) as well as R&D 
investment. Wachtel (2001) regards stock markets as a vehicle for fostering 
international portfolio and direct investment. Other authors have a more critical 
attitude towards stock markets, for example Levine and Zervos (1998) see improved 
liquidity as having negative effects on savings rates and therefore on investment. 
 
Market size (Population, Openness):  By endogenising knowledge capital, scale 
effects become more important. This should not have direct effects on the aggregate 
investment to GDP ratio but it is likely to have effects on the allocation of investment 
to different types. The endogenous growth literature (see Romer (1990)) especially 
stresses the sunk costs associated with R&D. Therefore bigger markets associated 
with larger national economies and more open borders should be positively correlated 
with R&D activities. Size effects have played a prominent role in the recent growth 
literature, since the size/growth link is stressed in the first generation of endogenous 
growth models (see Jones (2001)). There is of course a large literature which deals 
with the effect of openness on productivity growth, but only recently Alesina et al. 
(2000) have tried to look systematically into the effects of openness and country size 
on productivity.  
 
Education:  Since education affects the efficiency of labour it affects output and 
investment in the same direction and with the same intensity. Therefore it does not 
affect the investment rate as such. However, the composition of investment may be 
affected in the sense that more knowledge intensive forms of investment (ICT, 
software, R&D) may be complementary to the human capital endowment in the 
respective economy. Education may also play a role in attracting foreign direct 
investment. 
 
After having established investment equations one can determine the dynamic 
adjustment of labour productivity to changes in fundamental economic determinants 
via the impact of physical and knowledge investment on their respective capital 
stocks. The long run level of productivity is given by 
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where   and iy(..) are functions which are defined by equations (6) and (3). 
Since it takes time for (permanent) changes in investment to increase the stock of 
physical capital and knowledge, the dynamic adjustment of labour productivity to 
new investment levels is characterised by a process of convergence. Given the 
technological assumptions, with declining marginal products of physical and human 
capital, countries with low levels of human and physical capital endowments should 
grow faster. A summary measure of both forms of capital is of course labour 




(7)   where  ) (
*








yl ln  
2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS: The model specifies productivity growth as 
generated by 4 distinct activities, namely the investment of firms in both physical and 
knowledge capital, investment of households in human capital and changes in labour 
supply. The neoclassical model also weighs the contributions of these individual 
factors by the output elasticities of physical capital, labour and TFP. However in this 
section we want to go beyond pure growth accounting and ask how productivity 
growth at the aggregate level may be linked to the fundamental factors presented in 
Section 3, namely institutions, market size, demographic trends and education. The 
framework presented above allows for the direct estimation of these effects. It also 
allows us to distinguish between an investment and a TFP channel. The empirical 
analysis is based on a panel of 21 OECD countries over the period 1975 to 2000
50.  
 
Growth regressions have become a standard analytical tool for structural economic 
analysis. Nevertheless it is important to point out some caveats, namely omitted 
variables and endogeneity. Firstly, the empirical analysis probably leaves out some 
important factors. In order to reduce the likelihood that the variables used in the 
regression could be interpreted as proxies for unobservables, all regressions are run 
with country fixed effects. Not all variables used in the regressions can be regarded as 
strictly exogenous. Some of the indicators used in these regressions could be 
endogenous. In particular this holds for the financial market indicators. We try to 




As discussed in Section 3, the economic determinants most relevant for this study are 
the degree of regulation, financial markets, market size and the human capital 
endowment of the labour force. Empirical proxies for these variables must be 
selected. It is difficult to obtain internationally comparable figures of regulation. In 
this study we use the Fraser index which has the advantage of being available over 
the whole sample period
52. In addition we use the share of government consumption 
and the degree of openness as possible indicators for government involvement and 
                                                 
50 Data series for the different variables used in the analysis were available, starting in the mid-1970’s, for all of 
the EU countries, with the exception of Greece and Luxembourg. Outside the EU, comparable series were 
assembled for the US, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland. Since we are 
interested in medium term trends the analysis removes business cycle effects by using 5 year averages.  
51 GMM panel data estimators have been suggested (see Caselli et al. (1996)) for dealing with the endogeneity 
problem. However, with persistent time series, instruments can be weak and results can be severely biased in 
relatively small samples (see Bond et al (2001)). 
52 The OECD regulation indices are usually only available for the 1990s. 
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regulation. Unlike with a direct regulation index the results which are obtained with 
the two latter indicators are more difficult to interpret. Government consumption 
could also be negative for other reasons. For example, it could represent crowding out 
effects, but there could also be a bias due to the way in which a government’s 
contribution to GDP is measured. Similarly a positive effect of openness could 
indicate both higher competition but also market size effects.  
 
The structure of financing is captured in the regressions below by two indicators, the 
“volume of bank credit as a share of GDP” and an index of stock market 
capitalisation. In order to reduce possible problems of endogeneity with these two 
indicators we again use beginning of period values instead of period averages. 
 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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R**2  0.77 0.79 0.81 0.93 0.92 
Panel regression with country fixed effects. 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10% levels. 
1) Government consumption is excluded from regressions (1) to (3). Collinearity between government 
consumption and deregulation tends to make both regressors insignificant when used simultaneously. 
Only results with deregulation are reported here since this indicator slightly outperforms government 
consumption in the regressions. 
 
For modelling the effects of market size we follow Alesina et al (2000) and use three 
variables, namely openness, population size and the product between the two. The 
last variables capture possible non-linearities, for example that the degree of openness 
may be less important for large as opposed to small economies. 
 
As a human capital indicator of the household sector we use the average years of 
schooling of the adult population. The data are from De la Fuente and Domenech 
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(2001). In order to allow depreciation of human capital we use the youth dependency 
ratio as an additional regressor. 
 
Following the framework outlined above we first present results on investment rates 
(eqs. (5a) and (5b)). In a second step we estimate the parameters of the knowledge 
production function (eqs. (3) and (4)) and finally we estimate the contributions of 
physical and knowledge capital to labour productivity growth (eqs. (6) and (7)). 
 
2.1 INVESTMENT: This section analyses how the investment of firms is affected by 
the basic growth determinants. We are especially interested in the economic 
determinants of physical investment versus R&D. However, one should keep in mind 
that within fixed capital formation important changes have taken place, with 
investment in ICT becoming a more important investment category. In order to 
understand the structural changes within aggregate investment it is therefore useful to 
also look at individual investment categories such as ICT. Important shifts are also 
occurring along another dimension. With increasing international capital mobility, 
foreign direct investment is becoming much more important. In a forward looking 
analysis it therefore seems essential to explore the specific determinants of these ICT 
and FDI investment categories.  
 
Key Results from Regression Analysis: The most important result is that for all 
physical investment categories we find that regulation has a negative effect on 
investment rates. In contrast to this R&D expenditures are not affected by regulation. 
The first result is in conformity with the theoretical priors. There are various possible 
explanations for the latter result. Firstly, entry barriers may be less of a problem since 
R&D is probably highly concentrated amongst large incumbent firms. Secondly, 
certain forms of protection may actually be beneficial for R&D activities which yield 
risky returns. So far there is little empirical work on the relationship between 
investment and regulation. A more recent empirical study by Alesina et. Al. (2003) 
which uses OECD regulatory indices tends to support the results on physical 
investment rates and also finds a significantly negative impact of regulation in a panel 
of OECD service industries. The regression results also indicate that more stock 
market based financial systems tend to be more favourable to both physical and 
knowledge investment. It appears that equity markets are an important determinant of 
foreign direct investment. Given the rising importance of international capital 
mobility, these results suggest that the structure of financial markets may play a more 
important role in the future than they have played in the past. Kappler and 
Westerheide (2003) found similar results for a panel of OECD countries with 
different control variables.  
 
A certain degree of ambiguity however remains concerning the importance of the 
structure of financial markets. A comparison of columns (4) and (5) shows that 
adding indicators of financial structure does not really improve the fit of the 
regression. In the absence of financial market indicators the level of education, which 
is an intuitively plausible explanatory variable, becomes significant. These two 
regression results taken together could also be interpreted as indicating that stock 
markets simply place a high value on the human capital endowment of firms. A 
causal interpretation running from the structure of financial markets to R&D 
expenditure would not be correct. This leads directly to a discussion of the role of 
education for different types of investment. Education is negatively correlated with 
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aggregate physical investment rates but tends to be positively correlated with human 
capital investment. This should not be interpreted as suggesting that education is bad 
for physical investment. This correlation rather captures structural changes from low 
skilled-heavy industry production structures, with high levels of physical investment 
to high skilled-low capital intensity service sector production structures with low 
levels of physical investment. Also in the case of FDI, education is significant and 
positive. Internationally mobile capital seems to seek low regulation and high 
education environments. 
 
2.2 KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION: This section looks at the quantitative importance of 
knowledge investment measures (i.e. education and R&D investments) for TFP 
growth. The results are presented in two steps. Column (1) gives the standard 
specification of the knowledge production function, while columns (2) and (3) present 
slightly augmented versions where we ask whether institutional features affect the 
efficiency of knowledge accumulation
53. As can be seen from column (1) all three 
variables have the correct sign and except for education they are significant.  
 
Adding additional regulatory indicators improves the fit of the regression. Trade 
openness, corrected for country size appears to be especially important, whilst the 
regulatory indicator is not significant. It is interesting to observe that market size does 
not have an impact on TFP growth beyond its effect on R&D investment.  
 
This suggests that there are no particular efficiency gains in production due to country 
size, i.e. increasing returns in production is not present in this dataset. Market size 
effects are largely confined to R&D investment itself (see Table A1).  
 
Another interesting result is the strong negative effect of government consumption on 
TFP. However, one must be careful when interpreting this result. The way 
government production is measured in the national accounts could be a possible 
explanation for this result. Countries with a higher government share could have 
systematically underreported GDP, since the capital services of the government sector 
are not reported. Whatever interpretation is the correct one, government consumption 
appears to be an important control variable. This can be directly seen by looking at 
the consequences for the impact of education on TFP, which now becomes 
significant. Since there is a positive correlation between education and government 
expenditure, the exclusion of government consumption biases the effect of education 
downwards. Adding financial market measures to the regression in column (4) does 
not improve the fit but instead makes all the explanatory variables insignificant. This 









                                                 
53 All regressions have country and time fixed effects. The latter are meant to make the regressions more robust 
against common time trends in both the explanatory variables and TFP. 
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TABLE A2 :  TFP / KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
TFP TFP TFP TFP   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1.  YOUTH DEPENDENCY RATIO  0.076** 0.073**  0.048*  0.062 
2.  R&D EXPENDITURE  0.025** 0.022** 0.033**  0.009 
3.  EDUCATION  0.005 0.007  0.009* 0.01 
4.  DEGREE OF  REGULATION    0.04 0.03 0.03 
5. GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE     -0.06**   
6. OPENNESS   0.40**  0.25*  0.24 
7. OPENNESS   SIZE  ×  -0.13**  -0.09*  -0.07 
8. POPULATION    0.05 0.05 0.03 
9. BANK CREDIT      -0.004 
10.  STOCK MARKET CAPITALISATION      0.003 
11. TFP(-1)  -0.01 -0.04*  -0.07**  -.0.056* 
COUNTRIES/OBSERVATIONS  21/97 21/97 21/97 21/88 
R**2  .31 .40 .45 .34 
(1): panel regression with country and time fixed effects 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10% levels. 
 
The correlation is especially high with R&D expenditure and regulation. 
Unfortunately our analysis does not allow us to shed light on the direction of 
causality. Theoretically it could go in both directions. More market based financial 
systems could both exert pressure to increase efficiency and provide easier funding 
for R&D investments. But equally well the correlation could simply reflect the fact 
that stock markets place a high value on regulatory reforms and R&D investments. 
 
A specific feature of these results is the insignificance of direct measures of 
regulation as an explanatory factor for TFP growth. The results on regulation and 
TFP reported here lie somewhere in the middle between a recent joint CEPR and IFS 
(2003) study which reports a negative association between deregulation and TFP and 
an OECD (Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003)) study which finds a positive effect of 
deregulation on TFP. However, the results presented by the OECD are not clearcut 
and are open to some interpretation. The study finds that productivity gains are 
mostly associated with privatisations and not with levels of regulation in general. The 
study also finds that deregulation mostly facilitates technological catching-up but that 
there is little evidence that it leads to outward shifts in the technological frontier. 
Whether productivity gains from privatisations can be interpreted as true dynamic 
efficiency gains is also questionable in the light of the CEPR-IFS study which also 
finds productivity gains from privatisations (in network industries for example) but 
these are associated with reductions in employment. Thus the effect of privatisations 
could be temporary productivity improvements related to a reduction of economic 
slack in previously publicly owned companies. The fact that regulation is neither 
significant for R&D nor for TFP points in the direction that the link between 
regulation and moving the technological frontier is rather weak and an interpretation 
in terms of static efficiency gains is probably more appropriate. 
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Is the second half of the 1990s a special period for TFP growth? The second half 
of the 1990s differs from previous periods in various respects. First of all, some 
countries, in particular the US, managed an acceleration in the rate of technical 
progress and secondly technological convergence of the EU relative to the US came 
to a halt. It is by now well understood that technological developments related to the 
production and use of ICT are likely to be a major contributing factor. In this section 
an attempt is made to relate the estimates from the knowledge production function to 
the technological developments in the late 1990s
54. In a very stylised manner one can 
formulate the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The knowledge generating factors as identified by the knowledge 
production function, namely R&D and human capital can explain the international 
growth patterns since the mid 1990s. If this hypothesis is correct, then we would 
expect to see no systematic variation of the regression residuals with variables 
relating to hypothesis (2) to (4) 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a large industry specific element which plays a role. Countries 
with high ICT industry shares have benefited from the positive productivity shocks 
taking place in these industries. Alternatively those countries which are high ICT 
users have benefited from technological spillovers. If this hypothesis is correct then 
one would expect the ICT production share or, in the case of spillovers, the ICT 
investment share to be significant. 
 
Hypothesis 3: It is true that the ICT revolution was industry specific, but it was not 
confined to a specific country. With high capital mobility, those countries which 
offered attractive investment locations in terms of flexible labour and goods markets 
benefited most from the ICT boom. Alternatively it is sometimes argued that an 
ageing labour force would be less willing to adopt new technologies. If this is correct, 
then both measures of deregulation and the youthfulness of the labour force should be 
positively correlated with the residual.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Both industry specialisation (hypothesis 2) as well as flexibility in 
adopting new technologies (hypothesis 3) have interacted positively. In this case one 
would expect ICT production shares and measures of deregulation and youthfulness 
of the labour force to interact positively. 
 
The following Table, which summarises our analysis of the TFP residuals for 19 
OECD countries over the period 1996-2000 is intended to shed some light on the 
relative importance of these 4 hypotheses. The most significant relationships are 
found for the interactions of ICT production with either demographic or regulatory 
indicators. This suggests that both industry specialisation as well as favourable 
conditions in terms of technology adoption have been important factors for TFP 
growth in the late 1990s. Industry specialisation does seem to play the dominant role 
as expressed by the high correlation between the ICT share and TFP growth
55. There 
                                                 
54 We use the knowledge production function without controls (except for country dummies) for country specific 
efficiency changes (column (1) in Table A2) in order to assess how much the knowledge inputs can account for 
changes in TFP growth in the late 1990s. 
55 Countries with high ICT production shares combined with relatively low levels of regulation (on the basis of the 
Fraser Institute measure), such as Ireland, Finland and the US, have outperformed countries like Spain and Italy 
with low ICT shares and above average levels of regulation. There is however another group of European 
- 71 -  
is little evidence of spillover effects from investment on technology which goes 
beyond the pure investment effect. Implicitly these results reject hypothesis (1). 
Notice, however, that the results are sensitive to outliers. Ireland and Spain constitute 
positive and negative outliers in the second half of the 1990s. Removing the two 
countries makes the result less ￿ignificant. However, it does not change the ranking 
of the individual hypotheses. 
 
2.3 COMBINING THE EFFECT OF PHYSICAL AND KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL FORMATION 
ON PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: The previous two sets of regressions have shown how 
the basic productivity growth determinants affect physical capital formation and the 
creation of knowledge. This section looks at the relative contribution of these two 
factors to productivity growth when they are combined with two other factors, 
namely the growth of hours worked and the potential for catching up. As indicated 
above the neoclassical growth model makes fairly precise quantitative predictions 
concerning these four factors conditional on the choice of the output elasticity of 
capital and labour, which have been set to 0.35 and 0.65 respectively. This follows 
the standard practice of using the wage share for calibrating the output elasticity of 
labour (α ) in the production function. A comparison of column (1) – which gives the 
theoretically predicted coefficients – and column (2) – which gives the estimated 
coefficients – shows that the estimated growth contributions of these four factors 
seem to be close to the predicted contributions of the neoclassical model. These 
results are robust to instrumenting investment in order to control for possible 
endogeneity (see column (3)). The last column tests whether the individual growth 
determinants have an independent effect on labour productivity growth not 
adequately captured by our theoretical framework. As can be seen when looking at 
column (4), no significant effect of the individual growth determinants can be 
detected if one accounts for the impact of these factors on either TFP or physical 
capital formation 
 
TABLE A2.1: EXPLAINING  THE RESIDUALS OF THE KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
FUNCTION (1996-2000) 
  Coeff. R**2  Coeff. R**2  Coeff. R**2 
1. ICT Production  0.26***  0.40 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.09 
2. ICT Investment  -0.10  0.00 0.18 0.02 0.12 0.02 
3. Deregulation  0.40*  0.15 0.25 0.01 0.15 0.07 
4. Age of Labour Force  0.08**  0.27 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.03 
5. ICT and Regulation  3.02***  0.44 1.67 0.16 1.09 0.12 
6. ICT and Age of 
Labour Force 
0.46***  0.53 0.29*  0.18 0.19 0.15 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10% levels. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                           
countries consisting of Germany, Austria and Portugal which showed TFP growth rates above the rates 
predicted by their knowledge investment efforts despite below average performances in terms of the combined 
effect of ICT production shares and regulation. This could possibly be explained by their relatively timid efforts 
to increase the employment content of growth via labour market reforms. While the contribution of 
employment to growth has increased in the EU as a whole between the first and the second half of the 1990s, it 
has declined in Germany and Portugal, with Austria having a zero employment contribution to growth over the 
1996-2000 period.  




TABLE A3 :  PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH REGRESSIONS 
(WITH CONTROLS FOR TFP)  
  (1)
1  
) (2) (3) (4) 
1. INITIAL INCOME LEVEL  -0.036 -0.045**  -.042**  -0.037** 
2. HOURS GROWTH (EMPLOYMENT + HOURS)  -0.019 -0.017**  -.016**  -0.017** 
3. TFP GROWTH (IMPLIED LONG RUN ) 
) 2 0.036 0.044**  0.041**  0.036** 
4. INVESTMENT      
4A. INVESTMENT RATE  0.019 0.017**    0.006 
4B. INVESTMENT RATE (PREDICTED
3 ) 
)    0.017**   
5. EDUCATION      -0.001 
6. YOUTH DEPENDENCY RATIO      0.001 
7. DEGREE OF REGULATION      
7A. GOVERNMENT SIZE       0.006 
7B. REGULATION INDEX      0.019 
8. STOCK MARKET CAPITALISATION      0.001 
9. BANK CREDIT      -0.003 
10. OPENNESS      0.006 
11. OPENNESS * POPULATION      -0.001 
12. POPULATION      0.000 
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES / OBSERVATIONS   21 / 91 21/88 21 / 88 
R**2   0.63  0.58  0.67 
1) Coefficients as implied by the neoclassical growth model with an output elasticity of labour equal to .65. 
2) Coefficients estimated from Table A2, column (3) are used to calculate A*. 
3) Predicted investment rate from Table A1, column (1). 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10% levels. 
 
 
3. WHAT DO THESE RESULTS IMPLY QUANTITATIVELY?: The estimates reported in 
the Tables above can be translated and interpreted in terms of short, medium and long 
run multipliers and therefore can give an indication of the magnitude of the effect of 
certain policies or exogenous shocks. Table  A4 gives the estimated productivity 
growth contributions of investment in knowledge, physical investment and labour 
input growth. The most striking result is the large difference in the R&D multiplier 
relative to the physical investment multiplier. This is a fairly common result which 
can be found in many other studies (see, for example Grilliches (1994), Helpman and 
Coe. (1995) or Jones et al. (1995)). The results found in the literature suggest that the 
social rate of return of one unit of money spent on R&D is in the range between 25 
per cent and 100 per cent. This implies that a permanent increase in the share of R&D 
in GDP of 1 per cent would increase the growth rate of GDP in the range between 
0.25 per cent and up to 1 per cent. The results reported in the Table suggest that over 
a period of 25 years the average growth effect of an increase in the R&D share from 
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currently about 2 per cent in the EU to 3 per cent could increase growth by 0.6 per 
cent.  
 
However, extreme caution should be exercised when interpreting these results. One 
has to ask why the share of R&D spending is so low (only about 10 per cent of 
physical investment spending) when returns are so high? First of all, the average 
return compensates for substantial risks associated with R&D investment. Therefore 
these numbers say very little about the return that can be expected from concrete 
knowledge investment projects. A somewhat easier question to pose is the following: 
how can we explain why certain countries have a high R&D share and other countries 
have a low share? A look at Table A2 suggests that R&D activities require certain 
framework conditions. By looking at the cross-country variation of R&D spending 
across OECD countries one can identify clearly the following determinants, namely 
the level of education of the labour force and market size (proxied by openness and 
country size). Another possibly important variable is the structure of financial 
markets. If one takes these determinants into account, it is not that surprising that 
countries like Finland, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and the US manage to 
consistently have R&D shares above 2.25 per cent These factors also provide a good 
explanation why countries such as Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain have R&D 
shares of only 1 per cent or less. This suggests that any successful strategy to increase 
R&D spending in the second group of countries must be accompanied by measures to 
increase human capital endowments and by further efforts to better integrate their 
economies into the world market.  
 
A permanent increase in the growth rate of hours worked, whilst keeping the 
investment rate as well as TFP constant, has negative effects on labour productivity. 
Roughly speaking, an increase in the growth rate of hours by 1 per cent lowers 
productivity growth by about 3 per cent in the first 10 years. The results also give a 
possible explanation for the trend decline in TFP and labour productivity in OECD 
countries.  
 
With the fall in the birthrate in the 1970s all OECD countries have experienced a 
decline in the youth dependency ratio and an increase in the average age of the labour 
force. If it is the case that human capital depreciates then one would expect ageing of 
the labour force to have an effect on productivity. As our regression results suggest, 
this is indeed the case. Table A4 gives the results of a decline in the youth 
dependency ratio which is of the order of magnitude of the decline which actually 
occurred in OECD countries from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s. These numbers 
are fairly large and would imply a decline in the growth rate of labour productivity of 
-0.3 per cent per annum in the last 15 years. When interpreting these numbers one 
must keep in mind that there is an offsetting effect on productivity growth induced by 













TABLE  A4:   MEDIUM AND LONG RUN EFFECTS OF KNOWLEDGE,  PHYSICAL 
INVESTMENT AND LABOUR FORCE GROWTH ON PRODUCTIVITY (LEVEL EFFECTS) 
 5  YEARS 10 YEARS L ONG RUN 
1. KNOWLEDGE 
INCREASE IN TFP BY 1% 
0.2 0.4 1.0 
2. R&D Expenditure Share 







3. PHYSICAL INVESTMENT   
INCREASE OF INVESTMENT TO 
GDP RATIO BY 1% POINT 
0.4 0.7 1.8 
4. HOURS GROWTH  
PERMANENT INCREASE BY 1%  
-1.5 -2.6 -7.1 
5. YOUTH DEPENDENCY 
RATIO  
DECLINE BY 10% POINTS 
-2.0 -3.5 -6.8 
 
These results also give some indication of the effects of specific policy measures:  
Education: The results reported here confirm the very positive effects of education 
spending on productivity growth.  
 
Openness: One interesting foreign trade development is the increased openness of 
countries belonging to EMU. The estimates suggest that the increase in the total trade 
of EMU member states between the first and the second half of the 1990s may have 
increased productivity growth by about 0.04 % points per year. 
 
Regulation: The results on deregulation that we obtain from the growth regressions 
are comparable to previous results obtained by the IMF (see Bayoumi et al. (2003) 
and WEO (2002)). The implied change of moving to US levels of regulation as 
measured by the Fraser index used in the regression would suggest an increase in long 
run labour productivity of about 5 per cent. The IMF study implies a long run labour 
productivity effect of about 3 per cent. Both in the IMF study and in the ECFIN 
regressions the positive effect is generated via an increase in the investment rate. 
 
TABLE A5: EFFECT OF SOME POLICY MEASURES ON  
PRODUCTIVITY (LEVEL EFFECTS) 
  5  Years  10 Years  Long run 
1. YEARS OF EDUCATION  







2. INCREASED OPENNESS  
(EQUIVALENT TO THE 
INCREASE IN EURO AREA 
TRADE  BETWEEN 
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ANNEX 2: INDUSTRY LEVEL ANALYSIS : DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL 
POINTS 
INDUSTRY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY DATABASE: This database has been assembled 
by a team led by B. van Ark at the Groningen Growth and Development Centre 
(GGDC) for DG Enterprise. It consists of an industry dataset that covers the period 
1979-2001 for the 15 EU Member States and for the US. Disaggregation into 56 
industries is provided on the basis of the ISIC rev. 3 classification. The primary 
variables included are nominal value added, industry deflators, employment and 
hours worked per employee
56. Constant value added and hourly productivity series 
are then derived (see Table B for a complete list of the hourly labour productivity 
growth rates of all 56 industries over the last two decades – see also Tables C, D and 
E for additional information). 
 
Three methodological points need to be underlined:  
•  Firstly, the discussions on the emergence of a new productivity pattern linked 
to ICT industries (“new economy” era) have been associated with the statistical 
problem of correctly estimating price indices when the quality of the product is 
increasing rapidly (the typical case being for computer prices and other IT 
products). Hedonic deflators – based on the pricing of essential characteristics of 
the product – can help to overcome this and are applied by the US and a few 
European statistical offices. Following van Ark’s approach, ECFIN have 
uniformly applied US deflators (instead of national ones) to sensitive industries 
(industries 30 to 33 incl. in the ISIC rev. 3). These are derived using a double 
deflation procedure (both input and output). 
•  Secondly, the current best practice for GDP calculations is to use chained 
indices like the Fisher or Törnqvist indices
57. These indices avoid the usual 
problem associated with fixed-based indices (i.e. composition drift), and this is 
even more important when price indices vary a lot. It is, for example, a known 
property that the combination of the use of a Laspeyres price index and strongly 
declining prices (like in the IT industry) would overestimate the (value added and) 
productivity gains. In this study, and again following van Ark’s approach, we 
have used Törnqvist aggregation procedures throughout. That is, the deflator of a 
group of industries is calculated as the geometric mean of the component industry 
deflators, using average nominal value added shares
58. Or, in terms of changes in 
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For these two main reasons, the aggregate measures used in this study will often 
not correspond to official series of value added or labour productivity (see 
Table A for a comparison)
59. 
                                                 
56 Information on compensation is also included but is not used in the present study. 
57 Laspeyres indices are still however often used to calculate aggregate value added in volume. 
58 This formula also corresponds to the first-order approximation of a Fisher index. 
59 An additional explanation for the difference can be found in the series of 'Hours worked per Employee'. The 
series in the “Industry Labour Productivity Database” do not always match those at the aggregate level that 
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•  Finally, the EU-15 total is aggregated on the basis of Euro exchange rates 
applied to nominal values, whilst all international comparisons are made 
following the conversion of the constant price series into PPS, using (fixed) 1995 
conversion rates. All exchange rates are taken from ECFIN’s AMECO database.  
 
SHIFT SHARE ANALYSIS OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH (SECTION  2.1): 
Relating the productivity growth of the overall economy to the productivity growth of 
the constituent industries’ implies taking into account the simultaneous changes to the 
allocation and volume of the production factor (i.e. labour in the case of labour 
productivity). In the decomposition, the most important part is of course dependent 
on the productivity growth at the industry level that we can aggregate using the 
(fixed) beginning-of-period labour volumes. Another effect then involves 
displacements of resources amongst industries of varying productivity levels, which 
would result in overall productivity changes, even in the context of unchanged 
productivity at the industry level
60. And finally the interaction effect would then 
account for labour reallocation effects amongst industries with varying productivity 
growth rates (typically negative, when an increase in productivity is associated with a 
decrease in labour use).  
 
Formally we note, for the individual industries and for the overall economy, that 
(hourly) labour productivity is output (Y) divided by labour input (L): 
    t i t i t i L Y LPH / =
  ∑ ∑ = =
i t i L
i t i Y t L t Y t LPH /  
 
The second identity is only correct when we can use simple summation to aggregate 
output, that is when output is expressed in nominal terms (or with the use of a fixed-
based index). In this case as well, labour productivity can be written as a weighted 
sum of the intra-industry productivity values: 
  ∑ =
it
t i
t i t L
L
LPH LPH , 
 
This gives, in difference terms: 














t i LPH LPH LPH LPH ) ( ) ( 1 1
1
 
Dividing by LPHt-1 to get the growth (percentage change) and rearranging the terms 
we get: 
                                                                                                                                           
were used for the analysis in section 2 (source for the series at the aggregate level: GGDC and The Conference 
Board, Total Economy Database, July 2003, http://www.ggdc.net). 
60 An historical example is the surge in overall productivity accompanying the labour force movement from the 
low productivity agriculture sector to the higher productivity manufacturing sector, i.e. the "Denison effect". 
























































•  The first component is the intra-industry effect: i.e. the sum of industry 
productivity growth rates, weighted by the initial (nominal) output shares.  
•  The second component is the shift effect: i.e. the sum of changes in input 
shares, weighted by the relative productivity level (i.e. the ratio of industry 
productivity to average productivity). This effect could also be written and 
decomposed as the sum of industry labour input growth rates, weighted by initial 
output shares, minus total labour input growth. 
•  The sign of the residual (interaction) component is usually negative (in the 
economy there is a majority of industries where the productivity change and the 
labour input change have opposite signs). It may however be positive when 
beneficial restructuring of the economy occurs (in this case most of the industries 
enjoying productivity growth are at the same time attracting more resources).  
 
The decomposition described above would strictly hold only in the case of (discrete) 
percentage changes. The logarithmic approximation (used throughout the study) 
entails an error of a magnitude often comparable to the interaction effect. We have 
however defined the intra-industry effect and the shift effect analogously to the 
discrete case. A corresponding decomposition for the continuous time assumption can 
be found in Nordhaus (2002), who has also shown that when “old-fashioned” price 
index methods are used (i.e. not the Törnqvist method, as explained above), one 
should add to the decomposition an additional term accounting for the drift in prices. 
 
SPECIFIC INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTION TO TOTAL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 
(LPH) GROWTH (SECTION 2.2): To calculate the contribution of specific industries to 
overall LPH growth, we take advantage of the fact that the intra-industry effect is the 
dominant effect, and that, for the period and countries under consideration, the shift 
(and interaction) effects are minimal.  
 
The figures in the Tables should therefore be understood in the following way: 
•  The contribution to labour productivity per hour (LPH) growth from any group 
or sub-group of industries are calculated using a method compatible with the 
Törnqvist price index. 
•  The contribution to LPH growth from any group or sub-group of industries 
includes therefore the possible reallocation effects amongst industries 
belonging to that group or subgroup. 
•  The contribution from individual industries can clearly not include any 
reallocation effects. They are simply the product of that industry’s productivity 
growth rate and of the (nominal) value added share of that industry at the 
beginning of the period. 
•  As a result, the contribution to LPH growth from a group or subgroup of 
industries would only equal the sum of the contributions of the component 
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industries, if there were no changes in the volume of labour input. Conversely, 
any differences, apart from rounding and approximation, suggest a shift effect.  
 
ICT CONTRIBUTION TO LABOUR  PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH (CAPITAL DEEPENING 
AND TFP) (SECTION 2.3): This sub-section relies on a different data set, the “Industry 
Growth Accounting Database”, which has also been assembled by the GGDC for DG 
Enterprise. Disaggregated data on capital, allowing for a complete growth 
decomposition into labour, capital and TFP contributions is only available for 5 
countries (the US, Germany, the UK, France and the Netherlands) and for a 26-sector 
decomposition of total output. The time span of the data is unchanged (1979-2001). 
In addition, information on ICT related investment (software, computing and 
communications equipment) and on labour quality is also available at the industry 
level in this dataset. 
 
Based on this information set, a comprehensive measure of the ICT contribution to 
overall productivity growth can be tentatively derived, that would encompass both the 
TFP growth linked to ICT production, and the diffusion of ICT to the rest of the 
economy through investment in ICT capital. The accounting equation for productivity 
growth becomes
61 
() ( ) [ ]
() ( ) []
tot Y
ind ICT Y tot Y
ind other TFP g
tot Y
ind ICT Y
ind ICT TFP g
L g ICT K g













with g(Y/L), g(L), g(KnonICT) and g(KICT) denoting the growth of, respectively, output, 
hourly labour input, non-ICT capital and ICT capital. α is the wage share and η the 
share of capital expenditures devoted to ICT investment.
  
                                                
 
The second term is the part of capital deepening coming from investment in ICT 
capital (defined as software, computing and communications equipment).  
 
The third term in the equation measures the contribution to technical progress 
stemming from ICT industries. For this database “Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment; Instruments” and “Communications” are the two ICT producing 
industries (out of a total of 26 industries). Their contribution is weighted on the basis 
of nominal value added taken from the “Industry Labour Productivity Database”, 
using matching industries with codes 30 to 33 and 64 (ISIC rev. 3 classification).  
 
Summing up these components, we can obtain a ratio showing the importance of ICT 
(both the productivity gains linked to ICT production and to the diffusion of ICT 
 
61 Using standard conventions and assumptions and a modified production function to include ICT capital: 
  () A K K L Y nonICT ICT
α η η α − − =
1 1
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investment throughout the economy) to overall, economy-wide, productivity growth. 
Since the absolute figures that can be derived for labour productivity growth on the 
basis of this limited dataset are different from those obtained from the official 
national accounts data used in Section  1, we have applied the ratio of ICT’s 
contribution to labour productivity growth at the industry level to the official 
productivity figures given in Section 1. 
 
 
TABLE A : US + EU HOURLY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY : A COMPARISON OF THE 
AGGREGATES FROM THE ECONOMY-WIDE AND INDUSTRY DATASETS 













1981-1990  1.4 1.1 2.2 2.4 
1991-1995  1.0 1.1 2.4 2.3 
1996-2000  1.6 2.3 1.6 1.6 





- 80 -  
Table B Hourly Labour Productivity Growth Rates 1981-2000, US and EU15 (Average Annual % Change) 
US EU US EU US EU
Agriculture 4.6 4.9 2.2 5.2 10.4 4.2
Forestry 8.2 4.1 -9.7 3.2 4.6 2.9
Fishing -1.2 2 -11.3 1.4 12.8 0.3
Mining and quarrying 4.4 3.4 5.1 13 0.4 3.4
Food, drink & tobacco 0.6 2.7 3.6 2.6 -6 0.4
Textiles 3.4 2.9 2.1 3.1 2.6 2.2
Clothing 3.1 2.7 4.6 2.3 4.3 2.4
Leather and footwear 3.4 4.5 0.2 3.1 3.3 0.9
Wood & wood products 2.3 -3 -0.9 2.6 2.9 2.6
Pulp, paper & paper products 1.9 3.9 -0.1 3.4 1.7 3.2
Printing & publishing -1.1 2.6 -2.9 2.1 0.7 2.2
Mineral oil refining, coke & nuclear fuel 9.4 -4.8 5.5 5.2 4.5 -1.1
Chemicals   4.8 5.4 3 6.4 2.4 4.2
Rubber & plastics 3.9 2.8 4.3 2.7 4.7 1.5
Non-metallic mineral products 2.3 3.5 2.3 3.1 1.2 1.7
Basic metals 0.3 4.6 3.6 6.1 2.1 1.9
Fabricated metal products 2 2.4 2.9 2.5 1 1.1
Mechanical engineering -0.3 2.1 0.3 2.8 -0.1 1.3
Office machinery 27.5 26.3 28.5 28 53.4 48.1
Insulated wire 4.5 5.9 2.4 7.4 5.5 -1.4
Other electrical machinery  0.7 3 1.1 1.3 -1.3 2.1
Electronic valves and tubes 23.3 22.6 38.2 35.6 52.9 57.3
Telecommunication equipment 19.7 20.3 4.8 5.1 0.6 1.4
Radio and television receivers 9.4 11.8 -5.3 -0.8 -5.7 -5
Scientific instruments 2.4 2.5 -4.7 -3.1 -4.9 -7
Other instruments 4.7 6 2.3 6.8 7.1 5.4
Motor vehicles 0.8 4.4 3.8 3.3 1.2 1
Building and repairing of ships and boats 4.3 5.4 -4.4 1.8 2.6 1.2
Aircraft and spacecraft 1.2 4.9 -1.1 3.4 1.5 1.6
Railroad and other transport equipment  4.7 3.6 -2.4 4.6 3.2 3
Furniture & miscellaneous manufacturing 3.1 1.8 1.1 1.3 3.6 1.8
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.3 3.3 1.8 3.7 2.3 6
Construction -0.4 1.8 0.4 1 -0.1 0.2
Sales and repair of motor vehicles  -0.1 1.7 -2.4 2.2 -1.8 0.8
Wholesale trade and commission trade  2.8 2.2 2.9 3.3 8.3 2
Retail trade and repairs  3.1 2 2 1.7 6.6 1.6
Hotels & catering -0.8 -0.7 -1 -0.6 0.2 -0.8
Inland transport 1.5 2.7 1 3.1 1.2 2.3
Water transport 0.4 3.8 0.7 5.7 2.9 2.4
Air transport 1.2 3.7 2 9 4.6 5
Supporting transport activities -0.9 3.4 -0.8 3.6 4.6 1.6
Communications 15 2 . 4 6 . 3 5 . 9 1 0
Financial intermediation 0.1 2.4 1 1 3.9 4.8
Insurance and pension funding -5.1 2.7 2.5 1.1 1.1 -0.7
Auxiliary financial services 1.1 1.1 3.1 0.4 9.9 0.2
Real estate activities 0.2 -0.8 1.6 -0.1 1.2 -0.5
Renting of machinery and equipment -1.5 2.2 8.2 2.9 4.3 2.3
Computer and related activities 5.8 0.7 2.4 1.1 -5.8 2.4
Research and development 3.3 3.5 0 -0.4 1.3 -0.9
Legal, technical and advertising -1.2 0.3 -0.9 0.4 -0.3 0.8
Other business activities 0.3 -0.3 -0.7 0.8 -0.1 -1.2
Public administration  0.7 1 0.2 1.3 0.9 1
Education -0.2 0.1 0.3 1 -2.4 0.4
Health and social work -1.7 0.3 -1.8 1.2 -0.3 0.8
Other services 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 -2.1 0.3
Private households with employed persons 2.5 -4.6 2.3 -0.5 0.7 -0.1
Total Economy  1.1 2.4 1.1 2.3 2.3 1.6
US EU US EU
Number of Industries experiencing a productivity deceleration 27 23 21 44
(% Share of Total) (48) (41) (38) (79)
Number of Industries experiencing a productivity acceleration 29 33 35 12
(% Share of Total) (52) (59) (63) (21)
Source : Own Calculations and GGDC
1991-1995 1996-2000
1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
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Table C. Individual Industry Contributions to Hourly Labour Productivity Growth Rates in US and EU15 (1981-2000) 
EU15 Productivity level relative to US
US EU US EU US EU 1980 1990 2000
Agriculture 0.11 0.19 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.10 57.0 58.8 50.2
Forestry 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 108.5 72.1 126.2
Fishing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 126.2 174.7 176.0
Mining and quarrying 0.17 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.03 81.7 73.6 127.6
Food, drink & tobacco 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.07 -0.11 0.01 62.1 76.9 101.0
Textiles 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 119.5 115.7 114.5
Clothing 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 97.1 89.0 86.6
Leather and footwear 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 71.1 69.0 67.5
Wood & products of wood and cork 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 56.3 57.7 92.4
Pulp, paper & paper products 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 61.5 75.3 96.6
Printing & publishing -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 60.0 87.0 120.5
Mineral oil refining, coke & nuclear fuel 0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 387.5 93.8 69.6
Chemicals   0.09 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.09 52.9 56.5 73.5
Rubber & plastics 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 139.6 125.0 98.2
Non-metallic mineral products 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 84.7 96.3 102.4
Basic metals 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 57.5 88.0 98.4
Fabricated metal products 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 74.8 77.6 76.2
Mechanical engineering -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.03 67.2 85.6 103.8
Office machinery 0.18 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.23 0.12 99.6 88.3 66.0
Insulated wire 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 63.6 73.2 66.6
Other electrical machinery and aparatus nec 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 66.7 84.4 100.9
Electronic valves and tubes 0.09 0.04 0.22 0.05 0.46 0.10 50.8 47.4 52.1
Telecommunication equipment 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 75.0 79.8 84.2
Radio and television receivers 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 55.6 70.4 91.6
Scientific instruments 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 93.3 94.3 92.0
Other instruments 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 32.5 36.9 42.4
Motor vehicles 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 48.6 69.7 67.2
Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 72.2 80.6 102.4
Aircraft and spacecraft 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 46.7 67.6 84.8
Railroad equipment and transport equipment ne 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 70.9 63.8 90.0
Furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing; recycli 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 98.8 87.3 80.6
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.14 58.2 71.5 94.3
Construction -0.02 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 72.8 91.2 95.1
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles  0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.02 66.5 79.9 115.3
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except  0.17 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.47 0.10 107.4 101.5 75.9
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and moto 0.21 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.43 0.07 88.6 79.8 61.4
Hotels & catering -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 175.6 177.7 172.6
Inland transport 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.06 87.2 98.2 114.9
Water transport 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 73.2 103.4 129.2
Air transport 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 88.8 113.7 164.7
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; act 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 46.4 71.3 76.8
Communications 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.24 48.9 72.5 107.9
Financial intermediation, except insurance and  0.00 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.19 75.0 94.6 99.1
Insurance and pension funding, except compuls -0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.01 52.7 115.2 98.5
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.18 0.00 57.7 57.7 30.9
Real estate activities 0.02 -0.06 0.17 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 138.8 125.2 105.3
Renting of machinery and equipment 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 173.0 251.6 174.8
Computer and related activities 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.03 144.0 87.0 123.1
Research and development 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 113.8 115.6 101.9
Legal, technical and advertising -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.03 80.5 94.4 106.9
Other business activities, nec 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.03 100.5 94.9 96.8
Public administration and defence; compulsory  0.07 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.07 54.0 55.8 59.3
Education -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.12 0.02 115.3 119.0 142.1
Health and social work -0.09 0.02 -0.13 0.07 -0.02 0.05 61.4 75.2 92.2
Other community, social and personal services 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.01 96.4 97.5 110.3
Private households with employed persons 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 174.4 86.0 71.8
Sum of the intra-industry effects 1.43 2.08 1.37 2.23 2.41 1.64
Total Economy 1.13 2.39 1.08 2.29 2.30 1.62
1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
 
Source: Own calculations and GGDC 
 
Individual industry contributions are obtained by the multiplication of the specific industry growth rate of labour 
productivity by the share of that industry in nominal value added. Industries in shaded areas experience a growing 
contribution to total economy labour productivity growth rate (by comparison to the previous period). The sum of 
the individual industry contributions gives the intra-industry effect (with no reallocation of labour), while the total 
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Table D. Contributions to Total Hours Worked change in US and EU15 (1981-2000)
EU15 Hours worked level relative to US
US EU US EU US EU 1980 1990 2000
Agriculture -0.05 -0.36 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.12 384.4 304.4 207.4
Forestry 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 414.2 390.3 234.0
Fishing 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 145.8 85.2 97.3
Mining and quarrying -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 100.2 84.8 57.2
Food, drink & tobacco 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 236.7 208.5 190.1
Textiles -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 212.9 162.0 146.2
Clothing -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 184.6 188.6 204.5
Leather and footwear -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 407.2 497.2 604.8
Wood & products of wood and cork 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 144.5 113.4 90.4
Pulp, paper & paper products 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 114.1 93.7 90.1
Printing & publishing 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 133.7 104.3 95.7
Mineral oil refining, coke & nuclear fuel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 118.2 107.4 103.6
Chemicals   0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 184.5 168.2 143.4
Rubber & plastics 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 159.8 133.5 119.9
Non-metallic mineral products -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 258.3 239.8 198.6
Basic metals -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 151.2 150.7 109.0
Fabricated metal products -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 219.6 205.1 173.2
Mechanical engineering -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 165.3 170.4 135.8
Office machinery -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 47.7 66.4 81.2
Insulated wire 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 152.5 151.5 142.6
Other electrical machinery and aparatus nec -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 209.6 216.4 219.5
Electronic valves and tubes 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 73.6 52.5 45.4
Telecommunication equipment 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 93.8 72.0 60.5
Radio and television receivers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 315.5 379.0 289.3
Scientific instruments 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 71.7 65.7 72.0
Other instruments -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 186.1 224.7 259.8
Motor vehicles 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 283.9 216.1 153.7
Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 211.5 143.8 123.5
Aircraft and spacecraft 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 52.9 42.7 58.0
Railroad equipment and transport equipment ne -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 206.3 239.0 106.9
Furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing; recycli 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 201.3 165.9 142.6
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 153.6 131.4 104.9
Construction 0.12 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.27 0.06 201.0 156.0 118.7
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles  0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 417.9 307.9 260.3
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except  0.08 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.07 96.1 88.7 83.3
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and moto 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.09 105.5 96.7 90.4
Hotels & catering 0.20 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.15 0.11 77.7 69.2 66.9
Inland transport 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 156.0 154.7 110.0
Water transport 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 201.2 139.4 105.8
Air transport 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 63.9 34.7 31.0
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; act 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 962.1 534.9 455.7
Communications 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 126.6 127.0 98.0
Financial intermediation, except insurance and  0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 116.0 111.0 101.6
Insurance and pension funding, except compuls 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 58.8 57.7 53.0
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.02 77.2 62.4 55.5
Real estate activities 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 65.5 74.4 79.8
Renting of machinery and equipment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 99.9 74.8 81.0
Computer and related activities 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.08 189.7 110.6 80.2
Research and development 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 142.2 100.2 88.5
Legal, technical and advertising 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.17 0.13 90.0 82.3 87.1
Other business activities, nec 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.26 0.21 146.8 101.2 90.0
Public administration and defence; compulsory  0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.02 119.7 120.4 118.3
Education 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.05 85.2 79.7 72.4
Health and social work 0.30 0.12 0.27 0.00 0.21 0.12 118.0 95.9 85.7
Other community, social and personal services 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.12 0.12 150.2 146.2 138.2
Private households with employed persons -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 88.6 183.7 272.8
Total Economy 1.77 0.08 1.05 -0.01 2.06 1.08 141.7 119.7 103.9
1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
 
Source: Own calculations and GGDC 
 
Individual industry contributions are obtained by the multiplication of the specific industry growth rate of labour 
input by the share of that industry in total hours worked.  
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Table E. Contributions to total VA growth rate in US and EU15 (1981-2000)
EU15 VA level relative to US
US EU US EU US EU 1980 1990 2000
Agriculture 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.04 207.7 175.5 97.6
Forestry 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 828.6 690.6 296.8
Fishing 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 259.4 339.7 166.5
Mining and quarrying 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.00 69.3 62.1 57.1
Food, drink & tobacco 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.10 0.01 203.6 183.9 136.7
Textiles 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 209.0 203.7 135.1
Clothing 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 169.9 192.4 138.0
Leather and footwear 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 324.9 405.1 346.8
Wood & products of wood and cork 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 105.8 104.1 78.1
Pulp, paper & paper products 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 104.9 102.1 78.2
Printing & publishing 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 132.1 118.1 91.1
Mineral oil refining, coke & nuclear fuel 0.06 -0.07 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 166.5 78.2 77.4
Chemicals   0.08 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.07 162.8 132.6 90.6
Rubber & plastics 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 212.0 186.6 109.4
Non-metallic mineral products 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 234.9 285.9 163.6
Basic metals -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 103.2 166.2 106.9
Fabricated metal products 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 168.3 189.4 114.8
Mechanical engineering -0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.03 158.4 179.8 123.6
Office machinery 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.21 0.12 67.0 72.3 47.9
Insulated wire 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 142.5 138.3 85.0
Other electrical machinery and aparatus nec 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 190.5 230.4 200.6
Electronic valves and tubes 0.09 0.03 0.23 0.05 0.49 0.10 55.4 30.9 21.2
Telecommunication equipment 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 104.0 73.2 47.0
Radio and television receivers 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 218.2 329.5 250.5
Scientific instruments 0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 91.8 78.4 60.5
Other instruments 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 84.7 102.6 103.8
Motor vehicles 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.05 217.0 229.1 90.6
Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 239.7 179.8 114.5
Aircraft and spacecraft 0.02 0.01 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.01 49.2 39.5 48.3
Railroad equipment and transport equipment ne 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 178.0 210.8 87.2
Furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing; recycli 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 200.5 163.0 98.0
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.06 133.2 114.5 78.9
Construction 0.08 0.09 0.03 -0.02 0.19 0.05 182.6 168.3 86.7
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles  0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 389.0 291.2 240.9
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except  0.26 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.55 0.18 96.3 107.1 66.3
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and moto 0.31 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.50 0.12 88.9 88.7 56.1
Hotels & catering 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.05 128.7 132.6 95.3
Inland transport 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.06 132.5 176.0 106.8
Water transport 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 186.2 183.2 114.0
Air transport 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 67.1 57.1 49.6
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; act 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06 627.0 445.8 341.9
Communications 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.21 0.24 94.6 118.8 79.9
Financial intermediation, except insurance and  0.05 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.21 0.19 188.0 146.4 63.5
Insurance and pension funding, except compuls - 0 . 0 50 . 0 30 . 0 30 . 0 00 . 0 40 . 0 0 7 1 . 89 3 . 44 0 . 3
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.26 0.02 55.9 41.9 23.5
Real estate activities 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.36 0.16 98.2 98.9 76.7
Renting of machinery and equipment 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 236.1 220.7 144.5
Computer and related activities 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.14 179.5 109.0 70.8
Research and development 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 182.8 148.6 77.8
Legal, technical and advertising 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.19 118.1 97.3 81.5
Other business activities, nec 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.15 153.5 114.2 76.7
Public administration and defence; compulsory  0.14 0.13 -0.03 0.07 0.11 0.05 93.2 85.1 60.1
Education 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.06 128.6 115.6 84.6
Health and social work 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.14 122.1 96.3 69.1
Other community, social and personal services 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.10 184.1 171.8 118.9
Private households with employed persons 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 143.5 187.2 165.6
Sum of the intra-industry effects 2.78 2.38 2.07 1.51 4.25 2.72





Source: Own calculations and GGDC 
 
Individual industry contributions are obtained by the multiplication of the specific industry growth rate of value 





























ANNEX 3 : INDUSTRY LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOURLY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY, EMPLOYMENT 
AND OUTPUT TRENDS
62 IN THE EU AND THE US 
  
(1980-2000) 
                                                 
62 Trends are calculated using a HP filter which can result in some beginning / end-of-sample bias. The end-of-
sample bias has been effectively dealt with by extending the series to 2005. Some care must still however be 
taken in interpreting the patterns in the earlier years of the sample.   























1. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL CHANGE IN HOURLY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
 
(COMPARISON OF EU AND US TRENDS : 1980-2000) 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL CHANGE IN LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR 
 - BREAKDOWN INTO MANUFACTURING, PRIVATE SERVICES AND REST OF 
ECONOMY (PRIMARY INDUSTRIES + PUBLIC SERVICES) * 
 
 





















































* The graphs show the contribution to the total change in labour productivity per 
hour i.e. the combined effect of labour productivity growth and the output shares of 
the respective industries. The graphs have all the same scale and are additive (i.e. 
manufacturing + services + rest of economy = total economy). 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO TOTAL CHANGE IN LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  
PER HOUR IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
 (BREAKDOWN INTO ICT PRODUCING, ICT USING AND REST OF 
MANUFACTURING)* 
 



















































* The graphs show the contribution to the total change in labour productivity per 
hour in the manufacturing sector i.e. the combined effect of labour productivity 
growth and the output shares of the respective industries. The graphs have all the 
same scale and are additive (i.e. ICT producing + ICT using + rest of 
manufacturing = total manufacturing). 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO TOTAL CHANGE IN LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  
PER HOUR IN THE SERVICES SECTOR 
 (BREAKDOWN INTO ICT PRODUCING, ICT USING AND REST OF SERVICES)* 
 











































* The graphs show the contribution to the total change in labour productivity per 
hour in the services sector i.e. the combined effect of labour productivity growth 
and the output shares of the respective industries. The graphs have all the same 
scale and are additive (i.e. ICT producing + ICT using + rest of services = total 
services). 






















2. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT (HOURS WORKED) 
 
(COMPARISON OF EU AND US TRENDS : 1980-2000) 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT (HOURS WORKED) 
 - BREAKDOWN INTO MANUFACTURING, PRIVATE SERVICES AND REST OF 
ECONOMY (PRIMARY INDUSTRIES + PUBLIC SERVICES) * 
 













































* The graphs show the contribution to the total change in employment i.e. the 
combined effect of employment growth and the output shares of the respective 
industries. The graphs have all the same scale and are additive (i.e. manufacturing 
+ services + rest of economy = total economy). 
 
- 91 -  
 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT (HOURS WORKED) 
 IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
 (BREAKDOWN INTO ICT PRODUCING, ICT USING AND REST OF 
MANUFACTURING)* 
 



























































* The graphs show the contribution to the total change in employment in the 
manufacturing sector i.e. the combined effect of employment growth and the output 
shares of the respective industries. The graphs have all the same scale and are 
additive (i.e. ICT producing + ICT using + rest of manufacturing = total 
manufacturing). 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO TOTAL CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT (HOURS WORKED) IN THE 
SERVICES SECTOR 
 (BREAKDOWN INTO ICT PRODUCING, ICT USING AND REST OF SERVICES)* 
 















































* The graphs show the contribution to the total change in employment in the 
services sector i.e. the combined effect of employment growth and the output shares 
of the respective industries. The graphs have all the same scale and are additive 
(i.e. ICT producing + ICT using + rest of services = total services). 
 























CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL CHANGE IN OUTPUT (VALUE ADDED) 
 
(COMPARISON OF EU AND US TRENDS :  1980-2000) 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL CHANGE IN OUTPUT (VALUE ADDED) 
 - BREAKDOWN INTO MANUFACTURING, PRIVATE SERVICES AND REST OF 
ECONOMY (PRIMARY INDUSTRIES + PUBLIC SERVICES) * 
 












































* The graphs show the contribution to the total change in output i.e. the combined 
effect of output growth and the output shares of the respective industries. The 
graphs have all the same scale and are additive (i.e. manufacturing + services + 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO TOTAL CHANGE IN OUTPUT (VALUE ADDED) 
 IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
 (BREAKDOWN INTO ICT PRODUCING, ICT USING AND REST OF 
MANUFACTURING)* 
 


























































* The graphs show the contribution to the total change in output in the 
manufacturing sector i.e. the combined effect of output growth and the output 
shares of the respective industries. The graphs have all the same scale and are 
additive (i.e. ICT producing + ICT using + rest of manufacturing = total 
manufacturing). 
 
- 96 -  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO TOTAL CHANGE IN OUTPUT (VALUE ADDED) IN THE SERVICES 
SECTOR 
 (BREAKDOWN INTO ICT PRODUCING, ICT USING AND REST OF SERVICES)* 
 


























































* The graphs show the contribution to the total change in output in the services 
sector i.e. the combined effect of output growth and the output shares of the 
respective industries. The graphs have all the same scale and are additive (i.e. ICT 
producing + ICT using + rest of services = total services). 
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ANNEX 4 : INDUSTRY LEVEL ANALYSIS : DATA FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EU MEMBER STATES 
 
 








1980 1990 1995 1980-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000
TOTAL ECONOMY Belgium 2.6% 2.5% 2.2% 111 2.6% 2.5% 2.2%
Denmark 2.2% 1.9% 1.4% 111 2.2% 1.9% 1.4%
Germany 2.1% 2.4% 2.0% 111 2.1% 2.4% 2.0%
Greece 1.0% 0.8% 2.6% 111 1.0% 0.8% 2.6%
Spain 3.1% 1.7% 0.5% 111 3.1% 1.7% 0.5%
France 3.0% 1.5% 1.4% 111 3.0% 1.5% 1.4%
Ireland 4.5% 4.1% 7.6% 111 4.5% 4.1% 7.6%
Italy 2.1% 2.3% 0.7% 111 2.1% 2.3% 0.7%
Luxembourg 3.7% 2.2% 1.5% 111 3.7% 2.2% 1.5%
Netherlands 2.3% 1.4% 1.3% 111 2.3% 1.4% 1.3%
Austria 2.8% 3.8% 2.7% 111 2.8% 3.8% 2.7%
Portugal 3.1% 2.1% 3.0% 111 3.1% 2.1% 3.0%
Finland 3.1% 2.9% 2.2% 111 3.1% 2.9% 2.2%
Sweden 1.6% 2.0% 2.1% 111 1.6% 2.0% 2.1%
UK 2.1% 3.1% 2.2% 111 2.1% 3.1% 2.2%
EU15 2.4% 2.3% 1.6% 111 2.4% 2.3% 1.6%
USA 1.1% 1.1% 2.3% 111 1.1% 1.1% 2.3%
NON-FARM-BUSINESS Belgium 3.5% 2.5% 2.8% 0.71 0.75 0.74 2.5% 1.9% 2.1%
Denmark 2.1% 1.6% 1.9% 0.68 0.69 0.69 1.4% 1.1% 1.3%
Germany 2.4% 2.5% 2.3% 0.76 0.77 0.77 1.8% 1.9% 1.7%
Greece 1.2% 0.4% 3.1% 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.9% 0.3% 2.2%
Spain 3.2% 1.8% 0.0% 0.73 0.73 0.74 2.4% 1.3% 0.0%
France 3.2% 1.8% 1.3% 0.75 0.75 0.73 2.4% 1.4% 1.0%
Ireland 4.6% 4.5% 8.4% 0.71 0.71 0.71 3.3% 3.2% 6.0%
Italy 2.3% 2.5% 0.6% 0.77 0.76 0.77 1.7% 1.9% 0.4%
Luxembourg 3.6% 2.1% 1.6% 0.82 0.81 0.82 3.0% 1.7% 1.3%
Netherlands 3.0% 1.3% 1.7% 0.64 0.69 0.71 1.9% 0.9% 1.2%
Austria 3.3% 3.9% 3.1% 0.74 0.75 0.75 2.4% 2.9% 2.4%
Portugal 2.9% 2.0% 3.3% 0.71 0.72 0.71 2.1% 1.4% 2.3%
Finland 3.4% 4.3% 2.1% 0.72 0.71 0.72 2.5% 3.0% 1.5%
Sweden 2.2% 3.0% 1.7% 0.68 0.70 0.72 1.5% 2.1% 1.2%
UK 2.9% 3.3% 2.6% 0.72 0.75 0.74 2.1% 2.5% 1.9%
EU15 2.7% 2.5% 1.7% 0.74 0.75 0.75 2.0% 1.8% 1.3%
USA 1.6% 1.7% 3.1% 0.72 0.72 0.73 1.1% 1.2% 2.3%
REST Belgium 0.7% 2.5% 0.9% 0.29 0.25 0.26 0.2% 0.6% 0.2%
Denmark 2.5% 2.6% 0.6% 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.8% 0.8% 0.2%
Germany 1.2% 2.3% 1.0% 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.3% 0.5% 0.2%
Greece 0.5% 1.4% 1.0% 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.1% 0.4% 0.3%
Spain 3.0% 1.4% 1.0% 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.8% 0.4% 0.3%
France 2.5% 1.5% 1.3% 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.6% 0.4% 0.3%
Ireland 4.3% 2.9% 2.7% 0.29 0.29 0.29 1.2% 0.8% 0.8%
Italy 1.4% 1.8% 0.7% 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.3% 0.4% 0.2%
Luxembourg 4.0% 2.6% 0.6% 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.7% 0.5% 0.1%
Netherlands 1.2% 1.6% 0.4% 0.36 0.31 0.29 0.4% 0.5% 0.1%
Austria 1.7% 3.6% 1.0% 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.4% 0.9% 0.3%
Portugal 3.4% 2.6% 1.9% 0.29 0.28 0.29 1.0% 0.7% 0.6%
Finland 2.2% 0.9% 1.3% 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.6% 0.3% 0.4%
Sweden 0.5% 0.1% 2.7% 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.2% 0.0% 0.7%
UK 0.4% 2.7% 1.2% 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.1% 0.7% 0.3%
EU15 1.6% 2.0% 1.1% 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.4% 0.5% 0.3%
USA 0.2% -0.3% -0.1% 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.0% -0.1% 0.0%
Contribution to total Hourly Labour 
Productivity growth
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1980 1990 1995 1980-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000
MANUFACTURING Belgium 6.0% 3.4% 4.2% 0.23 0.22 0.20 1.4% 0.8% 0.8%
Denmark 2.1% 3.0% 2.9% 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.4% 0.5% 0.5%
Germany 2.6% 3.0% 2.0% 0.30 0.28 0.23 0.8% 0.8% 0.4%
Greece 0.5% 2.2% 2.4% 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.1% 0.3% 0.3%
Spain 5.9% 3.8% 0.7% 0.26 0.19 0.19 1.5% 0.7% 0.1%
France 2.9% 3.5% 3.3% 0.25 0.20 0.18 0.7% 0.7% 0.6%
Ireland 11.3% 8.6% 17.3% 0.22 0.28 0.30 2.5% 2.4% 5.2%
Italy 3.9% 3.6% 1.1% 0.29 0.23 0.22 1.1% 0.9% 0.2%
Luxembourg 4.7% 5.0% 2.7% 0.22 0.20 0.13 1.0% 1.0% 0.4%
Netherlands 4.5% 4.0% 2.0% 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.8% 0.7% 0.3%
Austria 4.6% 5.5% 5.0% 0.24 0.22 0.20 1.1% 1.2% 1.0%
Portugal 3.0% 2.9% 5.6% 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.7% 0.6% 1.1%
Finland 5.3% 5.7% 4.2% 0.27 0.22 0.25 1.5% 1.3% 1.0%
Sweden 3.9% 4.3% 1.7% 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.9% 0.9% 0.4%
UK 5.8% 4.8% 2.9% 0.27 0.23 0.21 1.6% 1.1% 0.6%
EU15 3.9% 3.7% 2.6% 0.26 0.23 0.21 1.0% 0.9% 0.5%
USA 3.6% 3.6% 4.6% 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.8% 0.7% 0.8%
ICTproducing MANU Belgium 15.4% 7.1% 6.3% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
Denmark 11.3% 7.4% 3.2% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
Germany 10.2% 5.6% 12.2% 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
Greece 21.2% 11.7% 7.3% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Spain 21.2% 11.0% 13.0% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
France 13.5% 8.2% 12.2% 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.3% 0.1% 0.2%
Ireland 29.5% 19.6% 44.2% 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.5% 0.8% 2.5%
Italy 17.7% 7.3% 5.2% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
Luxembourg 11.3% -6.4% 1.6% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Netherlands 10.0% 5.0% -1.5% 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.2% 0.1% 0.0%
Austria 16.3% 8.0% 9.2% 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
Portugal 24.4% 22.0% 10.8% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
Finland 21.8% 8.7% 12.8% 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.2% 0.1% 0.3%
Sweden 18.1% 7.4% -5.6% 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.3% 0.1% -0.1%
UK 21.3% 21.3% 24.3% 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.4% 0.3% 0.4%
EU15 13.9% 9.6% 17.1% 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
USA 16.2% 16.4% 26.0% 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.4% 0.4% 0.7%
ICTusing MANU Belgium 4.1% 4.0% 4.8% 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Denmark 1.2% 2.6% 1.3% 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.1% 0.2% 0.1%
Germany 1.6% 1.6% 2.3% 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Greece 0.7% 0.9% 2.8% 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
Spain 4.7% 2.7% 1.7% 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
France 3.0% 3.0% 2.2% 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.2% 0.2% 0.1%
Ireland 5.6% 6.2% 13.9% 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.3% 0.4% 1.0%
Italy 2.0% 4.1% 1.5% 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.2% 0.3% 0.1%
Luxembourg 5.4% 1.2% -2.8% 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.2% 0.0% -0.1%
Netherlands 4.0% 2.9% 2.9% 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.2% 0.2% 0.1%
Austria 4.3% 3.6% 4.8% 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.3% 0.2% 0.3%
Portugal 1.8% 3.6% 3.9% 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
Finland 4.8% 4.9% 1.5% 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.4% 0.4% 0.1%
Sweden 1.7% 4.4% 1.4% 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.1% 0.3% 0.1%
UK 4.7% 2.6% 0.7% 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.4% 0.2% 0.1%
EU15 2.8% 2.6% 2.0% 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.2% 0.2% 0.1%
USA 0.8% -0.6% 1.4% 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
nonICT MANU Belgium 5.9% 2.9% 3.9% 0.17 0.17 0.15 1.0% 0.5% 0.6%
Denmark 1.7% 2.7% 3.9% 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%
Germany 2.3% 3.5% 0.7% 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.4% 0.6% 0.1%
Greece -0.3% 2.5% 1.9% 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.0% 0.2% 0.2%
Spain 5.4% 3.7% -0.1% 0.18 0.14 0.14 1.0% 0.5% 0.0%
France 1.4% 3.2% 2.6% 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.2% 0.4% 0.3%
Ireland 9.4% 6.3% 9.9% 0.15 0.17 0.18 1.4% 1.1% 1.7%
Italy 3.7% 3.2% 0.5% 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.7% 0.5% 0.1%
Luxembourg 4.6% 6.4% 4.2% 0.19 0.16 0.10 0.9% 1.0% 0.4%
Netherlands 3.9% 4.3% 2.2% 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.5% 0.5% 0.2%
Austria 3.5% 6.0% 4.6% 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.6% 0.8% 0.6%
Portugal 2.3% 1.8% 5.8% 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.4% 0.3% 0.8%
Finland 4.5% 5.6% 2.4% 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.8% 0.8% 0.4%
Sweden 2.9% 3.8% 2.9% 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.4% 0.5% 0.4%
UK 4.5% 3.9% 1.2% 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.8% 0.5% 0.1%
EU15 3.2% 3.6% 1.6% 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.5% 0.5% 0.2%
USA 2.4% 2.6% 0.6% 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.3% 0.3% 0.1%
Contribution to total Hourly Labour 
Productivity growth
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1980 1990 1995 1980-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000
SERVICES Belgium 2.3% 2.1% 2.3% 0.48 0.52 0.54 1.1% 1.1% 1.2%
Denmark 2.0% 1.2% 1.3% 0.50 0.52 0.52 1.0% 0.6% 0.7%
Germany 2.2% 1.9% 2.3% 0.46 0.49 0.54 1.0% 0.9% 1.2%
Greece 1.3% -0.6% 3.0% 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.7% -0.3% 1.7%
Spain 1.9% 1.1% -0.3% 0.47 0.54 0.56 0.9% 0.6% -0.1%
France 3.3% 1.2% 0.6% 0.50 0.55 0.55 1.6% 0.6% 0.3%
Ireland 0.9% 1.8% 3.1% 0.49 0.43 0.41 0.4% 0.8% 1.3%
Italy 1.2% 1.9% 0.2% 0.48 0.53 0.55 0.6% 1.0% 0.1%
Luxembourg 3.2% 1.4% 1.2% 0.60 0.61 0.69 1.9% 0.9% 0.8%
Netherlands 2.4% 0.3% 1.6% 0.46 0.50 0.53 1.1% 0.2% 0.9%
Austria 2.5% 3.1% 2.4% 0.50 0.53 0.55 1.2% 1.6% 1.3%
Portugal 2.7% 1.3% 2.1% 0.49 0.52 0.51 1.3% 0.7% 1.1%
Finland 2.4% 3.6% 1.1% 0.45 0.49 0.47 1.1% 1.7% 0.5%
Sweden 1.3% 2.5% 1.7% 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.6% 1.2% 0.9%
UK 1.7% 2.9% 2.7% 0.45 0.52 0.53 0.7% 1.5% 1.4%
EU15 2.0% 1.9% 1.4% 0.47 0.52 0.54 1.0% 1.0% 0.7%
USA 0.8% 1.0% 2.7% 0.49 0.53 0.54 0.4% 0.5% 1.5%
ICTproducing SVCES Belgium 4.1% 2.0% 8.6% 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.1% 0.1% 0.3%
Denmark 5.1% 7.7% 6.4% 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.1% 0.3% 0.2%
Germany 4.6% 6.3% 12.7% 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.1% 0.2% 0.4%
Greece 4.3% 3.9% 7.5% 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Spain 2.6% 1.8% 2.5% 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
France 5.6% 1.3% 5.3% 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.2% 0.0% 0.2%
Ireland 0.0% 10.9% 2.9% 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.0% 0.5% 0.1%
Italy 3.2% 5.6% 6.1% 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
Luxembourg 6.9% 8.8% 4.4% 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.2% 0.3% 0.2%
Netherlands 2.1% 1.4% 4.3% 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Austria 4.1% 6.3% 2.0% 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.1% 0.2% 0.1%
Portugal 9.3% 8.1% 6.0% 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
Finland 4.2% 3.8% 7.5% 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Sweden 3.6% 6.2% 4.3% 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
UK 3.7% 6.2% 5.6% 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
EU15 4.1% 4.8% 6.8% 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
USA 2.1% 2.4% 0.8% 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
ICTusing SVCES Belgium 2.1% 3.0% 0.5% 0.24 0.28 0.29 0.5% 0.9% 0.2%
Denmark 2.8% 0.6% 3.5% 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.5% 0.1% 0.7%
Germany 2.3% 2.9% 2.2% 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.4% 0.5% 0.4%
Greece -0.5% -2.1% 3.7% 0.15 0.15 0.17 -0.1% -0.3% 0.6%
Spain 1.9% -1.0% 0.2% 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.3% -0.2% 0.0%
France 4.3% 0.9% 0.9% 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.8% 0.2% 0.2%
Ireland 1.9% -0.4% 2.5% 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.4% -0.1% 0.5%
Italy 0.5% 2.2% 1.5% 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.1% 0.5% 0.3%
Luxembourg 3.1% 2.2% 1.8% 0.35 0.28 0.36 1.1% 0.6% 0.6%
Netherlands 2.5% 0.4% 2.5% 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.5% 0.1% 0.6%
Austria 3.2% 3.7% 2.8% 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.6% 0.8% 0.6%
Portugal 2.8% 0.1% 1.6% 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.7% 0.0% 0.4%
Finland 3.4% 0.5% 3.3% 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.5% 0.1% 0.5%
Sweden 2.4% 2.3% 3.4% 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.4% 0.4% 0.6%
UK 2.1% 2.4% 4.5% 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.3% 0.5% 0.9%
EU15 2.2% 1.8% 2.1% 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
USA 1.6% 1.6% 5.3% 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.3% 0.4% 1.3%
nonICT Services Belgium 2.2% 1.1% 3.6% 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.5% 0.2% 0.8%
Denmark 1.3% 0.7% -0.9% 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.4% 0.2% -0.2%
Germany 1.9% 0.6% 1.1% 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.5% 0.2% 0.3%
Greece 2.2% 0.0% 2.3% 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.8% 0.0% 0.8%
Spain 1.8% 2.1% -1.0% 0.30 0.34 0.35 0.6% 0.7% -0.3%
France 2.5% 1.4% -0.2% 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.7% 0.4% -0.1%
Ireland -0.4% 2.7% 3.5% 0.23 0.16 0.16 -0.1% 0.4% 0.6%
Italy 1.7% 1.5% -1.6% 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.4% 0.4% -0.5%
Luxembourg 3.0% 0.8% -0.1% 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.7% 0.2% 0.0%
Netherlands 2.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.6% 0.1% 0.1%
Austria 1.8% 2.3% 2.1% 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.5% 0.7% 0.6%
Portugal 2.0% 1.9% 2.2% 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.4% 0.4% 0.5%
Finland 1.8% 5.4% -0.3% 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.5% 1.6% -0.1%
Sweden 0.4% 2.5% 0.3% 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.1% 0.7% 0.1%
UK 1.2% 3.0% 1.0% 0.26 0.30 0.29 0.3% 0.9% 0.3%
EU15 1.7% 1.7% 0.2% 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.5% 0.5% 0.1%
USA -0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
Contribution to total Hourly Labour 
Productivity growth
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ANNEX 5 : TOTAL ECONOMY LEVEL ANALYSIS : LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
PER PERSON EMPLOYED 
 
 














GDP   3.4 3.2 3.1 2.4 4.0 3.2 
EMPLOYMENT  2.4 2.1 1.8 1.1 2.0 1.3 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
(PER PERSON EMPLOYED) 
1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 2.0 1.9 
(TFP)  (0.7) (0.8) (1.1) (0.9) (1.5) (1.2) 
(CAPITAL DEEPENING)  (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.5) (0.7) 
EU15 
GDP   5.0 3.2 2.4 1.7 2.6 2.2 
EMPLOYMENT  0.3 0.3 0.7 -0.2 1.4 1.2 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
(PER PERSON EMPLOYED) 
4.7 2.9 1.7 1.9 1.2 1.0 
(TFP)  (3.2) (1.8) (1.1) (1.0) (0.9) (0.7) 
(CAPITAL DEEPENING)  (1.5) (1.1) (0.6) (0.9) (0.3) (0.3) 
 
 
GRAPH 1 : TREND GDP GROWTH  

















- 101 -  
GRAPH 2 :  BREAKDOWN OF TREND GDP INTO TREND EMPLOYMENT + TREND 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (PER PERSON EMPLOYED) 






















GRAPH 3 : BREAKDOWN OF TREND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (PER PERSON 
EMPLOYED) INTO CAPITAL DEEPENING AND TFP 
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* Labour productivity per person employed (labour productivity per hour worked figures are 
given in Table 3 in the main text). 
TABLE 2 : DECOMPOSITION OF AVERAGE GDP GROWTH RATES
1996-2000  1996-2002  1981-1990 1991-1995
BELGIUM 
GDP  2.7  2.1  2.0 1.6
EMPLOYMENT  1.2  1.0  0.1 0.5
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY*  1.5  1.1  1.9 1.0
DENMARK 
GDP  2.7  2.3  1.6 2.0
EMPLOYMENT  1.1  0.7  0.3 0.0
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  1.6  1.6  1.2 2.0
GERMANY 
GDP  1.8  1.4  2.3 1.6
EMPLOYMENT  0.7  0.5  1.0 1.9
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  1.1  0.9  1.3 -0.3
GREECE 
GDP  3.4  3.5  0.7 1.2
EMPLOYMENT  0.6  0.3  1.0 0.6
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  2.8  3.2  -0.3 0.7
SPAIN 
GDP  3.8  3.3  2.9 1.5
EMPLOYMENT  2.9  2.6  1.1 -0.3
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  0.8  0.7  1.8 1.8
FRANCE 
GDP  2.6  2.4  2.4 1.1
EMPLOYMENT  1.4  1.3  0.3 -0.1
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  1.3  1.0  2.1 1.2
IRELAND 
GDP  9.3  8.3  3.5 4.6
EMPLOYMENT  5.5  4.6  -0.2 1.9
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  3.8  3.7  3.7 2.7
ITALY 
GDP  1.9  1.7  2.2 1.3
EMPLOYMENT  1.0  1.2  0.6 -0.6
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  0.9  0.5  1.7 1.8
NETHERLANDS 
GDP  3.6  2.8  2.2 2.1
EMPLOYMENT  2.6  2.2  1.1 1.3
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  1.1  0.6  1.1 0.8
AUSTRIA 
GDP  2.7  2.2  2.4 2.0
EMPLOYMENT  0.6  0.5  0.2 0.2
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  2.1  1.7  2.2 1.9
PORTUGAL 
GDP  3.8  3.0  3.2 1.7
EMPLOYMENT  1.9  1.6  0.2 -0.6
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  1.9  1.4  3.0 2.2
FINLAND 
GDP  4.7  3.7  3.1 -0.6
EMPLOYMENT  2.2  1.8  0.5 -3.7
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  2.5  1.9  2.6 3.1
SWEDEN 
GDP  3.2  2.7  2.2 1.3
EMPLOYMENT  0.8  0.9  0.7 -2.1
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  2.4  1.9  1.4 3.4
UK 
GDP  2.9  2.6  2.6 1.7
EMPLOYMENT  1.3  1.1  0.7 -1.0
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY  1.5  1.5  1.9 2.7
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